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According to Professor Trevor-Roper, John Pym
was in the habit of calling on the Scots to aid the Long
Parliament’s cause and of dismissing them when he had done
1
with their services. Whatever the truth of this claim, 
most of the historians of the Great Rebellion have followed 
the example of Trevor-Roper’s John Pym, and have 
peremptorily summoned and dismissed the Scots as it suited 
the requirements of their narrative* For this, however, 
historians of the great contest between King and Parliament 
ought not to be blamed. After all, the object of their 
scholarship is the working out of that conflict, and the 
drama of the events depends very much upon the close combat 
between King and ’Country’. The Scots are but one ingredient 
in a complex of rival forces; and at times the significance 
of the Scots to the narrative is greater than at others. To 
the history of the Great Rebellion, particularly during its 
early years, the Scots are but a shade of colour employed 
to develop the grand canvas upon which the general 
historian works.
The treatment of the Scots in these early stages 
of the rebellion is episodic. It is a treatment which, 
though suiting the purposes of general history, is not 
necessarily appropriate to understanding the import of this 
single factor in the melee of the early ^^fO’s. Such is the 
task of an history thesis: to highlight the issues half-
1. H. R. Trevor-Roper, ’Scotland and the Puritan Revolution', 
Historical Essays 1600-1750« ed. H. E. Bell and R. L. 
Allard, London, 1963, 89*
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forgotten in the writing of great historical narratives. 
There has yet to be described the Scottish factor in these 
tumultuous events.
Most historians recognise that the parliamentary
side sought to gain some advantage from having a Scottish2
army on English soil. Some historians recognise that
parliamentary affection for the Scots fluctuated, and that
3it differed from one group to another. Historians generally 
recognise that Parliament did much to detain the King from 
his Scotward journey, in August 16M, lest Parliament be 
deprived of those advantages the Scots had provided 
hitherto. Most historians perceive that parliamentary 
affection for the Scots was not simple and grateful but
2. Clarendon is the arch-exponent of this thesis. See his 
History of the Rebellion, ii, 27; iii, 23, ^3, 73—^ 9 
91-2, 219, 221, 226, 23^. See also: S. Reed Brett, John 
Pym, London, 19*+0, I82ff.; Godfrey Davies, The Early 
Stuarts, 160V1660. Oxford, 1937, 91; S. R. Gardiner, 
History of England, London, 190*+, ix, 219, 226; John 
Richard Green, History of the English People, London, 
1879, iii, 205; David Hume, History of Great Britain 
(The Reigns of James I and Charles I), ed. Duncan Forbes, 
London, 1970, 397, Vl2-3; F. C. Montague, History of 
England from the Accession of James the First to the 
Restoration, London, 1907, 232, 237; Ivan Roots, The 
Great Rebellion. London, i96o, 28-9, 315 3*S *+6-8; H. R. 
Trevor-Roper, op. cit., 79; C. E. Wade, John Pym, London, 
1912, 18*+; C. V. Wedgwood, The King’s Peace. London,
1971, 369ff# Neither Macaulay nor Trevelyan has anything 
noteworthy to say about English attitudes towards the 
Scots.
3. Gardiner, op. cit., 29*+-7, 300-1, 376-7; Brett, op. cit., 
182-3; J. H.. Hexter, The Reign of King Pym, London, 19^1, 
28-9; Montague, op. cit.. 2Mo-7s Wedgwood, op. ^ cit., 
*+06ff. All historians consulted agree that a dislike of 
Presbyterianism occasioned some change in the attitude of 
Parliament to the Scots. Often, however, this conclusion 
is implicit in their comments on the subject of religion, 
rather than explicitly stated.
b. See any general history of the civil war.
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inlaid with misgivings. This betrayed itself especially on
5
the subject of religion, which was so natural a part of the 
parliamentary sense of the Scots that it was only the dire 
strait of near defeat that compelled Parliament to seek, 
in 16^3? Scotland’s military aid.
It seems to me that the general historians are
right in much of what they say about parliamentary attitudes
toward the Scots. However, their statements are a gloss.
They have not sought to detail the history of that relationship
and they have not attempted seriously to understand and
explain the fluctuations in the Long Parliament’s attitudes
toward the Scots from its opening to the making of the
Solemn League and Covenant. For instance, by being content
to observe simply that military pressures forced Parliament
7
into alliance with the Covenanters, historians fail to 
provide an adequate account of the considerations Parliament 
made when contemplating the proposed measure. Because of 
this oversight historians tend to underestimate the 
controversial nature of Scottish issues. On examination, 
much of the writing about parliamentary attitudes toward 
the Scots appears to be derived from a cursory examination
5. See above, Note 3* See also C. Hill, Society and Puritanism 
in Pre-Revolutionary England, London, 196^,212-^3.
6. Most historians do not delve into the debate of the 
proposed Scottish alliance in 16^3* They are usually satisfied to record simply that English prejudices against 
the Scots we re overcome when defeat threatened. See: 
Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War. 16k2-J\6*+9«
London, 1905. i. 177-8: Green, op. cit.«226-7: Hobbes, 
Bohemoth, ed. William Molesworth, New York, 15o; Hume, op. 
cit.,' 5^9: Sir John A. R. Marriot, The Crisis of English 
Liberty, Oxford, 1930, 21^; Montague, op. cit.. 289: C. V.. 
V/. Wedgwood, The King1 s War. London, 1970, 229ff.; Wade, 
op. cit., 306.
7* See above, Note 6.
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of the Scottish question in the early years of the Long 
Parliament.
Why should one attempt to probe the matter more
deeply? Historians of the period open their work with England
nearly prostrate before their Scottish saviours out of
gratitude for their stand against the Court. London, we are
8
told, celebrated the Scottish invasion as its own victory.
But not one historian has any difficulty in passing from
England’s salutation of the Scots to hinting darkly at
9
England’s suspicions. Almost every one of them seems 
determined to drain from his narrative any suggestion of 
English affection for their ’Brethren the Scots’, until 
each becomes as hard-headed about the Solemn League and 
Covenant as were Pym or Vane. There is no love at the 
bottom of it, but all Adwalton Moor and Roundway Down.
Again, I think the historians are justified in recording 
this dichotomy; and I appreciate that there is little room 
in their work for describing how Englishmen moved from the 
warm embrace of 16HO to the cool calculation of 16^ +3• They 
do not have the space to analyse adequately those prejudices 
which had to be overcome before Parliament was ready openly 
to align itself militarily with the Scots. But, however 
true and faithful be the record of historians, they have 
left some explaining to be done.
8. Gardiner, History of England, ix, 205; Davies, op. cit.,
95.9. The exception to this is Gardiner; and I deal specifically 
with him below.
XThe real historical problem left by the general
historian is one of proportion. The question crucial to this
thesis is: what significance does one place upon the Scots
in the preoccupations of the Long Parliament? This problem
is best illustrated in the work of Samuel Rawson Gardiner.
He, of all the students of that time, treats the Scottish
problem most extensively. It is he who describes in greatest
detail the growing coolness and even distrust of Parliament
10
for the Scots. He reveals that some were more willing than
others to cultivate and even promote the Scots; and that
these differences eventually issued in a heated outburst in 
11
the Commons. Yet, in his revealing summary of those
revolutionary events, written as an Introduction to his
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, he
treats the Scots as scantily as any. Of course this
Introduction is only a summary account of the important
issues in the conflict, but precisely for this reason it
reveals that Gardiner inclines not to hold the Scots of much
account in the concerns of Parliament men. But having skirted
the problem, he has not escaped it. Later in the same
Introduction he is compelled to observe that the Solemn
League and Covenant was yet another obstacle to reconciling
12
the parties into which England had divided. So the Scots, 
then, were of some significance in Gardiner’s account of 
that great breach in the English polity; but he has either 
underestimated the degree or not weighed it at all— a curious
10. Gardiner, loc. cit., 29*+-7, 300-1 , 376-7.
11 . ibid., 29V ^ r
12. S. R. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan 
Revolution, 3rd. ed., Oxford, 1906, xli. ~~
oversight when one considers that the Scottish question 
occupied the Parliament almost daily from 3 November l6*+0 
to the first recess beginning on 9 September 16M-1 •
Gardiner seems, therefore, to have raised the
tantalising problem of the Scots only to let it slip for
the sake of developing his thesis that 17th Century England
witnessed a puritan revolution. He is insistent that
Parliament, once so united, divided chiefly over the matter
of religion; and that, had it not been for this issue, the
Parliament might have disposed of Charles, as they were
later to dispose of his son in 1688, without the attendant
13horrors of civil war. Indeed, the dividing of the 
Parliament into warring factions has been a problem that 
has tested the wits of every historian of the Rebellion; 
and, like Gardiner, by overlooking the significance of the 
Scots, they all appear to have missed the first signs of a 
division that was the making of a generation of strife, and 
the origins of a problem that did so much to render the 
parliamentary cause so sluggish in war.
Gardiner dated the formation of the parties from 
September 16*+1, when in the closing days of the first session 
of the Long Parliament, the debate on religious policy was 
renewed, and the attack on the Prayer Book commenced. This 
attack, wrote Gardiner, !was the commencement of the Civil 
V/ar. There was now the possibility that Charles might find
13* Gardiner, History of England, x, 11-13*
a party not only in Parliament bat in the nation. 1 But if,
15as Gardiner elsewhere suggests, Scottish involvement in 
English affairs was to provide an occasion of enmity between 
Englishmen, then, even in the early months of 16V|, the 
Scots were dividing members of parliament and were giving 
to future royalists an opportunity to identify like-minded 
gentlemen with whom they would soon be in arms. Serious 
divisions had appeared in the Parliament long before the 
debates on the Prayer Book. Already, by March of 16VI, men 
were looking upon one another with suspicion and were 
rallying on the floor of the House in the same company as 
they were to rally on fields of battle. The cause of this 
hostility was a Scottish army on English soil.
This is not to say that Charles had a party 
ready to war at his side; but it is to say that the 
division out of which a royalist party would emerge was 
already apparent. The issue was not religion so much as a 
Scottish army. The very circumstances in which the Long 
Parliament was called were so unusual, so shocking, and so 
humiliating that even from its earliest days they gave 
rise to a problem which was to bedevil the entire course 
of the rebellion.
The aim of this thesis, then, is to affirm the 
consequence of the Scots in the affairs of Parliament by 
tracing the evolution of parliamentary attitudes towards
1M-. ibid., 1 5*




them from their welcome invasion of 16 -^0, through those 
events which rendered relations with them so business-like, 
to the Solemn League and Covenant itself. In the course of 
seeking to test and explain the commonly accepted 
assumptions about parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots,
I will argue that the general historians have underestimated 
the significance of the Scottish element in the making of 
events from November 16^ +0 to the Solemn League and Covenant; 
and that the Scots were fundamental to the political, and 
later military, strategy of the reforming party. The Scots 
not only provided the occasion for the reform so warmly 
desired in England, but they also opened the first cracks 
in Parliament's unity, and, thereafter, continued to 
highlight the emerging division even after they had 
withdrawn from England and when their support was needed in 
Ireland. As the struggle with Charles intensified in early 
16 -^2 and each party cast about for allies, the importance 
of the Scots in the English troubles, and particularly to 
the parliamentary party, was re-emphasised. In war, however, 
a conflict over Scottish policy, which mirrored the earlier 
disputes between the embryonic rebel and royalist parties, 
arose between factions of the parliamentary party. This 
protracted struggle, between those who desired a military 
alliance with Scotland, and those who preferred to compound 
with the King rather than seek Scottish aid, was not 
resolved for nearly a year, and contributed much to 
delaying the formation of the League with the Covenanters.
It is appropriate to point out that there are some
xiv
things with which this thesis is not concerned. Firstly, 
this work does not treat specifically the Long Parliament’s 
attitudes towards Scottish Presbyterianism. To raise this 
as an issue to be discussed in its own right would be to 
raise a question about the nature of English Civil War 
Protestantism which cannot be dealt with within the scope 
of this thesis. My work here is not concerned with what 
Parliament thought about Presbyterianism as a religious option, 
so much as with the political issue of how Parliament 
perceived the relationship of the Scots to its own struggle 
with the Croxm. Where this relationship is complicated by 
the aggressive Presbyterianism of the Scots, I touch upon 
religious influences; just as, where the relationship is 
complicated by constitutional problems, I touch upon 
constitutional influences. Moreover, quite apart from these 
considerations, there is the additional one of there being 
insufficient evidence upon which to base a full analysis of 
parliamentary attitudes toward Presbyterianism during the 
period under discussion. Further than observing that 
Parliament, at this time, was reluctant to adopt Scottish 
Presbyterianism, we cannot go.
Secondly, it is not the task of this thesis to 
deal with the Solemn League and Covenant itself, nor with 
the negotiations leading to it. My analysis ends with the 
defeat of the Peace Party and of opposition to the proposed 
alliance with the Scots on 5-7 August 16^ -3. The League itself, 
and the negotiations for it, are the points at which 
historians usually begin seriously to discuss Anglo-Scottish
XV
relations, because they see the Covenant as the beginning 
of an important new phase in the politics of the Civil 
War. Thus they have examined the content and implications 
of the negotiations and of the League in such detail that I 
do not think I can add profitably to their work on this 
score. However, I believe that I can contribute to our 
understanding of how the alliance became at all possible. 
This is a question which is not adequately understood simply 
because, as I have indicated, historians have neglected to 
study parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots prior to the 
formation of the Solemn League and Covenant. As we regard 
the Civil War with hindsight, we see how obvious and natural 
an ally were the Scots to the parliamentary cause, 
especially in the dark days of 16 +^3• But what seems obvious 
to us now was not so at the time. The issue of Scottish 
policy was not settled as simply as v/e might think; and by 
neglecting to question our assumptions on this matter, we 
fail to appreciate that the Solemn League and Covenant 
signalled the end of a struggle that had been hard fought 
since November 161+0.
Although this thesis deals with parliamentary 
attitudes toward the Scots, the discussion cannot properly 
begin until we have discussed briefly the immediate results 
of the Scottish invasion of England which began on 20 August 
16U0. This invasion and the ensuing negotiations at Ripon 
gave to the Long Parliament not simply the direct cause of
its calling; it also precipitated those conflicts with which 
my study begins.
It is well known that Charles' particular attempt
to impose a Laudian settlement upon the Presbyterian Scots
failed. Instead, he managed to provoke a fierce rebellion
against his royal authority. Ultimately, the Covenanters
felt obliged to invade England to pre-empt an attempt by
Charles to impose his will by force. The royal army, though
large and well equipped, lacked the discipline and training
of the Scots, and so gave way easily before their advance.
A stand was made at Newburn on the Tyne (29 August), but
the English force was driven back, and fled leaving
Newcastle undefended. The next day General Leslie occupied
the town; and the main royal army, advancing to its defence,
fell back upon York. In a few days the Scots occupied
Northumberland, Newcastle, and the Bishopric of Durham as
far as the river Tees; and they imposed a levy of £850 per
16
day on the occupied parts for the support of their army.
Though the main royal army at York was intact and, 
on paper, formidable, there was little spirit in it for 
fighting. Most importantly, the men who should have been its 
leaders against the Scots, the gentry and nobility, were not 
anxious to fight. On the same day that the royal vanguard 
was being beaten out of its positions at Newburn, a group of 
Peers opposed to Charles' government was signing in London a
16. C.S.P7P.. 1640-^1, 173—*+; Rushworth. iii, 1298.
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17petition for a Parliament and negotiations with the Scots. 
This was but one sign of that widespread discontent with 
the war and the royal government which general histories 
have adequately sketched. Further to this opposition, there 
was said to be in England even a party which was favourable 
to the Scots, or which was at least prepared to seek in 
England some political advantage against the King by 
exploiting the predicament his Scottish policies had created. 
Concerned by this additional factor in the English 
disenchantment with the war, Secretary Vane wrote to 
Windebank expressing his fear that if the Scots crossed 
the Tyne, the Court would find itself in a difficult 
position:
I wish these things had been foreseen in time, 
you know what my opinion has long been both of 
their strength and of a party in England...If 
they still advance southward it is then to be 
apprehended they have certainly a party amongst 
us . 1 8
The Venetian ambassador, Giustiniani, described this party
as one bent upon exploiting the war to obtain from Charles
the satisfaction they had been unable hitherto to win by
19
respect and loyalty.
The Scots were regarded more as friends than
17. There is one copy of the petition signed by Exeter, 
Bedford, Hertford, Essex, Rutland, Warwick, Bolingbroke, 
Mulgrave, Saye and Seal, Mandeville, Howard de Escrik, 
and Brooke: C.S.P.D., l6*+0, 61+0. Another copy was 
signed by Bedford, Hertford, Mulgrave, Warwick, 
Bolingbroke, Lincoln, Rutland, Exeter, Saye and Seal? 
Mandeville, Brooke, Hertford, North, Willoughby, Savile, 
Wharton, and Lovelace : ibid., 6M .
18. ibid., 61+2. See also Giustiniani1 s report that Scots had 
invaded England because they were encouraged by the open 
friendliness of the English: C.S.P.V., xxv, 70.
19. ibid., 73-
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enemies at this time because the Bishops* Wars, as they were
called, had brought to a head all the discontent with the
King's government. In addition to the discontent, Charles
was beset by a grave financial crisis. War had drained the
royal coffers, the cost of maintaining the army running at
20
£^,000 per month. How could he sustain his policy and 
the country's defence with only a trickle of money?
There was a solution upon which both the
Covenanters and the English opposition insisted: a
Parliament. On b September Charles received from the Scots
a supplication which called for a redressing of their
21
grievances with the advice of an English Parliament; on
5 September the Lords Mandeville and Howard presented the
petition of the Peers. As both the Earl of Arundel and
Giustiniani thought, the documents seemed to have been22
prepared in collusion. In this situation Charles resolved,
with the advice of his counsellors in London, to call a
great council of Peers to assemble at York on 2b September,
to advise him in his difficulties. However, as the Earls
Hertford and Bedford pointed out to the London counsellors,
the proposed great council could not properly supply the
King; and only a Parliament, for which a large part of the
23gentry and nobility cried, would suffice. Even the Yorkshire
20. Gardiner, History of England, ix, 20^.
21. Rushworth, iii, 1255-6.
22. C .S.P.V., xxv, 79. See also Secretary Windebankfs notes 
of a meeting between the Privy Counsellors in London and 
the Earls of Hertford and Bedford: Notes on the Treaty 
of Ripon, 79.
23. Gardiner, loc,cit., 202.
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gentlemen, for whom Charles had such high regard, petitioned
2b
for a Parliament. London too was eager. Charles was
compelled to yield. When the great council met he announced
25the summoning of Parliament for 3 November l61+0.
During the King’s speech at this opening of the
council he sought the advice of the Peers as to what answer
26
he should give the petition of the Scots. On the Earl of
27Bristol's motion the Peers recommended that the King
appoint from among the Lords assembled a commission to
28
treat with the Scots. On 2 October the Lords Commissioners 
met v/ith the Scots at Ripon. What they negotiated there 
compounded the political difficulties of the King, and 
gave rise to issues which provoked serious disputes among 
the members of Parliament not long after it met.
The main points of the agreement concluded at 
Ripon by 26 October were that a cessation of arms should 
continue until the peace was negotiated; that the Scots 
should remain in occupation of the North during these 
negotiations; and that these occupied territories should
2V. ibid.7 20^-6.
25* Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, ii, 97.
26. Ii.S.P.. ii , 1 86; Rushworth. iii , 1275.
27. H.S.P., ii, 186.
28. The Lords Commissioners were: the Earls Bedford, Hertford, 
Essex, Salisbury, Warwick, Holland, Bristol and Berkshire; 
the Lords Wharton, Paget, Kimbolton, Brooke, Pawlet, 
Howard, Savile and Dunsmore. They were assisted by the 
Earls Traquair, Morton and Lanerick, Secretary Vane,
Sir Lewis Stewart and Sir John Borough. The Scots 
Commissioners were the Earl of Dunfermline, Lord Loudoun, 
Sir Patrick Hepburn, Sir William Douglas, John Smith, 
Alexander Wedderbourne, Alexander Henderson, and 
Archibald Johnston : Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 2-1+.
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continue to pay for the support of the Scots, So far as 
this thesis is concerned the important point to remember is 
that the treaty of Ripon underlines the astonishing 
circumstances in which the Long Parliament opened. Ripon 
ratified the Scottish occupation and their exactions upon the 
North, which exactions being insupportable were soon 
underwritten by Parliament. At Ripon Charles lost the very 
point upon which he had most insisted: that the Scots
30
should evacuate England before the meeting of Parliament.
Now the presence of the Scottish army would only encourage
what Charles had hoped to avoid: 'the licence of members,
31whose demands are expected to be insolent. 1 Charles,
however, had more to fear than the insolence of his
opponents' demands. Because of Ripon, England had to support
two armies while the peace negotiations were being conducted.
This meant that Charles was obliged to keep Parliament in
being until the peace was ended and the armies paid off. The
opponents of the Crown, whether or not they had conspired
with the Scots, had won a great tactical advantage over the
King. As Buchanan wrote,
This incoming of the Scots, gave occasion and 
liberty to divers of the Nobles of England...to 
desire of the King, a Parliament for the good of 
the Kingdom. The King durst not refuse their 
demand, by reason of the Scots, more then the 
continuance of it, which he granted likewise 
thereafter for the same Causes.32
Thus the 'Country1 had won a Parliament which must sit at
least as long as the negotiations continued and the armies
29
29. For the Articles of Cessation signed at Ripon on 
26 October see Appendix I.
30. C.S.P.V., xxv, 87.
3 1. ibid.32. David Buchanan, Truth its Manifest, London, 16^5, 17*
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needed paying. Here was a great opportunity to pass that 
reforming legislation which men had long awaited.
However fortunate were these circumstances for 
the reformers, the invasion and the treaty had left a 
legacy of recrimination and suspicion. The coincidence of 
the interests and demands between the Covenanters and the 
King's English opponents gave rise to the belief that there 
had been a conspiracy to extract from the King what 
otherwise he would not have granted freely. Whether or not 
there was a conspiracy we cannot certainly say, nor is it 
the task of this thesis to discuss the evidence for and 
against the suspected plot. It is necessary only to be 
aware that a conspiracy was suspected, and that later Charles 
thought he had enough evidence to bring a charge of 
treason against his six leading opponents: Pym, Hampden, 
Holies, Strode, Haslerig and Lord Mandeville. This suspicion 
of foul, or at least irregular, dealings with the Scots was 
the seed from which sprang an important and neglected 
conflict within the Long Parliament.
Already we have noticed the suspicions harboured
by men like the Venetian ambassador, the Earl of Arundel
and Secretary Vane. The Earl of Bristol was said by
Strafford to be the Scots1 ‘Mercury* during the discussions
33which preceded Ripon. At Ripon itself the Earl of Holland,
3^regarded by Baillie as a friend to the Scots, kept a table
33. C. V. Wedgwood, Thomas Wentworth. First Earl of 
Strafford 1593-16^-1, London, 1961 , 299.
3*t. Baillie. 1. Sfo-6'.
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for the English and Scottish commissioners over which it
35was said a 'correspondence* was maintained. The English
Commissioners had even sent a trooper to prison for
insulting the Scots when first they alighted at their inn
36
at Ripon. Indeed, according to Giustiniani, the Lords
Commissioners were all men who had declared themselves
favourable to the Scots: and, moreover, their inclinations
37were known to the King* However, not all Englishmen felt
so disposed toward the Scots. Not surprisingly, opinions
were sharply divided. As Whitelocke observed,
The Discourses of the Scotish War, were various, 
those who favour’d the Popish and Prelatical 
ways, did sufficiently inveigh against the 
Covenanters; but generally the rest of the People 
favoured and approved their Proceedings; and there 
was a strange Spirit of division in the Opinions 
and Wishes of most Men in these Affairs, too 
many not only favouring, but joining with, and 
assisting the Proceedings of the Scots 
Covenanters.38
Then came the treaty itself which added material to the
controversy.
The key issue in the negotiation was whether the 
Scots should be paid a maintenance during the cessation. 
This was a demand at which even the Lords Commissioners 
baulked. The Scots found the Lords Commissioners, under the 
unquestioned leadership of the Earl of Bristol, the Scots*
35* Sir Henry Slingsby, The Diary of Sir Henrv Slingsby of 
Sc riven, Bart., ed. D. Parsons, London, 1836, 63.
36. ibid.
37* C .S.P.V., xxv, 87*
38. Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of English Affairs, 
London, 1732, 36.
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the end of proceedings on 5 October it was clear that the
Lords Commissioners were reluctant to yield to the Scottish
demands for financial support; and the day ended with
Bristol insisting that the Scots, contrary to their
kO
protestations, were invaders. It seemed that Ripon was
not, as some feared and others claimed, a meeting of
collaborators. On 6 October Vane wrote to Windebank that the
Scots' demands were 'very high and vaste'; and that the
Lords Commissioners appeared 'sensible of the exorbitance'
of the demand that the Scots should be provided with £*+0,000 i+i
per month. However, they were resolute that the treaty
b2
would not proceed until the English agreed on this point.
By 1 October the King had yielded the principle; and his
Commissioners informed the Scots that they were authorised
to negotiate the sum. After two more days of tough
bargaining the English managed to beat the Scots down from
their original figure of £*+0,000 to £25,500 per month. Thus
in fact Ripon simply ratified the exaction the Scots had
M+
imposed already— £850 per day. The Scots finally and
39'Mercury1, difficult negotiators from the beginning. By
39. The Scots objected to the Lords Commissioners' wish to 
negotiate upon the basis of the Pacification of Berwick, 
and to the English defence of their Scottish assistants 
in the negotiations, regarded by the Scots as incendiaries 
The Scots also objected to the refusal of the Lords to 
discuss the cessation without further discussions with the 
Kings Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 1-16; Baillie, i, 263 
1+0. Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 20-23.
*f1 . C.S.P.D. . 16lfO-M , 1M-M-. 
k2. ibid., 151 , 155, 166.
*+3» Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, 20-23.
M+. Whereas previously the £&50 was raised from Northumberland 
Durham and Newcastle, the articles of the cessation eased 
the burden a little by enlisting the support of Cumberland 
and Westmoreland to provide a proportion of the sum : see 
C.S.P.D., l6*+0—!+1, 173“*+$ Notes on the Treaty of Ripon,
"See also Appendix I for the Articles of Cessation.
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•ungraciously accepted the figure on 17 October, with the 
provision that should payment fail, it would be recouped by
*+5forcible exaction: in effect, by plundering. Enshrined in
the seventh article of the cessation, this condition epitomised
at once the uncompromising character of the Covenanters, and
the complete humiliation of England; and it proclaimed that
England had no alternative but to comply with the Scots* It
gave formal expression to the fact that England was being
blackmailed* The seventh article belied the Scottish
protestation of brotherliness* By 26 October the articles of
the cessation had been agreed to, and Charles had consented
to adjourn negotiations to London, where Parliament would
play its part in the settlement, and where, according to
Nalson, the Scots were assured of many friends in both 
^6
Houses.
Despite, however, the suspected league between the 
King's English and Scottish opponents, despite even the 
sympathy between them, the treaty at Ripon fired among the 
former a debate over the Scots. Though the Lords Commissioners 
were said to be favourable to the Scots, and though most 
later took the parliamentary side in the civil war, they 
nevertheless returned from Ripon somewhat shamefaced at the 
part they had played. At York the King asked them whether he 
should sign the articles of cessation. The Lords, however, 
would not give him a simple affirmative recommendation. They
*4-5* Notes on the Treaty of Ripon, *+6-*+7; see also Appendix I. 
The intention of the treaty was to avoid the plundering 
of the northern counties, but the provision allowing 
the Scots to raise the unpaid contributions themselves 
effectively subverted that intention.
*+6. Nalson, i, *+65«
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believed that there were many 'Articles unfit to have been
condescended unto by any Army, that had been but in a
probable condition of defence. ' Therefore they -would not give
the King any advice unless His Majesty would give them leave
to present a declaration of what had induced them to give
the advice they proposed. The Lords thus presented their
apologia protesting how much military and financial
circumstances had compelled them to advise the signing of
the articles and
conceiving it to be a great Wisdom in a Prince (in 
cases of Necessity) to dispense with the strict 
rules of Honour, for the safety and preservation 
of his Estate and People.1^
The fact is that, before Parliament sat, the
conditions under which it had been called had provided an
issue which was already dividing men in ways which
foreshadowed the divisions of the civil war. Before turning
to examine the attitudes of the Long Parliament itself
toward the Scots, we can profitably consider Whitelocke's
description of the effect Ripon was having upon England
prior to 3 November l6*+0:
Many wondred, and some inveighed against this 
Treaty, wishing the King would have put it rather 
to the Issue of a Battle; then to have given such 
Terms to his subjects in Rebellion, and of this 
judgement was Strafford, and the Episcopal Party. 
But the other Party cried up this Treaty, as Just, 
Honourable and Pious; to prevent effusion of 
Blood.. .*+8
k7.~ ibid.T k65-7; Rushworth, iii, 1308-10. 
^8. Whitelocke, op. cit.. 37.
Chapter I
A Point of Honour
1The Scots1 occupation of northern England in 16^ -0 
provided an issue around which embryonic royalist and rebel 
factions began to form even within a few months of the Long 
Parliament's meeting. When Parliament opened its most 
impressive feature was an apparent unity. So generally 
inclined were members to reform that the chief problem 
taxing historians of the Long Parliament has been to explain 
how this body came to divide into parties to a civil war. A 
score of theories has been advanced. However, none of them 
considers the very circumstances in which Parliament met: 
England defeated, and the Scots in occupation. It was this 
situation which provoked the first clashes in Parliament 
between men who would later constitute the royalist and 
rebel parties. I will argue in this chapter that it was the 
different attitudes of parliamentarians toward the Scots 
which first opened that division in the parliamentary ranks 
which made possible the civil war.
At first, Parliament appeared firmly wedded to
the Scots, and refused to tolerate an attack on them. When
Charles, for instance, opened Parliament, he declared the
Scots rebels and called on Parliament to aid him in driving
1
them out of England. But the Lords and Commons were 
sufficiently indignant at this aspersion upon their
'Brethren1 of Scotland to compel Charles to excuse his words
2
to both Houses. If this incident was galling for the King
1. See His Majesty's speech: Rushworth, iii, 1335*
2. The excuse was made on 5 November 16M-0 when Charles 
received William Lenthall, member for Woodstock, as 
Speaker for the Commons. For His Majesty's speech on 
this occasion see Rushworth, iii, 1336; C .S.P.V., xxv,
95; Baillie. i, 262.
2it was probably no less galling for certain members who 
soon were to raise their voices against fawning on the 
Scots. For despite the favour with which Parliament seemed 
at first to regard the Scots, awareness of the disaster 
England had suffered at their hands was sharp enough to 
provoke expressions of hostility. In fact, hostility to the 
Scots provided the single discordant note in the tedious 
harmony of opinion which marked the grievance debates of 
November 16^0.
Two days after the King's embarrassment before
the Houses (7 November 16Vl), Sir John Holland, along with
John Pym, Sir Benjamin Rudyard and others, rose to enumerate
the catalogue of a nation's grievances. Holland proved
himself one member of Parliament who did not regard the
Scots as saviours. Although he agreed with his fellow
speakers as to what were England's woes, he added one
that the others notably omitted. Holland included among the
country's four chief grievances the presence of Scottish
3forces upon English soil. Moreover, far from wishing to 
draw some advantage from the Scottish occupation, he 
recommended that if the Scots could not be persuaded to 
leave with the 'soft and gentle hand' of a reconciliation, 
consonant with the King's honour, then they should be 
repulsed with such resolution as became the 'ancient renown 
of the English Nation. '
3. According to Rushworth's records of Pym's and Rudyard's 
speeches (respectively: Rushworth, iv, 21 -*+; 26-7) 
neither considered the Scots a grievance. For Sir John 
Holland's speech see ibid., 27-8; Nalson. i, ^96-7«
3This opinion was in contrast to that of John Pym, 
According to the extract of his speech provided by D'Ewes, 
Pym saw clearly how closely related were the interests of 
the Covenanters and the English reformers. He saw that the 
reform cause would be served best by avoiding a rupture
5with the Scots: only those who wished to change religion 
and government desired a difference between England and 
Scotland, Thus Pym conceived the tactical and strategic 
importance of the Scots to the reformers; he believed that 
by friendship with the Scots the process of innovation and
4, In this thesis I will employ the generally accepted 
analysis of the reforming movement and its leadership 
provided bv J. H. Hexter (see his The Reign of King Pym, 
London, 19h-1, passim,), I concur with Hexterfs thesis 
that the leadership of the reform cause seemed to have 
been embodied in the so-called Middle Party, Whether 
such a group had a conscious existence, especially at the 
opening of Parliament, is arguable. However, it is 
certain that there was a widespread network of connections 
which bound together a group of like-minded men who were 
most prominent among the reformers: Pym, Hampden, St#
John, Lord Brooke, Lord Viscount Saye and Seal, etc.
This group certainly did seem to embody, at the opening 
of Parliament, the reform movement, as it provided the 
most effective leadership. This body, together with its 
more radical supporters like Isaac Pennington and Henry 
Marten, I will call the 'active party.' I will continue 
to use this terminology until the outbreak of war 
requires more appropriate categories. As a result of the 
influence of Hexter*s thesis we tend to fall into the 
habit of embodying the entire reform party in Pym himself. 
One is almost tempted to speak of the Middle Man rather 
than the Middle Party. To avoid this confusion I believe 
that it is judicious, when we speak of John Pym's 
leadership of the reform party, to think of it more as 
representative of the leadership of the reform party in 
the Commons, than of the leadership of a single man over 
the entire Parliament.
5. The word 'change1 seems to involve a paradox. Could Pym 
be opposed to change when he, and his fellow reformers, 
were so eager for it? By opposing change Pym and the 
active party meant opposing 'Innovations': i.e., the 
diversion of government from those principles of 
religion and statecraft which they believed used to guide 
monarchs and parliaments in the halcyon past.
6» D fEwes« Notestein, 9*
subversion, advanced by Laudians and other enemies, would 
be resisted, and the reformation of church and state 
undertaken.
Here was a fundamental difference of opinion that 
could not be stated more plainly. One man was for driving 
out the Scots, and the other for linking their presence 
with the cause of reform. Pym had pronounced at the outset 
that those who were hostile to the Scots were enemies to 
reform. He had uttered a strategic dictum which many men 
opposed to the government could not endure, and which was 
to provoke the first signs of hostility to the reforming 
party.
Not every parliamentarian saw the issues as
clearly as Pym or Holland. There were men who shared the
opinions of both. This fact highlights how difficult it was
for some men to submit to defeat by a traditional enemy for
the sake of reforming Stuart government. Sir Edward Hales,
who also this day spoke on the subject of grievances,
concurred with the King. He said it behoved Parliament to
assist the Crown against an enemy which had entered the
Kingdom forcibly, 'so that they may be ordered into their
own country, or chased out of this, without any dishonour
7
to the King's Majesty and this Kingdom...' But driving out 
the Scots was not Hales' only consideration. He conceived 
also that if this Parliament was to be, as he said, 'happy', 
it had to begin by redressing grievances at home; it was far
7. NalsonT i, V9V-5.
5better that the Scots had 'come into us than the Devill 
should raise his army to overthrow us both in Church and 
Commonwealth.' Hales argued that the first job for 
Parliament was to execute fully the penalties against 
papists for which the Scots chiefly had entered England. 
Still, if Hales was prepared to reap the benefit of the 
Scots' presence, he did not trust them; and he reflected 
that though he hoped the Scots intended nothing more than 
religious reform in England, such reform would test not on^  
the good intentions of members, but also those of Scotsmen.
The meaning of these speeches is plains not four 
days after Parliament's sitting a significant disagreement 
had emerged. Traditionally historians have held that the 
gentry was willing to seize upon defeat and the humbling 
of their King as the opportunity for reform. However, these 
few speeches suggest that, having obtained a Parliament with 
Scottish aid, members seemed liable to falter in pressing 
the advantage further. For some the issue was clear. Men 
of Pym's persuasion saw that the Bishops' Wars had given 
Parliament its being, and that an understanding with the 
Scots was a guarantee of the success of reform. As Thomas
8. ibid. Harbottle Grimston, who was unfailingly to serve 
the rebel cause, while in 16^ +3 Sir Edward Hales went over 
to the King, seems to have shared also this predicament. 
In a grievance speech delivered on 9 November Grimston 
admitted that during the Short Parliament England was 
threatened by the Scots with a danger that now. in 
November, was upon them. However, the constitutional 
problems and the state of propietary rights were so 
grave that they had to be solved before Parliament would 
vote money to meet the Scottish threat. Grimston was more 
ready than Hales to take advantage of the legacy of 
Ripon, but he did not deny that the Scots were a problem 
that England could not long tolerate: Rushworth« iv, 3^»
6May, official apologist for Parliament, was later to write:
Parliament was glad to suffer the Scottish occupation until
9
all things were better settled. The more determined reformers
in Parliament clearly hoped that the disadvantages of the
Scots1 occupation would be outweighed by the assistance their
friendship would contribute to the advance of reform.
Opposed to this view was another which maintained that,
though reform was necessary, the circumstances of reform
were intolerable. Holland, the man who first made this
10
point, was later to share the same cause with Pym; but
others who were later heart and soul for the Crown were soon
to take up the same point with a fierceness which threatened
the continuing unity of Parliament. The issue was crucial.
11
As if to emphasise this, the speech of Sir Edward Hales 
reveals to us the heart-searchings of a man very conscious 
of the difficulty of tolerating the Scots. He sought to 
comprehend in the one analysis of England's troubles the 
intolerable and the fortunate: the intolerable fact of 
invasion; and England's fortune in being rescued by the 
Scots from those who wished to change religion and 
government. Sir Edward Hales was worried; and he was not 
alone. Before one bill had been passed, Parliament was 
hesitating between two principles of action: between real- 
politik and honour.
9. Thomas May, The History of the Parliament of England 
which began November 3, 16^0: with a short and necessary 
view of some precedent years, Oxford, 18^+, 10^.
10. Significantly, Holland ended up as a firm Peace Party 
man, whose caution in prosecuting reform is revealed in 
his grievance speech of 7 November, as in his telling 
for the Peace Party in those crucial divisions on the 
Oxford negotiations in 16^3.
11. See above, Note 7«
7Sir William Widdrington and Charles Price were
12
both zealous for the King. They sat, respectively, for
Northumberland and Radnor; Widdrington was a substantial
landholder in his county, and Price, a professional soldier,
served in the royal army throughout 16*K) and was a Lieutenant
13 1V
Colonel by the end of the year. Both were Straffordians.
Both hated the Scots. On 10 November 16^0 Widdrington
presented a petition on behalf of his county complaining
15bitterly against the misery of Scottish occupation. In the
course of his speech Widdrington called the Scots 'Invading
16
Rebels1. Denzil Holies and John Glyn spoke after him
demanding that he make either a satisfactory explanation or
17be punished for his words. As Widdrington stood up to
explain himself, Price moved in angry terms:
That they would give Losers leave to speak, with 
all favourable Construction that one Member ought 
to give another; for his /Widdrington*s/ whole 
Estate was under Scots Power.18
In the event the House was not content to admit of a
12. Widdrington was expelled from the Commons on 26 August 
16V2 for raising forces against Parliament: C.J.. ii, 
738. Price fought for Charles in 16^ +2 and was a 
prisoner of Parliament by the end of that year : M. F. 
Keeler, The Long Parliament 16^0-16Vl. Philadelphia, 
195V, m :  cf. C.J.. il. 8W .
13« Keeler, op. cit.. 3i^*
1H-# D. Brunton and D. H. Pennington, Members of the Long 
Parliament. London, 195V? 239, 2*+!TI —
15* According to D*Ewes, the petition desired relief for 
the losses suffered by the county since the beginning 
of the Scots1 occupation. Coal could not be mined; trade 
was decayed; people were evicted from their homes; men 
had deserted the fields and the meadows were despoiled; 
cattle were starved and were forcibly sold at a loss; 
homes were plundered: D fEwes. Notestein, 22-3.
16. C.J.. ii, 25; Rushworth. iv, 38; D fEwes. Notestein, 20.
17. ibid.
18. Rushworth. iv, 38.
8favourable construction to Widdrington1 s words, and so he
was obliged to apologise, saying that he knew the Scots to
be the ’Kings Subjects, and would no more call them 
19Rebels#•.1
It is evident from this incident that the mood of 
the House was generally favourable to the Scots. As Balfour 
wrote:
then our good brethren would not have ws called 
rebels, bot houpit that ere long the Scotts armey 
should be called the Kings armey. So hotte was 
ther affectione to ws then.20
But whereas most, at that time, preferred to bear with the
Scottish audacity, or frankly to delight in it, there was
an undercurrent of anger, latent in some, obvious in others,
against the Scots' presence.
Although Widdrington had been silenced, the issue,
so far as Pym was concerned, had not been settled. He
understood that Widdrington and Price had touched upon a
nerve sensitive in ordinary Englishmen. He saw that
Widdrington's petition was eagerly taken up by the House
21
and 'much debated*. This suggests that many members were 
concerned with what the Scots were doing in the North, even 
if they were reluctant to call them rebels. In these 
circumstances Pym had to ensure that the effects of the 
occupation of the North did not swing opinion against the Scots.
19. C.J., ii, 25; D'Ewes, Notestein, 20.
20. Sir James Balfour, The Plistorical Works. Edinburgh,
182*+, ii, b25.
21. C^J., ii, 25.
9Benjamin Rudyard desired that the North be supported by the
common purse; and Sir Henry Anderson called for the relief
22
of Newcastle and Durham. But too much concentration on
the plight of the North did not suit Pym's purposes. It
could only awaken members to the ravages of the Scots and
infect relations between them and Parliament even before
23
the Scottish Commissioners had reached London. Pym,
therefore, but only momentarily, scotched the business by
turning the attention of members from the condition of the
North to the 'authors of this mischiefe' who 'might be found
out in time and out of their own estates to repair this 
2 b
losse.' As the Journal recorded succinctly, the matter
25was 'much debated; but nothing resolved.' When northern 
fields were ravaged, homes despoiled and trade in disarray, 
many must have gone that day confused, if not discontented, 
from the House.
During the debate on Widdrington1s petition Sir
If Pym was not happy to let the troubles of the
North fester into a general hatred for the Scots, he was
careful, on the other hand, not to neglect the North. He was
26
a leading figure in a debate on 13 November which ended 
with the House resolving that £100,000 be raised for the
22. D'Ewes, Notestein, 23. Anderson sat for Newcastle. He 
was later excluded from the House on account of his 
connection with the Hothams: Brunton and Pennington, 
op. cit., 266; Keeler, op. cit., 87. He was to prove a 
tireless advocate for the North in the ensuing months.
23. The Scottish Commissioners to negotiate the peace 
reached London on 1*+ November l6*k>.
2*+* D 1 Ewes, Notestein, 23.
25. CjJ., ii, 28.26. D'Ewes, Notestein, 23.
1 0
relief of occupied territory by an Act of Parliament. Pym 
did not wish to give encouragement to anti-Scottish feelings 
which might undermine the authority of his own party and also 
destroy a valuable strategic and tactical asset; at the same 
time he could not risk driving men of ardent patriotic 
spirit into opposition by neglecting the counties now 
occupied. When, on 10 November, patriotic feelings were 
warming to the troubles of the North, Pym saw fit to exert 
his influence to divert the debate from those problems; but 
on the following Friday he was content to let Parliament 
resolve in more congenial circumstances upon some assistance 
for the occupied parts. Pym realised that native English 
antipathy to the Scots, if handled indelicately, might be 
roused and overwhelm the reform party. However, Parliament's 
undertaking to pay the bills of the northern counties did 
not mean that the problem of the North and its repercussions 
in Parliament were about to disappear. After all, if 
Parliament defaulted on the payments, the Scots were still 
free (according to the seventh article of the cessation) to 
extract the due sums from the counties by plunder. Now that 
Parliament had made itself directly responsible for the 
northern counties, its leaders would be affected more 
immediately and more markedly by any apparent dereliction 
of duty.
For Charles, as for his opponents, the Scots were 
the crucial political factor. To the opponents of the 
government the Scots made possible the calling of Parliament
27
27. CVJ., "ii, 28.
11
and were regarded as guarantors of reform. Charles also 
saw that the Scots provided Parliament with an opportunity 
to attack his government. He believed, therefore, that if 
Parliament were deprived of their friendship he might the 
more easily provide for his own defence. Charles' first 
preoccupation, then, was to divide the Scots from his English 
opponents. He could do this in two ways. Firstly, he could 
hasten the despatch of the treaty with the Scots. The 
sooner this was done, the more quickly the Scots would 
return home, disband their army and leave Parliament without 
support. At the same time Charles might weaken Parliament 
by heightening those tensions between it and the Scots of 
which there were already signs. The royal policy was well 
appreciated by Giustiniani, the Venetian ambassador, who, 
through his connections with the Court, was able to report 
to his masters that an attempt to separate the English and 
the Scots was 'the only stroke with which His Majesty
aspires to conquer the hydra of so many troublesome
29
seditions.'
In concentrating on the reformers' dependence on 
the Scots Charles had seized upon the weakest point in his 
opponents' defences. There were good hopes of his exploiting 
it. Despite Pym's efforts to succour the North without being 
over-mastered by anti-Scottish fervour, his willingness to
28. See above, 5-6*
29. C.S.P.V., xxv, 111. The nature and progress of royal 
policy vis-a-vis the Scots is a dominating theme in 
Giustinianifs letters throughout the months preceding 
Charles' journey to Scotland in August 16^ +1 t see 
especially ibid., 102, 103, 107, 1^5.
28
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underwrite the expenses of the northern counties had neither 
resolved the kind of problem that worried Hales nor soothed 
the enmity of a Widdrington or a Price. In fact doubts and 
resentments were being kindled in some who were leading 
advocates of reform.
On 1*+ November Edward Bagshaw delivered an extra-
30 31
ordinary speech* Bagshaw sat for Southwark, and although
he was to join the King at Oxford in 16M+, he was at this
32
time working with Pym and his company. Bagshaw complained
typically against the country’s grievances, but, referring
to the outburst four days earlier, he carefully opened his
own mind on the subject of the invasion:
The Scots we have heard branded as traitors, 
because, contrary to the law of nations and their 
loyalty, they have invaded our lands; what other 
title have they merited that have invaded our laws 
and liberties, the precious evidences by which we 
should freely enjoy ourselves and our estates?
Yet Bagshaw was not censured for this implication. Perhaps
the leaders of the opposition could not afford to risk
fuelling the dissatisfaction that smouldered around the
subject of the Scots. But what is more strange is that
Bagshaw escaped censure even after hinting further that some
English were not free from the suspicion of treason:
Are not our lives in danger whilst an enemy 
disguised as a friend is provoked, and suffered 
to come into our very bosoms, and rifle some of 
their goods, others of their loyalty, which they 
neither would nor could have touched, might we 
with united power have withstood them?33
30. C.S.P.D.. 16^0-Vl, 260.
31. Brunton and Pennington, op. cit.. 236.
32. Keeler, op.^ cit., 9^.
33* My underlining.
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accusation can be explained by assuming that even if those
suspected of treachery were innocent, then they thought it
wiser to suffer the accusation: it would have been difficult
to deflect such a charge without provoking the Scottish issue
Pym had been attempting to play down. But Bagshaw had
scented something that Charles thought it profitable to
pursue. When on 3 January J\6b2 he charged the five members
and a Lord with high treason, in two of the articles Charles
3^accused them of conspiracy with the Scots against himself.
The King and his advisers must have thought the charges 
would stick.
On the day that Bagshaw made his accusations, the 
Scottish Commissioners reached London, and a desperate 
struggle commenced. The English Lords Commissioners at
35Ripon, as we have observed already, were not pleased with 
what had passed there# Yet they shared in varying degrees 
in the general desire for reform which accompanied the 
first meeting of Parliament# They also knew that there 
could not have been a Parliament without the Scots. On the 
whole the Lords, like Hales in the Commons, were reluctantly 
grateful to people they suspected.
In a similar frame of mind the House of Lords
3*+. The fourth article of the charge read: !That they have 
traiterously invited and encouraged a Foreign Power to 
invade His Majestyfs Kingdom of England’. The seventh 
article read: *And they have traiterously conspired to 
levy, and actually have levied, War against the King.1 
•, iv, 501 .
35« See my Introduction, xvii-xx.
The silence of the House in the face of this
Ripon. The Earl of Bristol opened the conference on behalf
of the Lords by closing off the murky and dangerous subject
of how the pacification of Berwick was broken, and why the
Scots had invaded England. He affirmed that it was the
Lords1 intention to report solely on the circumstances
which obliged the Lords Commissioners to treat and to
36
conclude in the terms they had.
The predicament of the Lords Commissioners at
37
Ripon has been explained. The essence of it was a
maintenance payment of £850 per day for the Scottish army,
which ’seemed very strange to their Lordships1. However,
necessity had forced them to accept a demand that was ‘hard 
38
of digestion.1 But if the House of Lords was reluctant to
discuss the origins of the war, it was not afraid to
suggest how much it distrusted the Scots now. Having
concluded his narrative, Bristol took the opportunity to
impress the Commons with the terrible state of the King’s
39affairs in the North. In this matter the Lords had taken 
a different view from that of the Commons, whose leaders 
were not especially sorry for His Majesty’s affairs when 
they promised to secure their own. The Lords were unready to 
exploit what they said necessity had imposed upon them. They 
therefore raised implicitly the question of the dignity and 
honour of the Crown and Kingdom. To illustrate how both had
36. Rushworth, iv, V6-51.
37. See my Introduction, xvii-xx.
38. Rushworth, iv, V6-51.
39. ibid. “
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reported to the Commons on 18 November what had passed at
1?
suffered, Bristol reminded the Commons of the distresses of 
the northern counties, which could not bear the burden of 
finding the £850 every day. If the supply of money failed, 
he said, the Scots declared that they could no longer obey 
His Majesty and would plunder for their upkeep.
Seemingly, Bristol, on behalf of the Lords, was 
impressing upon the Commons that it was useless to imagine 
that the embarrassment of the Scottish army occupying the 
North was something from which the attention of members 
could easily be averted. For the Scots were not merely upon 
English soil: they were threatening unrestrained plunder 
should their maintenance fall.
Since Parliament had undertaken to maintain the 
invaders to save the North from ravages, the Scots could be 
regarded as blackmailers; and blackmail was the very thing 
to spark the old hostility toward them. Bristol did nothing 
to discourage these feelings; for having raised the spectre 
of plunder within the northern counties, he went even 
further, to suggest that the Scots might advance into 
Yorkshire. This was no wild piece of scare-mongery. Once the 
Scots had exhausted the resources of the occupied territory, 
they would be obliged to move. Moreover, General Leslie 
already had contemplated a further advance as a means of 
exerting pressure on the English negotiators at Ripon; there
16
Vo
was no reason to think he would not still do it. Bristol 
thus argued wisely when he said that the prevention of such 
an advance should be the first concern of the Kingdom.
Then Bristol turned to the state of the royal 
army, making the Commons taste of his irony. He thought it 
odd, he said, that the Scots be maintained, and not the 
King!s army; and he left it to the discretion of the Commons 
whether they could trust the elements to contain the Scots.1
His Lordship confessed that the Scots had 
made great Protestations...that they had no Intent 
to advance...but return when they had received 
satisfaction.
Yet their Lordships did not conceive that the 
Kingdom should rely on Promises or Protestations.
Many Accidents might happen, when a Nation, 
come from a far Country to a better, should be 
told the Business they came about, was just, and 
their Quarrel good; who finding themselves in a 
fat Pasture might pick Quarrels with their Leaders, 
if they should go about to prevent them of the 
Reward of their Vertue and Valour.
Therefore, because of the possibility of further advances by
the Scottish army, Bristol proposed that the royal army
should not be disbanded but that it should be re-supplied,
for other Parts of England were left to the Scots
discretion.*
His Lordship said, he durst not say the Scots 
would not forward, but that it was in their 
Power, if they would; and therefore he recommended
*K). For Leslie’s plan to march further south see Baillie, i, 
263. To advance into Yorkshire would have been a breach 
of the treaty of Ripon, since according to that 
agreement the Scots were to stay north of the Tees. See 
Article VIII of the Articles of Cessation, signed on
26 October 16V1: Nalson, i, V63-V; Rushworth,iii,
1306; C.S.P.D., 16V0-V1 , 196. See also Appendix I.
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this Representation to the whole Body of the 
Kingdom to prevent future dangers.V1
The sensitivities of all Parliament-men and the 
worries of the leadership had not been spared. Bristol, on 
behalf of the Lords, had portrayed the present problems in 
such gloomy and threatening terms that no member could be 
ignorant of the circumstances that had angered some from 
the first. Who knew what an army of rapacious Scots might 
not do? Whatever threatened, it was now, after Bristol*s 
plain speaking, more than ever vital to Pym and company 
that the situation in the North should not be permitted to 
provoke the patriotic instincts of members into an outcry 
which might unseat the leadership of the leading reformers, 
and with it the reform cause itself. But the job of 
restraining the temper of the Commons was made more 
difficult by another problem.
For those most concerned with reform, the problem 
was not simply one of muzzling the natural enmity of their 
countrymen for the Scots, but of curbing the Scots themselves. 
Charles was not the only one in a difficult position on 
account of the Scots army. This is why Bristol's report of
18 November is so important. It showed that the Scots were 
in a position to extract everything they desired from 
England; and that Parliament should not expect any favours.
For the entirety of this report by the Lords on the 
Treaty of Ripon see Rushworth, iv, V6-51. See also:
Nalson, i, 52V-9 (who misdates the report 13 November);
D'Ewes, Notestein, VO-1.
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The Scots believed, of course, that those who had benefitted 
most from their coming would be most ready to meet their 
terms. Even though their hopes of perfect amity with the 
English reformers had been disappointed at Ripon by some 
unexpectedly stubborn bargaining, they knew how much those 
most intent on reform were in need of them. As Baillie 
observed:
Under God, they all everywhere professe that they 
are aughtin to that armie their religion, 
liberties, parliaments, and all they have; that if 
we take conditions for ourselves, they say they 
are undone.^
It looked, therefore, as if Pym and his associates 
in both Houses, were threatened on two flanks. If they 
acquiesced too readily in Scottish demands at the coming 
treaty, or if they were tough and provoked the Scots to 
cross the Tees, every English heart would be lost to them 
who had countenanced the intruders. From the standpoint 
of a reformer, the ensuing struggle between King and 
Parliament looked a very close thing. Charles could take 
the initiative; he was not outmanoeuvred and prostrate, 
for strangely, in the necessity of seizing the opportunity 
provided by the Scottish invasion, the opposition had 
created a situation fraught with dangers for itself. Charles 
had on his side the native antipathy for the Scots, and the 
difficulty of the task the parliamentary leaders were about 
to attempt in seeking to conduct a negotiation with the 
invaders: if they were either too hard or too conciliatory 
with the Scots, Charles might easily regain the advantage.
IfSTIinSs. i, 275-6; also 280-1 , 285-6.
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At the opening of negotiations on 19 November, the
immediate prospect turned gloomy for Charles, He seemed
naively to think that his presence at the negotiations
would ensure a peace consonant with his honour. Doubtlessly
he thought he could guide the talks to prevent the Scots
and Parliament colluding against him; but neither the Lords
Commissioners nor the Scots would tolerate his
superintendancy. For their part, the Scots believed they
would secure satisfaction only from those who disliked the
royal policy as much as themselves. As for the parliamentary
leaders, they did not intend that Charles, by reaching a
quick agreement with the Scots, should deprive their
Parliament of its reason for existence. Time was what the
leaders needed if reform was not to be frustrated by
another dissolution. As Secretary Agostino wrote:
Meanwhile it is announced that they /the Scotjs/ 
will receive every possible satisfaction from the 
Parliament, though it will not hasten the 
conclusion of the affair, careless of the expense 
of 25,0001 a month if they see all the affairs of 
England satisfactorily adjusted with the support 
of their arms...Mi-
On this first day of negotiation the Scots were 
concerned with the indigestible question of supply. They 
warned that their supplies were precarious; that their men 
lived only on water; and that there was no relief coming from 
the northern counties. They advised that they were preparing 
a paper on their conditions, and recommended the plight of 
the counties, or rather of themselves, to the consideration
b^m C.S.~V., xxv, 100. 
M+. ibid.; see also 97»
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V5
of Parliament. The Commons was not slow to act.
A grand committee of the whole House of Commons
considered (21 November) the question of supply for the
Scots, for the royal army and for the occupied counties. It
was resolved that a standing committee (usually called the
Committee for the King’s Army) be formed to investigate and
*+6
report to the Commons on these matters. Clearly the 
Commons had set out to tackle a crucial business for which 
the members seemed well equipped to deal. Wilmot, Ashburnham 
and Hopton were actually officers of the royal army; Uvedall 
was its paymaster; and Hotham had had military experience 
in Holland. Rainsborough was a naval captain. However, the 
committee membership was unlikely to be united in their 
attitudes toward the problems they had to consider. On the 
one side were Hampden and Holies. They were among the leaders 
of the active party and men most like to countenance the 
Scottish invasion for the advantage it brought their cause. 
Denzil Holies had placed himself already in the pro-Scottish
V8
camp by his attack on Widdrington. On the other side was 
a batch of future and prominent royalists: Commissary Wilmot,
The matter of the negotiations conducted on 10 November 
was reported the following day at a conference of both 
Houses. See Palmer’s notes on the conference used by 
Notestein in his edition of D ’Ewes* Diary: D ’Ewes, 
Notestein, V8-9: cf. Nalson. i, 52^-9. 
b6. The members of the committee were: Sir William Uvedall, 
Sir Peter Hayman, Sir John Hotham, Hampden, Sir 
Christopher Wray, Kirton, Captain William Rainsborough, 
Purefoy, Capel, Commissary Wilmot, Noel, Sir Walter 
Erie, Sir Gilbert Gerard, Colonel William Ashburnham, 
Sir Ralph Hopton, Sir John Merrick, Denzil Holies, Sir 
Robert Harley and Sir H. Bentley: C .J ., ii, 3*+.
V 7. Keeler, op. cit., passim.
V8. See above, 7•
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Ashburnham, Hopton, Capel, Kirton and Noel, Wilmot, 
Ashburnham and Hopton having connections with the Court, 
being army officers, and having suffered defeat and a
V9
humiliating cessation, were unlikely to favour the Scots,
50
or those who tried to delay completion of the treaty, Noel 
and Kirton were future Straffordians and royalists— a mark 
of unfailing hostility to the Scots and to the tactics of 
the active party. With this membership, which mirrored the 
divisions emerging in the Commons, the committee, rather 
than dissolving the Scottish issue, crystalised it.
Moreover, the appointment of the committee was not 
going to prevent the Scottish issue being disputed in the 
House. Tempers were prone to flare when questions of England*s 
honour and defence were raised— a sure sign that opinion was 
dividing. A week later, for instance, a dispute erupted over 
money to be shipped north for the armies. The point at 
issue was what proportion of the sum (£50,000) each army 
should receive* Some members were testy at the idea of the 
Scots getting more of the sum than the royal army; though 
some, like Sir Thomas Roe, being more concerned to prevent 
plunder, were prepared to give the Scots all. Details of the 
debate are sketchy; but it is clear that the resentments 
exposed by Holland, Hales, Widdrington, Price and Bagshaw
M-9* Keeler, or>. cit., passim.
50. It is not surprising that a committee should reflect 
divergent opinions within the House. Members of 
committees were nominated by members standing in their 
place and calling the name of some other member whom 
they desired to be of the committee. Members would 
naturally tend to nominate for committees, especially 
those appointed to examine some controversial issue or 
problem, men who represented views akin to their own.
2 2
were simmering away. The point was not settled until k
December when the interests of the royal army carried the
day* The conscience of the members doubtless had been
afflicted by Bristol’s irony; and with the presence of many
officers to improve the effect of his words, the Commons
resolved that of the £50,000, £30,000 was to be sent to the
royal army, and the rest to the northern counties and thence
52
into the pockets of the Scots* On 10 December the House 
followed up the measure by voting two subsidies for the 
supply of the northern counties and the royal army in place 
of the £100,000 ordered on 13 November. The votes were
53passed apparently without any serious opposition. Even men 
prepared to countenance the Scots would have had no desire 
to see the North plundered or Yorkshire invaded. There did 
not seem to be any members who trusted the Scots so much as 
to believe that measures were not required for the 
preservation of the North and the defence of the South.
51
Thus the debate of 28 November was a reminder to 
all that the undercurrent of suspicion of the Scots, of 
regret at England's predicament, and perhaps of distrust for 
the politic men careful not to offend the Scots, threatened 
to rupture Parliament's untried unity. Given the importance 
Charles was placing on these negotiations, Pym had to treat
'51 * D'Ewes, Notestein, 81. This debate occurred on 28 
November l6*+0.
52. ibid., 108.
53* C . J ., ii, 1+9; D'Ewes, Notestein, 136. D'Ewes' report of 
this vote is as terse as that of the Journal. He records 
no debate. As he usually gives some indication if a 
serious debate took place I conclude that there was, 
very likely, general agreement on the question.
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carefully the misgivings of the Commons.
Unfortunately for Pym, he could not control the
Scots. It was their arrogance and bluster which threatened
to provoke the reaction Pym was anxious to avoid. On 17
5b
December the Earl of Bristol reported the Scots*paper 
promised at the first meeting of the Lords and the Scots
55Commissioners. The paper was in two parts. The first
56
contained the eight articles of the peace treaty; the 
second concerned the 'calamitous state* of the Scots*army. 
Though the articles were stiff, it was the ultimatum 
contained in the second part which was hardest for the 
Commissioners to accept: that unless £30,000 were sent 
immediately, the Scots would be obliged to plunder the
57northern counties. There was now no mistaking the mood of 
the Scots. Certainly the Kingdom owed the money to support 
the northern counties; but such tough-mindedness, expressed 
even before the supposed 'Brethren* had settled down to 
bargaining, must have confounded many not yet so fierce as 
a Widdrington or a Price. Indeed, the Commons were very 
worried by the attitude of the Scots. Rather than springing 
to meet their demands, the next day the House voted £25,000
58
for the payment of the King*s army. The first reaction of
54. D*Bwes, Notestein, 81. This debate occurred on 28 
November 16V0.
55* See above, 19.
56. L.J., iv, 111-12; Nalson, i, 689; Appendix II.
57* D'Ewes, Notestein, 16^-6.
58. The Commoners voted that £25,000 lent by Mr. Harrison 
on the customs be paid to .Sir William Uverdall for 
payment of the army: C. J., ii, 5*+.
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59the Commons was to secure their defence.
Delay, however, would make the Scots only more
determined; and that determination would serve to increase
the English suspicions already aroused. As it was, Scottish
necessities fathered this latest threat. The Scots had not
been convinced by the fair words of persons despatched
apparently to assure them how much England was beholden to
their arms. Without money, assurances were worthless. On
12 December Baillie wrote:
for our affaires they have granted two subsidies, 
about 200,000 pound Sterling for the present, 
mainelie for the maintenance of our army. We are 
offended, that the monie decreed and daily pressed 
by us, and as oft promised by them, is yet gone 
away in so small a proportion. They confesse 
that army is their own, and a most happie meane 
for all their desyres; that the dissolving of it 
were their ruin; that for the keeping of it on 
foot and all our bygone losses, what they would 
doe! Yet we tell them all is but fair words: they 
by their ways, hes oft put us neare extreame 
necessitie, either to disband or plunder. ..60
So the Scots sent in their ultimatum and confirmed every
latent doubt. Not content with pressing the English for an
instant £30,000 toward the agreed maintenance of their army,
they chose to advance a new demand: their sixth article of
59. Parliament proceeded with this defence policy throughout 
the early days of January 16V|. The chief problem was 
raising money for the royal army. Sir Paul Pindar agreed 
to advance £60,000 for the army on security of the 
customs: C.J .« ii, 67; D'Ewes. Notestein, 2V8-9* On 15 
January a letter was sent under the Speaker's hand to 
the Lord Mayor of London suggesting that the citizens 
might assist in raising a further £60?000 for the royal 
army; and that there should be provision for security
of their loans in the bill of subsidies: C>J., ii, 68;
D'Ewes. Notestein, 257; Rushworth. iv, 1*+2. On 10 
February 16V1 the Commons Journal reiterated that the 
second £60.000 was for the royal army and garrisons:
C .J .. ii, 82.
60. Baillie. i, 280-1.
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the treaty claimed compensation for damages suffered by the 
Scots in the war. This demand coming so soon after the pay- 
or-plunder threat was the very thing to damage Parliament's 
unity.
The Earl of Bristol was evidently shaken when he
announced (12 January) the Scottish demands under the sixth 
61
article. He reluctantly presented a paper containing the 
Scots' claim for compensation, saying that he was shocked 
when he considered the dishonour into which England had
62 63
fallen. The Scots alleged damages above £700,000, of
which part ought to be covered by England because she 'had
seen that what they had done was for the good of both 
6b
kingdomes...' This appeal divided those parliamentarians 
vjho approved the Scots' coming from those who would have 
them out of England.
By 21 January when the Commons moved to discuss 
this demand, the division had become serious. Sir Benjamin 
Rudyard said that the honour of His Majesty and the nation 
behoved them to pay compensation. But Sir John Maynard, 
more sanguine than Rudyard, called for the matter to be 
referred to the Lords for further negotiation with the 
Scots. Clearly he thought the demand too bold. Rigby was
61. L.J~ i v ,  112.
62. D 'Ewes, Notestein, 2^6.
63. According to Baillie, the Scots calculated their expenses 
at £785jo28, of which they proposed to put aside
£271,500, leaving £51V,128. Of this sum they offered to 
bear as much 'as the Parliament should find reasonable 
or us able.' Baillie, i, 289.
6V. D 'Eyres. Notestein, 21+6.
26
for postponing the debate until England was capable of 
paying. D»Ewes immediately objected to this dangerous 
proposal. Any delay risked subjecting England to the 
desolations of Germany. Under such circumstances they could 
not afford to provoke the Scots; he so feared them that he 
advised that the royal army be not reinforced, lest 
reinforcement interrupt the treaty when England had every 
hope of peace. Therefore, he urged that the House resolve 
into a committee to debate the issue so that all objections
65to the proposition might be fully answered. For D fEwes 
no price was too high for peace.
While most debaters, then, were worrying about
the size of the Scots* demand and the difficulties of
England’s position, Sir Christopher Wray delivered a speech
which opened the minds of those parliamentarians who held an
understanding with the Scots to be the lynch-pin of
parliamentary strategy. Recognising that some of his fellow
members were afraid of the Scots* intentions and were
worried by Scottish demands, he called upon the House to
apply *without any scruple or distaste* what he regarded as
a necessary remedy for England's sickness. He was for a
full agreement with Scotland. He was, he said,
confident the recovery will be perfect and the 
whole body of Great Britain safe and sound. The 
happy union of Scotland and England hath long 
flourished in interchangeable blessings, but of 
late by dark underminings we are severed into 
Scotch and English armies. Let their /the ScotsJ./ 
well composed preamble speak for me, which I wish 
were printed as an excellent emblem of brotherly 
love that discovers who has wounded us and how
65. ibid. 268-9.
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each should help the other, seeing our and their 
religion and laws are both at stake. Think of it, 
noble senate, their substance is ours, we live or 
die, rise or fall, together. Let us find out the 
boute-feux of this prelatical war and make them 
pay the shot for their labour...Nor need we fear 
that they intend to disposses the English of their 
inheritance, being ready to withdraw their forces 
on reasonable terms, referring their demands for 
reparation...to the justice and courtesy of this 
House, which I assure myself will give a bountiful 
and speedy supply for bis dat aui cito dat is.the 
best motto of this time.66 ~~ ~~
The debate of 21 January 16V1 proved to be an open admission
that there was in the Commons division over the Scots. The
House resolved to consider the sixth article further on the
67next day in a grand committee.
When the debate resumed on 27 January it was
plain that many had not been impressed by Sir Christopher
68
Wray's wisdom. Sir Thomas Jermyn, Sir Henry Vane the
69
elder and John Selden urged that nothing should be
promised. Others, like Grimston and Perd argued that payment
should be made out of the estates of 'Incendiaries' and by a
gift of Parliament only if these were insufficient. St.
John urged the House to nominate a sum, and then to request
that the Lords Commissioners negotiate from that figure for
70
a lower payment. There was hardly a man, even among the 
leading reformers, happy with the proposal to pay compensation
66. C.s.pTd. . 16^0-ifl, ^25-6.
67. C.J. . ii, 71.
68. Comptroller of the Household and a Privy Councillor. He 
was from the very first a royalist. See Keeler, op. cit.,
✓ 235.69. Treasurer of the Household and Secretary of State, Though 
he was to take the parliamentary side, he could be 
considered at this time as belonging to the Court party.
70. D'Ewes. Notestein, 273*
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dilatoriness annoyed D'Ewes. It would not satisfy the Scots.
England needed peace and Parliament should be prepared to
do what was necessary to have it. He argued, therefore,
that a question should be put committing England to
reparation, so that a peace might be concluded and the
71
armies dissolved. D !Ewes was right. The Parliament had no
alternative but to pay. But only after a ‘serious and long
debate* was it resolved:
That a friendly Assistance and Relief shall be 
given, towards Supply of the Losses and 
Necessities of the Scots; and that in due Time 
this House will take Consideration of the 
Measure and Manner of it.72
There was no division. However, the feelings of many members
whose dislike for the Scots we have already noted were more
likely to be provoked than soothed by the general willingness
to assist the invader. It smacked of treason, Nalson commented,
to treat *invading Rebels at the Rate and with the Terms of
73Friendship...f
Those members who voted grudgingly for the relief 
were soon disabused of their hope that agreement would 
hasten the treaty. Only five days later at a conference of
7Vboth Houses the Lords reported that the Scots were 
thankful for the vote of *Assistance and Relief'; but they 
still would not proceed to the remaining articles until the
75sum was fixed. All things tended to greater misgivings.
to the Scots as well as maintaining their army. All this
71. ibid., 273-V.
72. C .J ., ii, 71, D 1Ewes, Notestein, 27^-5» 
73* Nalson, i, 73*+.
7b. C. J ., ii, 7b (27 January 16VI).
75. D 'Ewes. Notestein, 293-V.
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prevent a conclusion of the treaty, and thereby to provide
the Scots with a pretext for keeping the northern counties.
The Scots, on their part, disturbed by increasing signs of
hostility, were anxious to calm these fears, and thus they
produced a paper detailing losses by which to justify their 
76
claim. Many members were not impressed. Meanwhile, news of
77Scottish reinforcements served to increase suspicion.
The seriousness of the breach that was opening in 
the Commons was revealed on the day (3 February) that the 
House resolved to settle a sum as a 'Brotherlie Assistance* 
upon the invaders.
To decide upon a sum was;the object of the debate; 
but after all the upset of 21 and 22 January it was not 
going to prove a simple matter. Men as far apart as Marten 
and D'Ewes shared the common problem. Marten proposed 
£300,000. D'Ewes was relieved; he feared a greater sum.
This was a figure, he said, they could readily vote; and 
vote they must, for the treaty was costing them £60,000 per 
month. Here was an opportunity to bring the treaty quickly 
to a close. John Selden, who had already distinguished 
himself as an opponent of the Scottish demands, spoke again 
•to the great offence of the House*. He attempted to re-open 
the issue that many had believed concluded on 22 January. 
Parliament, he argued, was not authorised to treat of 
reparations; and in so doing it had breached 'divers statutes
76. C.sTpTv .« xxv, 118.
77. ibid.
Suspicions grew that the sixth article was designed to
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to aid and assist them coming with swords in their hands.*
Selden was so incensed by the demand for reparations that
he was prepared to risk a breach with the Scots. He declared
that England ought to treat of reparations only when all
other articles were finished and the Scots had returned
home. Kirton feared that by paying, which he was willing to
do, they ran the risk of treason. But D fEwes, representing
those preoccupied by necessity and peace, replied to those
arguments that there was nothing illegal in making peace
78
with a people who were no foreign enemy.
Once more, and more fiercely than ever, the
festering hostility to the Scots burst forth. Some, like
Sir John Strangways and Selden, wanted to rescind the past
resolution of the House, and seemed prepared to risk war
for honour's sake— a prospect as terrible for those who
thought first of peace as for those who cared more for
strategy. Sometime during this debate Sir Benjamin Rudyard
79delivered a speech. It was a speech significant on several 
oounts. While it was by now clear that opinions about the 
Scots and the treaty were becoming sharply divided, attitudes 
were also shifting. As we saw at the opening of Parliament,
78. D'Ewes, Notestein, 317-20. According to Peyton it was 
Sir John Strangways who first raised the question of 
Parliament's power to treat of reparations. Selden 
supported him: Peyton, f.79v.
79» Nalson dates this speech to 22 January: Nalson, i, 737* 
Rushworth puts it at 3 February: Rushworth, iv, 167*
I believe Rushworth is right because Rudyard mentions 
a particular sum which was not in question on 22 
January. Furthermore, Giustiniani claims that the 
Scots did not present their paper of expenses until 
after 22 January: G .S.P.V. . xxv, 118; cf. above, 29.
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But by February he had found himself in a predicament similar
to that of Sir Edward Hales— hostile and suspicious but,
paradoxically, grateful. Now Rudyard was wounded by the
ingratitude of the Scots. Had not His Majesty assented to 
81
their articles? Was this satisfaction not enough? Rudyard
was increasingly dubious about their good intentions.
Referring to the Scottish protestations of innocence, which
preceded their invasion, Rudyard recalled their claim
That they would take nothing of the English, but 
what they would pay for, or give security..,
But what had in fact happened was quite to the contrary.
Rather than the Scots paying and giving security,
we have defrayed them hitherto and are provided to 
do it longer. They did well remember, That we 
assisted them in Time of their Reformation; and it 
is not to be forgotten, that we did bear our own 
Charges.
Yet Rudyard was prepared to give them a fair sum 
'that we may go off with a friendly and handsome Loss: If 
they reject it, we shall improve our cause.* V/ith the words 
'our cause' we come to the matter that was troubling 
Rudyard. It seems he had begun to think there was a 'cause* 
or case against the Scots which would be strengthened if 
they were not prepared to accept a reasonable and *friendly' 
settlement. Such a refusal would indicate some other, 
perhaps sinister, intention in the Scots' Invasion, and lend 
strength to the argument that there was an English cause to
So. See above, 2.
81. See Rushworth, iv, 36V-6. Rushworth gives the Scots' 
demands and the replies thereto.
80
Rudyard did not appear to regard the Scots as a problem.
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vindicate. Perhaps Rudyard was beginning to worry about the
integrity of English lands. Whatever it was, he hinted
gravely at something tempting the Scots:
It was never yet thought, Mr Speaker, any great 
Wisdom, over-much to trust a successful Sword. A 
Man that walks upon a rising Ground, the further 
he goes the larger his Prospect; Success enlarges 
Mens Desires, extends their Ambition, it breeds 
Thoughts in them they never thought before: this 
is natural and usual. But the Scots being truly 
touched with Religion, according to their 
Profession, that is only able to make them keep 
their Word; for Religion is stronger and wiser 
than Reason or Reason of State.
However, despite these doubts, Rudyard hoped to return to
what seemed to be his former opinion of the Scots and
their deeds in England. But in hoping that Providence would
guide them to a 'closer, firmer, Union', for the benefit of
religion and the greatness of the King, he was admitting
that things were not ending as he had hoped in the 
82
beginning. Such a shift of opinion bespoke increasing 
anxiety over the Scots and whether they could be trusted.
Most men make no mark in history. Some appear 
briefly and disappear unremembered. Thus Gervase Holies 
seized the stage for one defiant, chivalrous moment and 
then, to his honour, was cast into the Tower. He achieved 
nothing except to prove that men were now raging at one 
another because of the Scottish army. Incensed probably 
as much by the uncertainties of a Hales or a Rudyard as by 
those like Wray who frankly applauded the Scots, Gervase 
Holies rose to deliver a denunciation that rocked the
82. For the text of the speech see Rushworth. iv, 167-8; 
Nalson, i, 737-8.
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Sir, We are now upon the 5th /sic/ Article... 
which as it was expressed by a Noble Lord at the 
Conference, is a very teeming Article; it hath 
produced many other, and they such /that/... 
whatsoever Focus or Artifice they may be slighted 
over with, I do not like their Countenance; they 
may well be our Younger Brother of Scotland, but, 
like Jacob, they seem to me as if they had an 
Aim to supplant us, and take away our Birthright.
Sir, There is no Man that hath a more 
charitable Construction of their intentions than 
I had, whilst they made their Addresses in humble 
Distance as befitted Subjects to their Sovereign... 
my heart went along with them...but now, Sir, when 
I see them swell in their Demands beyond all 
Proportion; when I heard them enlarge upon their 
first Proposition and require Things unfit for a 
King to grant, and dishonourable for this Nation 
to Suffer, I cannot but fix a Mark of Danger 
upon them: I fear we have nourished in our Bosom 
those that will sting us to Death.
Here he was interrupted, but the House bade him continue. He
observed that he had known oppressions, but that the Scots'
demand for reparation was in reality a command more
threatening than any oppression. Such arrogance would not
have been suffered from the Scots in bygone days, so 'it
cannot but trouble me, that we should not only meet them at
the Half Way, but embrace the Bearers.' He hoped, therefore,
that the blood of their ancestors had not run cold. He
proposed that a select committee should consider those
demands which were reasonable, that they might be granted,
and the rest should be rejected:
And if our firm Peace may be had upon honest and 
favourable Terms, I will cherish the Thoughts of 
it; if not, there are but two Ways left worthy 
the Entertainment of this Nation; that is to 
stand or fall with Honour.
God, I hope, and our English Virtues, will 
secure the first; if otherwise, he is neither 
worthy of Life nor Memory? that shall not bury 
himself in the Ruins of his Country.
Immediately there were cries of 'To the bar*. To the bar] '
Parliament:
Others opposed the call. Pie moved to explain himself but his
3V
Gervase Holies went on later to vote for Strafford and to
8V
join Charles in the field. Ultimately the Commons voted 
£300,000 to the Scots; but the calls for and against 
Gervase Holies confirmed that the House was not unanimous. 
Gardiner claims that with this vote all chances of a break
8 5
with the Scots came to an end. Be that as it may, the 
tension unleashed in the House by the debate made a rupture 
within the Commons more likely than before.
83explanation availed him nothing. He was sent to the Tower.
The problem now was one of money. But it was one 
which impinged much upon the honour— in some minds, even 
upon the survival— of a nation. For the moment financial 
difficulties were great enough without having any worry of 
the 'Brotherlie Assistance1. On February 16 Charles 
assented to a Bill for the ‘Relief of his Majesty's Array and
86
the Northern Parts, being a grant of Four entire Subsidies.1 
Meanwhile a flurry of orders was made for receiving and
87distributing £60,000 to be borrowed from the city of London.
83* Rushworth., iv, 168-9.
8V. Keeler, op, cit., 220; Gervase Holies is included on 
D'Ewes' list of Straffordians: D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 
f.85 /When referring to the D'Ewes Harliean MSS. I 
employ the old foliation system. On the microfilm I 
employed the new foliation was not always clear/,
85* Gardiner, History of England, ix, 272.
86. L.J ., iv? 16^: C.J.T ii. 87.
87. For origin of this sum see Note 59. See also C.J., ii,
82 for 10 February 16V1, where Hyde reported from a 
committee of the whole House, and it was ordered that 
out of £60,000 to be lent by the city of London for the 
use of the royal army and garrisons, the first £50,000 
was for the use of the army: that before the commanders 
of the army paid their soldiers, the County must be
paid a month's billet money towards the County's arrears; 
and that the next £25,000 to be raised after the 
£50,000 be raised for the northern counties.
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However, by 17 February the House was agitated about the 
slowness with which London was providing the sum. The 
Commons, therefore, despatched Sir William Uvedall to the 
Lord Mayor to ’demand of him1 an order for Sir William to
receive all monies already collected, or to be collected,88
until the sum of £50,000 was received. Defence had once
again assumed the first priority, for this first £50,000 of
89
the London loan was for the supply of the royal army. On
the same day the Commons went into a grand committee on the
matter of supply. It soon resolved that the Committee for
the King's Army should consider ways of raising money on the
subsidies granted the day before. New members also were
added to the committee: Sir William Widdrington, Green,
Hyde, Cage, John Harrison, Sir William Carnaby, Scawen,
90
Partridge, the citizens and burgesses of London.
The addition of the new members to the Committee 
for the ICing's Army emphasises the concern of the House for 
the Scottish problem. Adding the 'citizens' of London 
(Alderman Pennington, Alderman Soames, Craddock and Vassall) 
showed the serious requirement for London money; whilst the 
infusion of northern members (Widdrington, Scawen and Carnaby) 
pointed to the growing dissatisfaction of the northerners 
with their occupied condition. They were probably well known 
by now among their fellow members for their strong views on 
the subject. Indeed, the whole issue was one which attracted 
men of strong views; for among the new members were the
C.J.. ~li, 88.
89. See above, Hote 87.
90. C.J., ii, 88.
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London radicals as well as the future royalists, Hyde and 
Harrison, and the future royalist-Straffordians, Widdrington 
and Carnaby. The signs of division were becoming ominous.
The next day (Thursday 18 February) there was grim
news for the Parliament and the refurbished committee.
Uvedall reported that despite Alderman Pennington’s
assurances that £60,000 would be paid into the city chamber
by Monday 16, there was only £21,000 paid in. The House was
disturbed at this report. Rudyard, who was already worried
by the Scottish problem, told the House that if it failed
to raise this money 'it would endanger both our honours and
91
safeties.* A tone of urgency, therefore, characterised
the Commons* business the next day (Friday 19)* Once more
the House went into committee on the relief of the northern
counties and the supply of the royal army— for what was
described as *the present necessity and safety of this 
92
Kingdom.* The committee decided to order Mr. Speaker to 
write to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Commons of London, 
to remind them of their promise of £60,000; and the Speaker, 
in his letter, was authorised to use such ’motives and 
Arguments as he shall think fit, to stir and quicken them to
93the performance of their promise.* Even the reticent 
Commons * Journal could not contain the excitement of the 
House. To the discontents which harbouring an enemy had 
kindled was added a wider fear of financial collapse and 
invasion. It was impossible when thus oppressed by the
91« D 1 Ewes, Notestein, 371* 
92. C^J., ii, 89.
93* ibid.
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spectre of disaster that men, already divided as to the part 
of the Scots in English affairs, could long maintain the 
outward signs of unity.
On Saturday 20 February the Rouse resumed its 
deliberations in committee. This time it was proposed that 
two extra subsidies by granted to provide better security 
upon which the Londoners might be induced to lend more 
willingly. Edward Kirton, once more prominent in debate, 
told the House that if money could not be found 'we should 
provide for our safeties.' Clearly he envisaged the 
alternative of war. D'Ewes at least thought he did and 
rebuked him: war would cost them blood, he said, as well as 
money. D'Ewes, however, did not deny the gravity of the 
situation; he argued that unless the subsidies were voted 
every man's safety and estate would be threatened. 
Furthermore, he did not doubt that men would lend, 
especially if Parliament played its part in preparing bills 
to settle the religious question. As it stood, London was 
already upset by Father Goodman's reprieve, and by a still 
undisbanded Irish army.
By raising these London grievances D'Ewes brought 
into the open what members opposed to the Scots must have 
suspected. The fact was that the Crown's main opponents were 
prepared to exploit England's military predicament to 
extract from Charles what they claimed for reform. Moreover, 
the reformers were becoming dissatisfied with what they had 
accomplished so far. Strafford and Laud had been impeached,
38
of course, but the processes were bogged down. On 9 November
9VMonopolists were excluded from sitting in the Commons; on
957 December Ship Money was declared illegal; Convocation’s
96
controversial new canons were voted illegal on 16 December;
but these things were little more than a declaration of
policy, the only substantial achievement so far being the
Triennial Bill which was given the Royal Assent on 16
97February. V/ith relatively little done and with the great 
issue of Strafford still unresolved, there was a sign of 
frustration in the House: some members began calling for a 
deferment of the debate on the extra subsidies until they 
saw how the Lords would treat the accusations against the 
Earl. Others wanted the debate deferred until 'some finall 
course weere taken with the saied Earle of Strafford.' This 
was a dangerous proposal, particularly as the delay of money 
might trigger a Scots advance. Pym, perhaps fearful that 
his more vigorous supporters would over-reach themselves, 
moved that London be forced to lend. Culpepper, Holies and 
D'Ewes all objected: this was a violation of the very 
liberties they were gathered to uphold. Capel, however, 
thought that the crisis was so grave that 'if hee knew his
9W. C .J ., ii, 2V; Rushworth. iv, 33*
95* C.J ., ii, V6; Rushworth, iv, 88.
96. C . J. , ii, 51-2: Rushworth. iv, 112-13
97. C . J ., ii, 87; L.J., iv, 1b3; Rushworth, iv, 189. 
Parliament had to wait a good deal longer before it 
saw much of the fruit of its labours. It was not until 
5 July 16*+1 that the Star Chamber was abolished, and 
with it the Court of High Commission. Ship Money was 
not abolished either until 7 August; nor was an Act 
passed limiting the royal forests until that same day. 
Parliament had to wait until August before the fines 
against refusers of knighthoods were abolished - see 
Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan 
Revolution""l625-I660, 3rd, ed., Oxford, 1906, passim.
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owne sonne had monie and would not lend it upon this occasion
98
hee would torture him,'
Pym's startling motion had turned the debate away 
from Strafford's trial and back to the original subject; 
but discussion exhausted itself on the question of how to 
raise the money 'because', as D'Ewes wrote, 'we knew not 
wheere for the present to have it.1 Subsidies and further 
borrowing seemed the only alternative. Nevertheless, the 
extra subsidies needed to attract the loans were still 
fiercely opposed. This time the issues had come to a head, 
and the clash, which barely had been avoided in the past, 
could no longer be escaped.
In these early days of the Long Parliament there
were few divisions of the House. Therefore any division
represented a serious divergence of opinion. When the question
was put in committee whether a question for two or more
subsidies should be put, those for the subsidies won a
99complete victory. What had made this division and victory 
possible? If we compare this vote for the extra subsidies 
with the previous votes for the 'friendly Assistance' (22 
January l6Vi) and for the £300,000 (3February 16V1) we can 
deduce an answer to our question. On both 22 January and
3 February the anti-Scottish group opposed paying reparations
98. For the record of this debate on the two additional 
subsidies see D'Ewes. Notestein, 380-V.
99. The Ayes, told by Sir Robert Pye and Giles Strangways, 
were 195. The Noes, told by Sir John Wray and John 
Moore, were 129 s ibid., 38h— 5- When the report was made 
from the committee the Noes yielded, and the two extra 
subsidies were voteds ibid., 385; C. J ., ii, 89.
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to the Scots. However, while most men feared the consequences 
of rejecting this Scottish demand, the resistance of the 
anti-Scottish group was rendered ineffective, and both votes 
passed in favour of ‘Assistance1 without a division. But on 
the question of the two extra subsidies the arguments of the 
anti-Scottish group prevailed. Clearly, some people who 
formerly had lent their support to the pro-Scottish group, 
out of fear of provoking the Scots, must now, for the same 
reason, have switched sides to support those who were outraged 
by the Scots and by their parliamentary sympathisers.
On this occasion the anti-Scots group was arguing 
for financial measures that would, by providing an adequate 
supply toward the maintenance of the Scots, prevent their 
threatened advance. This argument would have appealed to 
those worried men like Rudyard and D'Ewes who might have been 
prepared to accept a Parliament and the prospect of reform 
at Scottish hands, but who were too worried about peace and 
property to keep in England a Scottish array, with all its 
attendant dangers, to awe the King. They wanted to make 
peace and be rid of the armies as quickly as any, and 
without provoking the Scots. They were men who did not 
scruple to swallow unpalatable Scottish demands; but, 
having swallowed them, they were happy to support measures 
which would keep the Scots in place; and which, by meeting 
England's financial obligations to them, would speed a 
happy end to the treaty.
The line-up of the tellers is revealing. For the
Ayes was a future royalist (Strangways) and a future Peace 
Party man (Pye); for the Noes there was a staunch ally of 
the Scots in Wray, and in Moore, the uncompromising 
radicalism that was the making of a regicide. Here is 
further evidence that the dispute was dividing men along 
the lines of later conflict. Moreover, it appeared that the 
advantage of an invasion, which promised much benefit to 
the reforming cause, was unsettling the unity of Parliament 
and shaping a disenchanted body of members whom Charles 
could make his own. If there was any doubt among the most 
active reformers that the Scots were in danger of becoming 
a political liability, affecting their control of the 
Commons, events were soon to establish it beyond doubt.
Alderman Isaac Pennington, who was distinguished
100
early for his radicalism, was a key figure in the attempt
to extract concessions from Charles by exploiting the Scots
occupation. From the first he was closely linked with
Parliament's loan-raising efforts in London. His tactic was
to raise sufficient sums to placate the Scots, but not so
much, or so readily, as would bring the treaty quickly to a 
101
conclusion. The tactical problem, for Pym and associates 
like Pennington, was to keep the Scots in England as long 
as possible to assist reform without provoking an invasion.
We have noted Pennington already in connection with the 
London loan of £60,000. Despite his assurances, the House
100. Pennington became in later years a leading parliamentary 
Independent, and survived to sit in the Rump.
101. Professor Valerie Pearl, London and the Outbreak of 
the Puritc3n Revolution, Oxford, 1961, 197-8.
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was annoyed and distressed by the failure of London supply.
In the meantime, some of the more aggressive members had
proposed putting political conditions on the progress of the 
103
treaty. Thus the most anti-Scottish of the victors of
that division over extra subsidies were suspicious that
political interference with the loan-raising in London had
occurred. They decided themselves to call upon the Londoners.
On 23 February a committee was formed to treat with the
merchants 'and such persons as they might think fit1, and
was commissioned to employ whatever 'Motives as they shall
please for procuring of such Money as they can get.... '
This committee was the epitome of the anti-Scottish party,
most of its members being future royalists: Digby, Capel,
Hyde, Culpepper, Sir John Strangways, Sir Ralph Hopton, Sir
Henry Herbert, Sir Edward Hales and Sir Henry Vane the




To those who planned to take advantage of the 
Scots' array, this formidable committee must have posed a
102. See above, 36-7*
103. See above, 37.
10V. C. J.. ii, 91. Digby, Capel, Hyde, Culpepper, Strangways, 
Hopton, Herbert and Hales were all future royalists.
The elder Vane, at this stage, could be counted of the 
Court. Sir Robert Pie was opposed to the Scots, as 
witnessed by his telling for the Ayes in the division 
of 20 February over extra subsidies. He was also a 
Peace Party man who had contemplated making his peace 
with the King: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 1076- 
1076v. Given the unanimity of opinion among the above 
committee members, and the absence of men of a clearly 
contrary view and different political histories 
(Hampden, Erie, Holies), then, if Sir Arthur Ingram 
and Sir Edward Hungerford were of another mind from the 
rest of the committee, they were certainly a minority.
The fact that such a committee could be formed witnessed
how much the fortunes of the active party had declined, and
those of the more conservative elements had improved.
Certainly it was threatening to assume the management of
105
Parliament's business with London, A few days later 
(27 February) the Commons was again considering the business 
of raising money; this time Pennington was on the defensive. 
Pennington's aim was, as we have seen, to supply only such 
money as would keep the Scots threateningly on English soil 
without provoking further invasion. However, as London 
lending became more dilatory, and as men grew more fearful 
of a Scottish advance, some members, the anti-Scottish ones 
particularly, became less happy with Pennington's role as a 
money-raiser. If he were to retain his influence over this 
important aspect of parliamentary business, something needed 
to be done quickly. Thus he rose in the House to reassure 
members that money was coming in, and that soon the £60,000 
would be paid.
Unhappily for Alderman Pennington, the Scots 
themselves were becoming anxious about their standing with 
the English, and chose this moment for an inept attempt to 
rescue their declining influence in English politics. The 
Scots were distressed to discover in England that their 
supposed friends were more intent on exploiting the Scottish 
presence for their own political purposes than they were
*+3
threat to their plans, if not to their political survival.
10 %  Pearl, op. cit. , 202.
to the Covenanters' wishes. The Earl of Bristol, by-
attacking their sixth article (on the payment of reparations)
106
during the negotiations, had proved again that he was
unready to accept meekly the Scots' proposals. Although
ultimately he favourably reported this article to the
Houses— removing the suspicion that the Scots 'began to
107conceave of his too hot reasoning against us...1 — yet
they knew there were many in both Houses 'averse from this
demand, and brust out into words, in several places, of 
1 0 8
dislyke...' In late February Baillie frankly commented
that the city of London had promised long since £60,000,
but had delayed paying it, then, because of Father Goodman's
reprieve; now, because of the Earl of Strafford. 'They will
give no monev: this is their great weapon; so both armies
109are in their third month.' These friends, who calculated
how much advantage they could wring from delaying the
treaty, must have been as disenchanting as enemies to a man
1 1 0
who was hoping to finish the treaty by 15 February.
helpful in assisting the Scots to settle the peace according
As weeks rolled by the Scots saw their friends 
falling away* It was Bristol's policy to save England from 
an insoluble constitutional and religious conflict between 
the Commons and the Crown by persuading Charles to add to
106. Baillie. i, 289-90.
107. ibid.
108. ibid., 290.
109. ibid., 302. Baillie wrote that Parliament had decided 
to put 'private' matters— Strafford, Windebank, Goring, 
the Papists and Monopolies— before all others. 'When 
these were closed, they intended to close a Session, 
and dismiss the armies.' ibid., 290-1.
110. ibid., 290.
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his Privy Council moderate Peers who would serve him with
111
wiser counsel. But their promotion to the Privy 
112
Council and the attempt to steer a course between the
King and the Commons, proved ultimately damaging to the
Scots. On the one hand, they grew to doubt even more their
friends among the Lords, who now 'were heard to plead
publicklie for a delay to Straffordfs processe and to look
upon Scottish affaires not altogether so pleasantlie as
113they wont...1 On the other, various of their allies in 
Parliament and in London blamed the Scots for the promotion 
of those Peers who seemed determined to curb the active 
party. Thus the Scottish Commissioners ordered Alexander 
Henderson to prepare a paper assuring their friends that 
they were constant against episcopacy and the incendiaries. 
Unfortunately, the paper fell into the hands of a stationer 
and was printed.
The paper, viiich called for an end to episcopacy,
offended even staunchly anti-episcopal Puritans who
regarded it as an unwarranted interference in English
114
concerns. Meanwhile, Hyde, Capel and others seized the 
opportunity to attack Pennington and whoever else liked the 
Scots to tarry, striking at the point where they were most 
vulnerable: this dalliance with enemies. Hyde showed that 
his committee to treat with the London merchants had
111. Gardiner, History of England, ix, 339-VO.
112. It was thought Hamilton persuaded the King to this: 
Baillie, i, 305. The Lords were: Bristol, Essex, 
Bedford, Hertford, Mandeville, Savile, Say and Seal.
11 3 . ibid.
114. ibid., 305-6.
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approached men who were not reluctant to lend and -who had 
promised a further £50,000. Their complaint, said Hyde, was 
against the Scots themselves, for circulating this anti- 
episcopal paper. Capel supported him by adding that their 
objection was to the stay of the Scots, and if they were
115gone money would flow. They had been talking, evidently,
to men of a different political persuasion from Pennington*s
contacts. He, conscious of the danger of being regarded as
a friend to invaders, declared that the number which took
116
objection to the paper was inconsiderable. Sir John 
Strangways and Sir Ralph Hopton joined in with fierce 
attacks on the paper and with calls that it be read. Others 
like Erie and Strode opposed them.
It must have been obvious to the active party that
the developing attack on the Scots had to be stopped. If it
were not, the policy of making peace conditional on certain
political concessions would be in tatters, if not the entire
reform programme. Soon the House was all shouting and abuse
as men rose to speak and were interrupted. To close the
debate, Sir John Evelyn and others said that the Scots
disavowed printing the paper, and eventually the affair was
passed over; but it had been one of the 'greatest distempers*
1 1 7D'Ewes had ever seen in the House. There was no doubt now 
that many people inside and outside Parliament would no 
longer readily tolerate the Scots, and wished them speedily
11 5. D'Ewes. Notestein, 417.
116. Quoted from the diary of Framlingham Gawdy by 
Notestein: ibid.
117. ibid., 418.
gone. The shadow of dishonour grew darker upon those who 
frustrated the despatch of peace. Among the moderate men, 
who gave a tentative support to the anti-Scottish group, 
there was grave concern over the burgeoning cost of the 
treaty, and over the constant threat of invasion; but among 
the more fervent opponents of the Scots, men who would one 
day draw the sword upon Pym and Parliament were already 
hostile to the tactics of the more zealous reformers.
The Scots, feeling themselves deserted by their
old friends, now new counsellors, and assaulted by the
wrath of the episcopal party, were admonished even by true
friends for their rashness: 'though they loved not the bishops,
yet, for the honour of their nation, they would keep them up
118
rather than we strangers should pull them down.* This
crude interference in English business was a set-back for the
Scots as well as for their friends, who told the Scots that
119
now the enemies of Scotland were in the ascendant. This
was a moment of crisis. English tempers had flared on all
sides, giving the anti-Scottish group of court supporters
and future royalists a temporary authority. In the country,
Lady Brilliana Harley saw the whole affair as an attempt
1 2 0
to overthrow the godly party.
Pennington was shaken by this reversal of fortune.
In reply, he made a clumsy and embarrassing attempt to re­
jig. Baillie« i, 305.
119. ibid.
120. 'Letters of Lady Brilliana Harley', ed. Thomas Taylor 
Lewis, Camden Society, lviii, 185^ +, 58.
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establish his own credibility and influence over money-
raising, which only compounded his defeat. Walking into the
Commons on 1 March he confidently assured the House that he
had propositions from London which, if the House accepted,
would bring in £100,000 upon the new subsidies. He
disparaged the offer of £50,000 made to the anti-Scots
committee, because of the remonstrance which accompanied
the proffered loan. He declared that there would be no
provisions attached to his offer of £100,000. The House,
to have the sum, was to declare the proposed loan an
acceptable service to the Commonwealth, and should send
members, whom the citizens wished to nominate, to request
121
the Lord Mayor and Aldermen to raise the loan. These 
propositions were a bold breach of privilege; but what is 
a breach of privilege between friends? Desperate for money, 
the House apparently permitted Pennington to nominate the 
members, since a committee manned by Erie, Pym, Hampden,
Holies, Fiennes and Vane the younger was ordered to the
1 2 2
city. Hyde, Capel, Strangways and the rest could not
object. They, after all, had pressed hard for completing
the treaty and raising money. There was an attempt by members
of the anti-Scots committee, supported by Lord Falkland, to
tax Pennington for his aspersions upon that committee; but
1 2 3
the matter did not develop.
121. DJEwes, Notestein. 420-1.
122. C.J., ii, 94. It is not certain from the sources that 
the members of the committee were those proposed by 
the citizens; but it is unlikely that those named by 
the House could have been unacceptable to Pennington 
and his friends.
123* D !Ewes« Notestein, 421-2.
Two days later (3 March 1641) an embarrassed
Pennington confessed to the Commons that he had been
mistaken in advising that £100,000 could be raised. He
tried to mollify the House by offering £2,000 apiece from
1 2 4
himself and half-a-dozen friends. Lord Digby gloated in 
triumph. V/ith Pennington's most recent rebuff the anti- 
Scottish faction asserted its influence, if only briefly. 
For the moment their authority in treaty matters was 
recognised. On the very day of humiliation for the extreme 
party, the Lords desired a conference on the eighth article 
for the demolition of the fortifications of Carlisle and
125
Berwick. Hyde, Sir John Strangways and the elder Vane
joined Holies and Glyn as reporters. There were no 
1 2 6
radicals.
The discomfiture of Pennington and the prominent 
position which anti-Scottish (and future royalist) members 
began to assume in the debates and committees of the Commons 
was due to the steady growth of a party opposed to delaying 
the pacification, and to seeking political advantage from 
the presence of Scottish forces in England. The movement was 
carried along by a strong patriotic anti-Scottish sentiment 
which had been developing in Parliament from November 1640 
to March 1641. Originally, it had been provoked by military 
defeat, then subsequently inflamed by a group which seemed 
more concerned to take advantage of the defeat than to
12V. ibid., 433. This incident was not without heat. D'Ewes 
recorded that Sir Henry Jermyn and Henry Martin replied 
upon each other v/ith 'foul language. ' ibid.
125. C.J.. ii, 96; D'Ewes, Notestein, 434.
126. C^J., ii, 96.
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restore England's honotir. The conflict between practical 
politics and questions of honour caused the first major 
crisis in Parliament. Those members most active for reform, 
and more inclined to take the opportunity which occupation 
provided, began to clash with others who wanted the treaty 
rapidly and honourably concluded. There were even some who 
preferred war to a dishonourable peace. In the Commons, 
almost without exception, those hostile to the Scots, or to 
the articles of the treaty, who would not permit obligations 
to the Scots to be used for political advantage, were future 
royalists: Hyde, Culpepper, Kirton, Capel, the Strangways, 
Jermyn, Hopton, Digby, Widdrington, Price and Herbert.
They were supported by belated royalists like Sir John 
Hotham and Edward Bagshaw, and reluctant parliamentarians 
like Sir Robert Pye and Sir John Holland. The conservative 
side of Parliament was hostile to the Scots; it was a 
matter of honour. Their opponents, of course, were the 
leading reformers: Pym, Holies and Hampden. These were 
supported by men like John Glyn, Sir Christopher Wray and 
Sir Walter Erie, and by radicals like Marten, Pennington and 
Moore. What is important about this division is that it 
occurred along lines corresponding to the party divisions of 
the civil war.
This dispute, although neglected by subsequent 
historians, was of paramount concern to both King and 
Parliament. Charles pinned his first hope of restoring his 
authority upon driving a wedge between Parliament and the 
Scots. If the negotiations discredited his main opponents
51
easily strike up an alliance with moderate forces in both
Houses, If negotiations went badly, and if the anti-Scottish
group gained the upper hand in negotiating the treaty, the
reform envisaged by Pym and Hampden and supported by the
radicals would be in jeopardy. Since the chief proponents
of reform were seen to be pro-Scottish, and since their
reform policy was so closely bound to their Scottish policy,
then, with the defeat of the Scottish policy, the reforms
127
also would be threatened.
and Parliament jibbed at the Scots' demands, he might
127, See Appendix III for an analysis of Gardiner's treatment 




As I argued in Chapter I , a group had been forming 
in the Commons, ever since the opening of Parliament in 
November 1640, that was eager to give impetus and a new 
direction to the handling of peace negotiations. This group 
was anti-Scottish in sentiment, and generally consisted of 
future royalists and royalist-Straffordians: it was a proto- 
royalist group. If this body prevailed, and negotiation of 
the treaty speeded up, the pre-eminence of the more ardent 
reformers would be broken, and political reform in England 
would cease to be a condition of peace with the Scots.
Events were to prove, however, that the anti-
Scottish party was not sufficiently strong to topple the
Commons1 leadership. However, the active party could not
ignore the strength of the anti-Scottish faction. To do so
would be perilous. Instead, the active party sought to
control their opponents by taking into account their
attitudes; and to conciliate them by proceeding with the
treaty, while keeping it under their own control. Nevertheless,
the attacks launched by the reformers upon the new Irish
1
army and on the royal army in the North kept the Scottish 
debate open, and, by continuing to aggravate patriotic
1. There were two Irish armies: the 'new1 and the 'old'.
The 'Old' was the army of occupation. It consisted mostly 
of Protestants and was scattered in detachments 
throughout Ireland, and was only about 3,000 strong, both 
horse and foot: see C. V. Wedgwood, Thomas Went worth. 
First Earl of Strafford 1593-1641 , London, 1961, 140; 
Gardiner, History of England, x, 52. The 'new' Irish 
army was that raised by Strafford, upon subsidies- 
voted by the Irish Parliament, during its session of 
16-24 March 1640, to support the King's planned summer 
campaign against Scotland. It was nearly 8,000 strong, 
mainly Catholic, and reputedly well armed: Gardiner, 
op. cit., ix, 213; Wedgwood, op. cit., 31^.
sentiment, consolidated the anti-Scots party as a distinct 
group in the Commons, hostile to the leadership but unable 
to replace it. In this respect a major obstacle to the 
success of the anti-Scottish party proved to be Strafford's 
attainder. He was hated so generally that the strength of 
the anti-Scottish faction was swamped by the widespread 
preoccupation with his ruin. All other parliamentary 
business, including the treaty, was halted until Strafford's 
end had been encompassed. Moreover, some of the anti-Scots 
party must have shared the prevailing distaste for Strafford, 
since their faction made no evident attempt to resist, in 
April 1641, this further delay of the treaty. But those who 
supported Strafford survived the threshing and winnowing of 
the anti-Scottish group to emerge as the Straffordian core 
of an embryonic royalist party. The execution of Strafford, 
though it was a victory for the active party, did not, 
however, mean a defeat for the anti-Scottish sentiments of 
their opponents. In fact, the unrelenting demands of the 
Scots throughout these crucial months began perceptibly to 
turn the active party against their 'Brethren', so that the 
reformers grew to be as mindful of English interests and 
integrity as the Straffordians and the anti-Scottish group 
had been all along. The anti-Scottish faction was not an 
internally cohesive party. One part consisted of men who 
opposed paying a penny to the Scots (there were even some 
for fighting them); but their numbers were small. The other 
part consisted of those who, not so hostile to the Scots, 
but moved by varying degrees of dislike, wanted to see the 




When the conference of 3 March was reported in 
the Commons, Digby moved to press home the advantage which 
the anti-Scottish group apparently had won in recent weeks. 
He failed. At the conference the Lords proposed that 
Parliament should accept the first part of the complex and 
contentious eighth article of the Scottish demands—  
pertaining to the demolition of the fortifications of 
Berwick and Carlisle, and the withdrawal of their 
garrisons— because of the expense of long continuing the 
treaty. Furthermore, they suggested to the Commons that the 
Lords Commissioners should move the Scots to present all 
together the remaining demands they proposed to make under
3the eighth article. When Treasurer Vane reported the 
conference, Digby moved that the Commons approve the Lords1 
recommendations for speeding the treaty. Hollis opposed 
this; and Digby was unable to rally enough support to 
maintain his proposal, and to prevent the House from 
slipping into another interminable dispute over money.
The momentum which the anti-Scottish faction seemed to have 
developed in the past few days already was running down.
The days that followed confirmed this impression of failure. 
On b March the Commons entered into a long and ragged 
debate as to whether they should discuss raising money or 
the eighth article. Some members renewed complaints about 
the failure to disband the new Irish army, and the delay of
2. See above, b9.
3* L 1Ewes« Notestein, 4^4: L.J., iv, 175- 
b. D'Ewes, Notestein, 434-5^
tenuous character of this alliance was soon evident.
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Strafford’s trial; tempers flared; order was restored 
again; and the House eventually resolved that it would 
consider money first, then the eighth article, and, finally,
5the Irish army.
Friday 5 March witnessed beyond a doubt to the
weakness of the anti-Scottish group at which the preceding
days had hinted. The House resumed debate on the Lords1
report of the eighth article. There was a hot dispute over
whether the first part of that report (concerning the forts)
should be voted separately, or whether both parts (the second
concerning the Lords* proposal to have the Scots present all
their remaining demands together) should be voted as one.
Eventually it came to a question of whether the Lords *
paper should be committed before anything was voted. The
anti-Scottish faction would brook no delay and refused to
yield. The House was divided, and the refusers were beaten
6
decisively: 213/107*
It is clear that many who had voted v/ith the anti- 
Scots party in favour of the extra subsidies on 20 February 
had sv/itched sides. The Yeas had a reasonable case. The 
Scots were firm that they would treat only article by
5. ibid.‘«~V$8. D'Ewes records that during this debate 
someone hissed— considered a serious abuse— and he 
narrowly escaped a call to the bar.
6. G .J., ii, 97; D *Ewes, Notestein, W+-5* Tellers for the 
Noes were Ashburnham and Sir Frederick Cornwallis (both 
future royalists; and Cornwallis, a future Straffordian). 
Tellers for the Yeas v/ere Hollis and Sir Anthony Irby.
This division does not imply that the strength of the 
anti-Scottish group v/as 107, but it is a sign of the 
support they could rally.
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second proposal would anger the Scots rather than advance
the treaty. The vote revealed that the anti-Scots party
could not hold its support. But it also showed that there
was a resolute core in favour of concluding the treaty,
which could rally the support of a third of the House, and
which would not tolerate a delay of the treaty for any
political advantage. The active party had won this round,
but, trying to promote reform at home, it could not afford
to alienate further such a strong band of opponents. The
obvious plan would be to conciliate them. Indeed, this is
what happened. When the House moved to appoint a committee
to consider the Lords' paper and to prepare for a conference
with them, the committee did not so much reflect the victory
of the active party as continue to recognise the substantial
minority opinion represented by the anti-Scottish group.
The members appointed were Sir Henry Vane the elder, Sir
7
John Strangways, Culpepper, Hyde, Holies and Glyn.
The active party, then, had not rejected out of 
hand the views of the anti-Scottish group. However, external 
pressures also were exercising some influence upon the 
policy of the reformers. The Scots themselves continued to 
exert such pressure on Parliament that they pushed the 
reformers toward the more hostile position of the anti- 
Scottish faction.
It was the question of supply which aggravated
article, so it was prudent to consider whether the Lords*
7. CaJ., ii, 97
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the situation. The Scots had grown impatient with the 
failure of money supplies, and despatched a sharp note to 
Parliament. They threatened to plunder counties that were
8
better provisioned unless £25,000 was supplied instantly.
On the morning of 6 March Sir Henry Vane the elder, 
obviously shaken by the demands, rose to urge that the 
House consider the Scottish paper which, he declared, if 
ignored, threatened the imminent ruin of the Kingdom. Many 
members did not relish paying the Scots sums which had been 
reserved for the royal army, especially under threat. 
Others, however, supported Purefoy*s proposal to employ 
that money to meet the Scots* demands rather than, as 
D*Ewes put it, to run the hazard of war. Even Vane the 
elder, who had opposed such proposals previously, gave way 
rather than risk invasion. In the end the House voted what
the Scots demanded. The money was to be paid that very
9
afternoon through the Earl of Warwick.
The same afternoon, doubtless impressed by the 
morning*s shock, the Commons voted the demolition of the 
northern English strongholds. However, they also voted to 
approve the Lords* proposal that the Scots* Commissioners
10
should present, in one body, all their remaining demands.
8. For the paper see L. J., iv, 176-7. The paper was actually 
delivered by the Scots Commissioners to the Earl of 
Warwick. The Lords delivered the paper directly to Sir 
John Hotham late in the evening of 5 March: D*Ewes, 
Notestein, 448-50.
9. ibid., V50; C.J., ii, 97; L.J., iv, 177- The sum of 
£2^,000 to be taken from £*+6,000 reserved for the royal 
army in the care of Sir William Uvedall, treasurer of 
the army.
10. C .J., ii, 98; D *Ewes, Notestein, 451.
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Thus the active party, having asserted its authority on the
floor of the House on 5 March, the next day accepted the
very proposition it had rejected on the previous. The active
party now seemed ready to prosecute the treaty more
speedily. When confronted by such aggressive Scottish
behaviour the active party could not but yield to a more
celeritous policy. If it refused, it risked further
invasion, and a revolt against its leadership in the Commons.
As it stood, a third of the House had shown itself
unyielding on the point of further delaying the treaty; and
there was a substantial number of other members who had
supported this core in the past— for example on 20
11
February — to prevent a Scottish invasion. The active 
party could not ignore this strength of opinion. It was 
better to let the treaty proceed, but under the auspices of 
the active party itself.
If most members were happy with this decision to 
speed up negotiations on the eighth article, the Scots were 
not. One might have expected that the Scots would have been 
ready to oblige the English in anything that hastened the 
end of the treaty. But no; the Scots, though anxious to be 
home, were wary of any attempt to hustle them out of England 
before the English had fulfilled their financial obligations. 
Hence the Scots interpreted Parliament’s proposal that the 
Scots Commissioners should present all their remaining 
articles in one body (rather than one at a time), as an 
alignment of the Commons with the Peers and the Crown. This
11. See above, 39-^1.
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their commitments by hastily concluding the treaty. As far
as the Scots were concerned, Baillie wrote,
We would be most gladlie at an end; yet if we were 
readie to goe, as we cannot be in haste, they know 
and proclaime that they were undone; yet the 
unstabilitie and fearfullness, and cleaving to 
their moneys of too many of them, will make us trust 
them lesse and see the more to our own affaires,12
they saw as an attempt by the English to wriggle out of
Within two days of this letter the Scots, as Baillie 
had predicted, did look to their own affairs. They issued 
another ultimaturn detailing the misery of their soldiers. What 
was hardest for them, the Commissioners wrote, was that they 
were obliged by the cessation to remain within the bounds of 
counties whose resources were exhausted. Unless arrears were 
paid their army must starve or break out of its limited 
territory. The predicament of both the English and the Scots 
could not have been put more plainly. Moreover, the Scots 
hinted ominously that the troubles of both kingdoms would not 
be removed unless Parliament decided the time and manner of 
paying the ’Brotherly Assistance' before the treaty drew to a 
close. With this provision in mind, the Scots hoped that the
13treaty would be speeded that they might return to their homes.
12. Baillie, i, 310. Baillie wrote this letter on 15 March
16V1 .
13* L. J., iv, 187* According to article eight of the 
Cessation the Scots army had to reside within 
Northumberland and Durham, and was permitted only to 
send convoys into Cumberland and Westmoreland to collect 
unpaid contributions. This meant that by this time 
(March 1641) Northumberland and Durham, directly subject 
to the burdens of occupation, were seriously weakened 
in their resources. As neither Westmoreland nor 
Cumberland was an hospitable county for an army of 
occupation, both being largely barren hilly places, the 
Scottish threat to break from their limited bounds 
seemed to suggest a move into Yorkshire— a breach of 
the Cessation. See Appendix I.
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very seriously. During the next few days the Commons
searchingly entered into the business of raising money,
perplexed, on one side, as to how to raise the sums; and
1 4
staggered, on the other, by their size. Yet despite the 
fact that strong pressure from the Scots was beginning to 
push the active party towards a policy more like that of the 
anti-Scots group, there were still some members who were 
unmoved in their zeal to exploit the occupation for political 
reasons. There were still members who were not impressed by 
England*s predicament. These men hoped to advance their 
cause not in spite of, but precisely by means of, this 
predicament. Such a man was Henry Marten.
On Saturday 20 March, while the Commons sat in 
committee on these problems, Marten moved that no money be 
advanced until justice was done on Strafford. He was 
seconded by Sir Walter Erie. Such a proposal was contrary 
to the prevailing mood of the House. Moreover, if Pym and 
his allies wished to maintain control of treaty affairs, 
this radical proposal had to be quashed. Immediately this 
motion was put, Strode moved that the Speaker resume his 
chair, thus breaking off the debate before it got out of
* 5hand. To ensure that the business of money-raising could
14. On 19 March 1641 Sir Henry Mildmay and Sir Thomas 
Barrington were ordered to treat with a Mr. Collwell 
or with whomsoever they thought fit for the speedy 
raising of loan funds: C .J. , ii, 108. The following 
day Sir John Hotham delivered a paper on the suras due 
to both armies by 16 April. There was a debate on how 
Parliament could meet these obligations: D'Ewes, 
Notestein, 513.
15. ibid. , 513-V.
The entire Parliament treated this Scottish paper
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proceed undisturbed by radical proposals, the debate was
1 6
transferred to a select committee from whose membership
Marten and Erie were conspicuously absent. The committee
represented a wide spectrum of parliamentary opinion. On the
one hand, it was served by men who had taken a lead in
prosecuting the treaty and attacking the Scotish
predilections of the active party (Sir Henry Vane the elder,
Sir John Gulnepper, Hyde, Sir John Hotham and Henry
17Bellasyse); but on the other, it was dominated by Pym's 
friends and by others on whom they could doubtless rely: 
Nathaniel Fiennes, Holies, John Crewe, Sir Henry Vane the 
younger, Arthur Goodwin, Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir Edward
1 8
Hungerford, John Hampden, William Cage and William Strode. 
The treaty was thus proceeding more in accord with the 
wishes of the anti-Scottish group, but definitely under the 
aegis of the active party.
Whatever opinions divided this committee, the 
members were soon united in bewilderment at their 
difficulties. They reported that the House should inform 
the Peers that the Commons had left no ways unattempted in 
their efforts to raise money, 'but cannot find any which is 
likely to answer the Urgency and Necessity of the Occasion. 1
16. ibid.V 516: C .J ,, ii, 108.
17* C .J .« ii, \08. I conclude that Sir Henry Bellasyse was 
a man to take his stand with Culpepper, Hyde and the 
rest because: a) he, like them, was a future royalist, 
which suggests that he was likely to be anti-Scottish; 
b) he sat for Yorkshire, which would have given him a 
special interest in the treaty: and c)— granted a) and 
b)— because he was considered by members worthy to be 
nominated for this committee.
18. ibid.
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needs, so, therefore, they should ask the Lords for their
19advice as to what might be done in this crisis — an 
extraordinary suggestion when one considers how jealous was 
the Commons of its privilege in financial matters.
The Lords replied frankly to the Commons, and their
answer was an indication of a growing impatience— inside and
outside Parliament— to finish the treaty. The Lords said that
there was no shortage of money but only a reluctance to lend,
since men feared the dangers which the unsettled peace
threatened. There was only one way of opening London purses,
and that was to give some real hope of peace with the Scots.
For their part, the Lords ordered their commissioners to
proceed resolutely in their negotiations, and to satisfy the
Scots on all points. The Lords also proposed that a committee
of both Houses should approach London for a loan. The Earl
of Essex also pointed out that another obstacle to raising
money was the Kingdom1s grievances, which were still
unredressed, and the authors thereof still unpunished. He
assured the Commons that the Lords were ready to join with
20
them to remove all such hindrances. It was clear that the 
Lords wanted nothing to stand in the way of the treatyfs 
despatch.
There was only £120,000 left to provide for all the Kingdom's
19. ibid., 109-10; L.J., iv, 193*
20. ibid., 194-5; C .J., ii, 111. The trial against Strafford 
opened this same day (22 March 1641). It is likely that 
Essex’s speech was made in reference to this fact, and 
that he, and his Peers, hoped the opening of the trial 
would be sufficient to remove the particular grievance 
of a delay in the execution of justice.
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A variety of pressures, then, was playing upon the 
Commons, and upon the active party especially, to clinch the 
peace. There was the behaviour of the Scots themselves, the 
wishes of the Lords, the fears of the London financiers as 
well as those of the anti-Scottish group in the Commons; and 
although this parliamentary party was being held in check, 
the general parliamentary momentum for meeting these 
obligations to the Scots and for making a peace was high. 
Even the first sign of a threat from the English army, 
though startling, did not suffice immediately to deflect 
the Commons from its course.
On the day after the above conference with the
Lords (23 March), the Peers delivered to the Commons a
21
letter from officers of the royal army. The letter
declared that the army's ability had been slighted by the
Commons, and that the army, to restore its lost honour, was
ready to take the field against the Scots. The officers also
complained about parliamentary interference in the internal
22
affairs of the army. The sharp words against Parliament 
and the veiled threat to move against the Scots so upset 
members that there were calls for disbanding the royal army
2 3immediately. However, most believed the House should
proceed with the raising of money, so the officers1 letter
24
was dropped; and the House ordered the despatch of the bill
21. ibid. The letter was not reported in the Commons until
2b March: ibid.. 112; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 356-7.
22. For the report of the letter's contents see D'Ewes. B.M. 
Harl. MSS. 16>+, f. 9*+5v.
23. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 356.
2b. ibid.
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for two extra subsidies and resolved to join with the Lords
2 5to treat with the city for loans. On 25 March the Commons
agreed with the Lords to seek a loan of £120,000 from
26
London. Once again the committee chosen by the Commons
was dominated by the active party which now had taken treaty
27
affairs firmly into its own hands.
Even though the active party had consolidated its
control over treaty affairs in the Commons, it was not
relieved from pressure to proceed to a conclusion. In fact,
the active party had to commit itself more firmly to ending
the treaty and relieving England of the threat of invasion.
The first reply of the city fathers to the joint committee
was negative. They complained that wars in the realm and the
delay of justice against delinquents made men reluctant to
28
lend. To meet this backwardness, Parliament instantly
29 30
offered personal security to whomsoever should lend.
But on 31 March the Recorder of London reported that so far
25. ibid. f .  357; C.J.. ii, 112.
26. ibid., 112-13; L^J., iv, 198; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS.
162, f. 360. The committee of both Houses was to go 
into London on 27 March.
27. The committee of the Commons consisted of William 
Pierrepoint, Erie, Fiennes, Hampden, Sir Thomas 
Barrington, Holies, Mildmay, Crewe, Sir Gilbert Gerard 
and, to represent the anti-Scottish group, Digby,
Hyde, Sir Edward Hales, Lord Falkland and Sir Gervase 
Clifton: C .J., ii, 113* I take it that Clifton was 
anti-Scottish, being a future royalist and a 
Straffordian: Brunton and Pennington, op. cit., 229.
28. C.J., ii, 114; L.J., iv, 202; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS.
T52, f. 379.
29. It is not clear what is meant by 'personal' security, 
though I take it that it meant that M.P.s themselves 
were to provide security for repayment of loans.
30. C.J . „ ii, 114; L.J., iv, 202.
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the Lord Mayor could find only fifty men willing to lend 
£1,000 apiece, and begged more time in which to raise the 
money. So, when on 3 April the city reported for the third 
time, Parliament was so concerned to secure the money that 
the joint committee promised the London representatives 
that the funds would be used exclusively for disbanding the 
armies, and that there should be no delay in redressing
31grievances. There no longer seemed any doubt that the 
whole Parliament was determined to raise money for the 
Scots and finish the treaty, rather than exploit the 
negotiations for political advantage.
Of course an eagerness to pay arrears and to keep 
the Scots confined to Northumberland and Durham was one thing; 
actually bringing the treaty to a close was another. The 
test of the active party’s earnestness in this matter would 
come when the present cessation expired on 16 April. Would 
the active party want to renew it again?
Certainly there were some men very eager that the 
cessation should not be renewed, and that negotiations be 
forced to a conclusion. The move came from the Committee for 
the King's Army. On 1 April Sir John Hotham reported from 
the committee a proposal that the English and Scottish 
armies be disbanded at the end of the present cessation—
3 1• ibid., 206.
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16 April. So many members approved the measure that the
Speaker stood up to test the matter with a question. At this
moment of decision the House was turned from its course.
Mr. Godfrey Bosvile, whose radicalism was to propel him into
the Rump, moved that the Commons should first vote the
disbanding, not of the English or Scottish army, but of the
Irish army. The House, distracted by this highly contentious
issue, dropped Hotham*s report and fell to debating
33Bosvile*s motion.
The problem of the Irish army was one exactly 
suited to wreck any debate on disbanding the armies in 
England, though we cannot be certain that Bosvile had acted 
according to a plan to divert the Commons from decisions 
that were likely to end the treaty. For some time now, many 
members had desired the disbanding of the new Irish army 
which Strafford had raised, and which he had hoped to 
employ in the King's service against the Scots. This was the 
army of which Strafford was said to have advised His Majesty, 
*You have an army in Ireland you may employ here to reduce
3 Vthis Kingdom.* Whatever Strafford was said to have advised 
at the council table on 5 May 1640 was now the chief article
32. D * Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 391. Other proposals were 
made also: that the Scots be treated with for as long a 
time as possible in which to pay the *Brotherlie 
Assistance*; that £275,000 was due to both armies on 
16 April, but that since three parts of the sum was due 
to the northern counties, they should be dealt with to 
forego their money till October 1641, and in the meantime 
a bill be passed to ensure payment of that sum: ibid.
33* ibid.
34. C. V. Wedgwood, Thomas Wentworth, First Earl of 
Strafford 1593-1^2. London. 1961 . 286.
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in Parliament’s charge against the Earl, and a source of the 
dark fears of conspipacy which beset Parliament during its 
early months. But the fear was not universal. There were 
some members who were preoccupied rather v/ith the Scottish 
threat than with the supposed threat of an Irish army which, 
in the last resort, might be necessary for England’s defence 
against the Scots. Thus a dispute occurred over the disbanding 
of the Irish army, which brought again those who most 
disliked and feared the Scots and were most careful for 
England’s honour into conflict with the active party. The 
clash over the Irish army, provoked by Bosvile’s motion, 
shows that despite the changing policy of the active party, 
there were still great differences between the anti- 
Scottish faction and the leaders of the House. Hence, even 
while the anti-Scottish faction and the active party seemed 
to draw closer to one another on the subject of the treaty 
with the Scots, their fundamentally different attitudes to 
the Scots manifested themselves over the question of the 
Irish army, confirming and consolidating the anti-Scot 
group in its variance with the reformist leadership of the 
Commons.
The issue of the new Irish army had been causing 
contention between future royalists and future rebels for 
some months now. On 4 January 1641 the Commons had resolved 
to represent to the Lords the disorder and danger of the 
newly levied Irish army, and to request that the Lords join 
the Commons to petition His Majesty for its disbanding. 
Significantly, Sir Walter Erie and Sir John Clotworthy, men
69
close to the parliamentary leadership, were chosen managers
35of this conference. The business rested three days until
there was a great debate about the ravages committed by the
Irish army. D'Ewes proposed a conference with the Lords on
the subject, but Sir Thomas Jermyn opposed him, arguing
that there should be no conference, and that the Irish should
not be demobilized until the Scots had returned home. The
debate was interrupted by a message from the Peers and not
36
renewed that day. But if the business was neglected in the
House, it was not neglected in the committees where the
reformers were doing their work. Erie and Clotworthy
reported to the House on 11 February about the Irish army,
and the Commons ordered a second time that there be a
37conference with the Lords about disbanding it.
The Lords shared more fully the concern of the
anti-Scottish party in the Commons, and therefore they were
reluctant to commit themselves hastily to the course
proposed in the lower House. They delayed their reply to
38
the message from the Commons until 23 February 1641; and 
when they replied, they did so in terms which could not have 
been satisfactory to the active party. The Lords said they
35. C. J . ■> ii, 62. It is worth noting, as further evidence 
that the disbanding of the new Irish army was an 
especial concern of the active party, that Nathaniel 
Fiennes, son of the Lord Saye and Seal, was chosen as 
messenger to arrange this conference with the Lords; 
and that the committee in charge of Strafford's 
prosecution was set the task of preparing heads for the 
conference: ibid.
36. D'Ewes. Notestein, 230; C .J., ii, 65. As I have observed 
above, Sir Thomas Jermyn was regarded as a faithful King's 
man from the opening of Parliament: see above, 27, Note 68.
37. ibid., 83.
38. ibid.« 91; L.J.« iv, 70.
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would agree with the proposition to disband the new Irish
39army only if the old were reinforced. Clearly the Lords
were not prepared to throw away even a popish army in this
dangerous time, so worried were they by the Scots1 presence
40
in England,
The next time the Commons discussed this problem
(Saturday 13 March) it was in the context of reducing the
41
expense of the armies. It was a perfect occasion on which 
to renew the issue of disbanding the new Irish army. But 
many heatedly opposed the disbanding. Sir Frederick 
Cornwallis, for instance, a future royalist and Straffordian, 
declared that it was unfit to disband ‘because their is an 
enemy in our bosome1, and then walked out of the House 
(clearly in demonstration of his disgust), with Erie moving 
as he did so that he should explain what he meant by such
39. The report of the Lords’ answer was made on 26 February:
C. J ., ii, 91; D ’Ewes, Notestein, 407. However, both the 
Commons’ Journal and D 1Ewes note only that the report 
was made. At the same time as the conference was 
reported, the Commons ordered that the business be 
debated on 2 March, but there is no record of the 
debate in either D'Ewes or the Journal. For some 
evidence as to the content of the Lords* reply we have 
to go forward to 13 March 1 641 where, in a debate on 
the disbanding of the new Irish army, Sir Simonds
D ’Ewes reveals that the Lords were prepared to agree to 
disbanding that army if the Commons would agree to 
reinforcing the old Irish army: D'Ewes, Notestein, 484-5.
40. The Earls of Hertford, Bristol, and Holland led the 
Lords in this view, and managed the conference on their 
Peers' behalf: L.J., iv, 170. Some Lords were evidently 
adept at concealing their real feelings from the Scots: 
on 15 March Baillie was writing of 'our good friend' 
Holland: Baillie, i, 305-6. As I have indicated already, 
Bristol was suspect to them.
41. The Commons had just ordered the Committee for the 
King's Army to consider means to lessen the charge of 
both armies in England, and to find out what sums would 
be required to disband them: D'Ewes. Notestein, 483.
words. Sir John Strangways, another future royalist, 
opposed the disbanding until Parliament saw how the treaty 
with the Scots would end. Others met the argument for 
disbandment with motions to strengthen the Irish army, 
which were so well supported that the Speaker attempted 
to put a question for reinforcement. However, in the event, 
nothing was decided; and the dispute was postponed until 
15 March, when the radicals won the point, persuading the 
House to renew its demand that the Lords join the Commons 
in petitioning the King for disbandment, and even to refuse
45
the Lords* wish to reinforce the old Irish army. It was
fear of a Catholic conspiracy which gave strength to the
argument to disband, a fear the radicals exploited by




If the fear of popery dominated the Commons, it
was suspicion of the Scots that distracted the Lords. The
conference was held; but a week was to pass before the Lords
would give an answer. Meanwhile, the Commons reopened the
debate on 23 March. Someone moved that the House should send
again to the Lords, with Henry Marten calling for the
V 7
Commons to proceed without them. D*Ewes opposed this 
audacious motion, and urged that they ask the Lords a third
V2. Recorded in Moore*s diary, f. 324: see D*Ewes, 
Notestein, 484.
43. Sir John Coke the younger to his father, in a letter 
dated 13-lV March from London: see H.M.C., Cowper, ii, 
274.
44. D'Ewes. Notestein, 484-5.
V5* C .J., ii, 104; D*Bwes. Notestein, 486-7-
46. ibid.; C . J .. ii, 104.
47. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 162, f. 351-
72
time to appoint a day for petitioning the King. Besides, 
he said, there was the problem of raising money to pay the
4 8
Scots, to which the new Irish army was a 'great obstacle'. 
D'Ewes was turning the argument of the anti-Scottish party 
against them. They argued that safety demanded that England 
retain the new Irish army; D'Ewes responded that maintaining 
it would provoke the disaster they hoped with Irish aid to 
avert. This must have irked those who a few weeks earlier 
had defeated Pennington's attempt to attach political 
conditions to London money and to the conclusion of the 
treaty. But there was no chance that the anti-Scottish group 
would win the point again. The Scots were insistent, and 
began to threaten for their money which only London could 
supply. Moreover, continued argument on behalf of the Irish 
army and outspoken contempt for the Scots would discredit 
the anti-Scots group in the eyes of men who were sensitive 
to any suggestion of popery. A message again went up to the 
Lords for a conference on disbanding the Irish, disarming
4 9
recusants at home and purging the Court of Catholics.
Given the strength of these fears of a Catholic 
conspiracy and of a threatened Scottish advance, it was not 
surprising that, when the Commons still had received no 
reply from the Lords on the Irish army, Bosvile was able to 
interrupt Hotham's important proposals for ending the treaty. 
But since disbanding the Irish army had been long prosecuted 
by the active party and resolutely opposed by the Lords and
i+8. ibid. 7 f. 351-2.
>+9. ibid.
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motion looked like an attempt to protract the treaty at
least until the increased dangers and heightened fears,
occasioned by further delay, forced the Lords into yielding
on the Irish army. The insistence on disbanding this army
against all the objections of the anti-Scots party could
only have widened the breach that was opening in Parliament,
Young Sir John Coke, who thought himself above the factions
he saw forming in Parliament, wrote to his father at
Melbourne Hall that the question of the Irish array certainly
was dividing the Commons, On one side he saw Sir John
Strangways and those who wanted to maintain the Irish army
till the treaty was done. These, he implied, were defenders
of a ’popish party1. On the other side, their opponents
formed that party which was labouring 'to get all the
50
strength of the Kingdom' into its own hands. The opponents 
of the Scots and supporters of the new Irish army had now 
become an identifiable group in the mind of at least one 
member. But now that the anti-Scottish group was aggravated 
and distinguishable, the active party began what appeared 
to be an attack upon England's last defence against the 
Scots, the royal army itself. The ensuing struggle over the 
royal army was going to confirm the divisions that were 
present already in the ranks of the Long Parliament.
On the same day that Marten urged the Commons to 
go on without the Lords in the business of the Irish army 
(23 March), the Peers delivered in the letter from officers
by the anti-Scottish faction in the Commons, Bosvile!s
£6.' H.M.C., Cowper, ii, 274.
letter the officers complained that they were mistrusted by
Parliament, and declared that, as the Scots were preparing
to advance, they for their own part were ready to prove 
52
their valour. This shocked some members so much that 
they wanted to disband the army, but as I have pointed out, 
at that moment Parliament was too preoccupied with raising 
money to satisfy the Scots, and to provide for the ultimate
53disbanding, to take heed of this suggestion. There was no 
doubt, though, that some members believed war was imminent. 
Whatever the Scots were about to do, the royal army seemed 
about to take the offensive.
Everything the reformers hoped for appeared 
threatened. War and defeat had given them a Parliament and 
a lever to move their projects; but renewed war was likely 
to reverse their fortunes. After a long humiliation, a new 
chance in battle to recover England’s honour might divert 
all attention from the reforming programme and undermine the 
support of those who for the sake of the programme had dealt 
too obligingly with the ancient foe. A victory would restore 
the prestige and fortunes of the Crown, while those who had 
once countenanced the Scots would be discredited and liable 
to accusations of treason. If there was a defeat, the effect 
on the active party would be the same. It was imperative,
51. See above, 64.
52. D ’Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 945v.
53. See above, 64-5* An additional problem with this proposal 
would have been that to disband the royal army 
immediately would have demanded that it be paid off 
immediately. This would have had the effect of 
compounding the money problem.
51
of the English army. We have noted already that in this
75
curbed. This, however, was not to be done without stiff
opposition from the anti-Scottish group. On 3 April the
Commons voted a head of a conference with the Lords:
That during the Session of this Parliament neither 
the King's Army, nor any of the Trainfd-Bands of 
Yorkshire, shall March or Advance without the 
special Order of his Majesty, with the Advice.and 
Consent of both Houses of Parliament, except in 
Case the Scottish Array should Pass the Limits 
appointed by the Treaty...That all Persons so 
offending, shall be accounted and taken for 
Enemies of the King and State; saving in Case the 
Scots do draw their Forces together, then, the 
drawing the King's Array into one or more Bodies 
shall be accounted no Breach...5*+
therefore, that the aggressive mood of the royal army be
However, the conference did not eventuate. 
Apparently it was considered that the Lords, who had shown 
themselves mistrustful of the Scots, would be disinclined to
55curb the ardour of the King's army. The vote of 3 April 
was renewed on the sixth. This time it was proposed that 
what was intended as an order of both Houses, should be 
voted as a declaration of the Commons' opinion. Some members 
wanted to reject the proposal. Others were prepared to vote 
it, but with a declaration attached proclaiming the Scots 
enemies if they moved aggressively— Capel was first among 
them. But pacific opinions akin to those of D'Ewes prevailed.
5V. This head of conference is recorded by D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. 
MSS. 162, f. 399. I, however, have given the text from 
the final form of the resolution taken on 6 April 16V1:
C . J ., ii, 116; Rushworth, iv, 223.
55- 1 think the Lords had shown already that they had taken 
the part of the army, for when the Earl of Holland 
delivered in the officers' letter on 23 March, he 
enlarged upon the grievances of the army and urged the 
Commons to supply them money. He urged that the Commons 
'might pardon them though they wrote in too high a 
straine...' D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 16V, f. 9*+5v.
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He argued that any declaring the Scots enemies v/ould only
provoke them, as they had already suffered much because of
Parliament's misfortune in being unable to raise money for
them. The resolution to order the English army to remain in
56
camp was voted as a declaration only of the Commons. The 
Venetian ambassador interpreted this vote as a victory for 
those who wished to keep the Scots in England 'to serve 
their own licence and serve as a bridle to any generous
57decisions the king might take...1 Men like D'Ewes simply 
wanted to avoid renewed war; but radicals like Marten and 
Pennington, and closer to the centre, the great leaders like 
Pym, Hampden and Holies, would have hoped that their 
declaration could stop the army from doing anything which 
menaced their own survival. If the English army drove out 
the Scots, and Charles thereby was relieved of the pressure 
obliging him to continue the Parliament, the active party's 
policy of reform would be at serious risk. Therefore, if the 
Scots had to leave England, it was better they should do so 
with the blessing of the active party. It was essential that 
the leaders of the Commons should not lose control over 
England's dealings with the Scots.
For months now the active party had been frustrating 
the anti-Scottish party, to whom it seemed there was no 
intention to relieve England of the Scots. On 9 April the 
anti-Scots faction attempted again to end the treaty. That 
day the question arose whether or not to extend the cessation
56. ibid., f. V05-6.
57» C.S.P.V., xxv, 1V0.
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a fortnight longer; and the anti-Scottish party opposed.
58
But again it was beaten. Gardiner nearly overlooks this
very important division. He cursorily observes that the vote
worried Pym and his associates, who feared for their control
of the Commons at a time when the Lords seemed to be cooling
in their ardour for Strafford's prosecution. Gardiner
completely misinterprets this division. Once more he seems
to ignore the months of hard-fought divisions, rousing
speeches and ill-tempered remarks which bespoke outrage at
England's dishonour. He complacently observes that
the unhappy religious question stood in the way 
of all harmonious action...There were many who 
wished, in the interest of the bishops, that 
another war might break out, in which the Scots 
might be less successful than before.59
The division of 9 April was the last serious 
attempt of the anti-Scots group to direct the treaty 
deliberations. But they had not been routed. In fact, they 
commanded nearly half the votes in the House; and if it had 
not been for a matter of such transcendant concern as 
Strafford's trial, they might have captured in time the 
last handful of votes. However, the progress of Strafford's
^8. According to the Commons' Journal the division was:
Yeas, 167, Tompkins and Lord Compton being the tellers; 
Noes, 128, Holies and Sir Edward Hungerford the tellers: 
C .J., ii, 118. According to D'Ewes the tellers were 
reversed: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 16V, f. 963v. I accept 
D'Ewes' account. Going on the past behaviour of the 
House it is unlikely that Holies would have voted 
against extending the Cessation. On the other hand, one 
would expect a future royalist like Tomkins and a future 
royalist-Straffordian like Lord Compton to have voted 
for the Noes. D'Ewes records that the tellers did 
behave according to expectation, and so I conclude that 
his record is faithful.
59* Gardiner, History of England, ix, 326.
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prosecution was by this time beginning to preoccupy members
60
completely. As Gardiner points out, the leadership in the 
Commons was becoming disturbed over the aloofness of the 
Lords, and feared that disagreement (over things like the 
Irish army) might affect their judgement of the case against 
Strafford. Many members thought their survival depended upon 
Strafford's extinction; so that when their case seemed about 
to fail they seized upon the merciless expedient of 
Attainder. After the Commons had walked out in dismay from 
the trial (10 April), agonizing weeks followed as they 
awaited the Lords' reaction to the Attainder, and, finally, 
that of Charles himself. During the month between 10 April, 
when the Scots Commissioners presented the eighth article in 
full, and 12 May, when Strafford was dead on Tower Hill, the 
anxiety with which members awaited the process of Attainder 
was transformed into terror by fears of an army plot at home, 
and a Catholic menace from Ireland.
There was no doubt that the Scots army worried 
the Parliament; but with the failure of the impeachment of 
Strafford a new and more immediate threat began to menace 
the survival of the reforming party. If Strafford were 
acquitted, Charles might easily launch a counter-attack 
against a discredited leadership of the House of Commons. 
Rumours were abroad. It was known that he was shaping a 
moderate party around Bristol and Bedford in the Lords; and 
Goring had revealed already to the Lord Newport a plot 
concocted by the dilettante officers, Suckling and Jermyn.
6o, ibid.
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The Scots Commissioners handed all their demands under the 
eighth article to the Lords on the very day that the Commons 
deserted Westminster Hall for the way of Attainder; but 
consideration of the treaty was not renewed until 17 May, 
when Strafford was five days dead. On 10 April Parliament
61
readily elected to extend the cessation for another month.
It was clear the reformers were giving themselves time to
deal with the Attainder rather than with the Scots. On 1V
April, when the Earl of Bristol was describing for the Lords62
the complexities of the eighth article, the Commons were
6 3
reading the Attainder for the second time. On 15 April the
6V
Lords delivered the eighth article to the Commons, but it
65was not reported in the House until 22 April, the day
66
after, the Commons voted the Attainder; and when the 
Commons did return on 27 April to the treaty, it was not to 
discuss the articles but to raise the sums needed to maintain
67the Scots until the treaty could be resumed.
Doubtless the Scots were not pleased with further 
delay. However, they too had promised themselves the delight 
of seeing Laud and Strafford destroyed. The Scots did not 
doubt that unless these incendiaries were extinguished they
61. L.J., iv, 213; C.J., ii, 118; D !Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS.
16V , f. 965v. The cessation was extended from 16 April 
by one month.
62. L.J., iv, 216.
63. D fEwes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. V37.
6V. C.J., ii, 120-1: L.J., ii. 217-18: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. 
MSS. 16V, f. 975.
65. , ii, 125.
66. ibid.
67. .C-T-? ii, 128-9; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. V95-6. 
D'Ewes here notes that the debate was over a proposed 
poll tax and the borrowing of further sums from London 
until the tax was bringing in money.
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would continue to plot the downfall of the Covenant. For the 
Scots, one of the chief objects of the treaty was to ensure 
that Laud and Strafford were removed as advisors to the 
Crown. The Scottish Commissioners had been instructed to
treat for the punishment of all incendiaries between the
68
two kingdoms; and in accordance with this instruction, the
demand was enshrined in the treaty, and now was before
69
Parliament as part of the eighth article. Moreover, they
already had contributed accusations to the impeachment of
70
both the Archbishop and the Earl. The Scots, therefore, 
were in no position to complain when Parliament was about 
the business for which the Scots had invaded England. It 
seemed that even the hostilities of the anti-Scottish 
group, not exclusively Straffordian, disappeared for the 
moment in the blast of nearly universal hatred for Strafford,
71
If we examine a list of Straffordians we quickly 
realise that there were men who spoke against the Scots but 
who were opposed to Strafford. On the other hand, I can find 
no evidence of a Straffordian who could tolerate the Scots, 
Many Straffordians, men like Widdrington, Kirton, Gervase 
Holies, Lord Compton and Cornwallis, voted not merely against 
the injustice of legislatively condemning a man against whom
68. ^Instructions from the Committee of Estates to the 
Scotch Commissioners appointed for the Treaty at 
London... 1 C.S.P.D. , 164-0-Vl , 2M+—5.
69. Punishment of the incendiaries was covered by the 
eleventh part of the eighth head, under the eighth 
article: D 1Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f- 60V; Rushworth, 
iv, 372.
70. The Scots presented their charges against Strafford and 
Laud on 17 December 16V0: Nalson, i, 680-8.
71. D ’Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. J\6$, f." 85; Verney Papers, 57-8.
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no charge could be proven; they voted also against those 
men who, to the mind of a Straffordian, had revealed in 
their dealings with the Scots an inclination to exploit 
every opportunity for the sake of some political advantage, 
even at the cost of England*s honour. To the Straffordians 
the Attainder was a deed of the same order, Whereas once the 
active party had tried to use the Scottish occupation and 
delay of the treaty to force political concessions from 
Charles, so now they chose to destroy the Kingfs chief 
minister by Act of Parliament when the legal prosecution was 
failing. When a Straffordian considered the events of the 
past months and compared the bill of Attainder with the 
active party*s handling of the treaty, he could have 
concluded that the active party seemed to be bent on 
implementing its policies by fair means or foul. If the 
active party, Straffordians asked themselves, used both 
treason and murder to attain their goals, then what more 
did they intend? There can be little doubt that the Attainder 
divided the embryo of the royalist party from the 
progressive wing of the Commons. The Straffordians had not 
found themselves suddenly thrown together by the introduction 
of the Attainder; they were not the product of a few April 
weeks. They had been schooled for long months in the tactics 
of men who, it seemed, would stop at nothing to have their 
reforms. The Straffordians had tasted daily since November 
the humiliation of supporting an occupation by an old enemy. 
They were exasperated by the checks the active party put in 
the way of an attempt to rid England of her invaders. Nov: 
the reformers were sending a man to death by the same
8 2
disingenuous means.
of the Lords to the Attainder. On 27 April, when the Commons
were debating taxes and loans, the Lords were reading the
72
Attainder for the second time. It looked as if it might
pass, but the Lords were in no haste to proceed with the
matter. They faltered. The leaders of the opposition were
alarmed. Charles contributed to the growing tension by
announcing that he would not disband the new Irish army
73until the treaty was concluded, and that he would go into
7b
the North and personally take charge of the royal army. 
Certainly something dreadful was expected. The active party 
feared that Charles would attempt to dissolve Parliament 
with a disaffected army at his back. When the Usher of the 
Black Hod called up the Commons (1 May) to hear His Majesty 
in the Lords, the Commons believed they were about to be
75dissolved. Instead, Charles declared that his conscience 
would not permit him to condemn Strafford. The King's 
attitude, however, did not relieve the Commons of their 
doubt that Parliament was threatened; indeed, if Charles 
did not yield on the Attainder, it seemed that a dissolution 
was inevitable. In these circumstances the Commons ordered 
that a bill for two extra subsidies, now in the committee' 
stage, be amended so that the passing of this bill (or any
In the meantime the Commons awaited the reaction
72. L.J., iv, 227. The Lords read the Attainder for the 
first time on 26 April 16V1: ibid.
73. C.J., ii, 131.
7b, C.S.P.V., xxv, 1^5.
75. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 572: The Black Rod assured 
the Commons, when he saw their fearful countenances, 
that they were not going to be dissolved.
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The fear of a dissolution had been worrying the 
parliamentary leaders since November. They knew that the 
Scots' invasion had compelled Charles to call Parliament; 
they knew that he needed Parliament to raise money both for 
his own army and for the Scots army also. Now the Houses 
were about to pass a bill to raise that money for the 
Scots and to pave the way for their return home. The active 
party realized that once they had met these financial 
obligations Charles would no longer have so pressing a need 
for Parliament. Thus by amending the subsidy bill to prevent 
a dissolution once provision was made for the Scots, the 
active party was admitting publicly that hitherto it had 
regarded the necessity to pay the Scots as the guarantee of 
Parliament's survival. The reason for all these months of 
delaying in treaty-making was thus made apparent to any who 
hitherto had not understood. Now, however, the active party 
had to seek some other device to ensure Parliament's future 
sitting. Unless appropriate steps were taken, Charles might 
save Strafford and close Parliament at a single stroke.
Nor were the Scots an aid to Parliament in this 
predicament. In fact, they were as impatient as the King to 
finish the treaty. At this dangerous moment, when the 
reformers would have looked most for Scottish support, the 
Scots, who had restrained themselves from pressing their
7o. C. J . , ii, 13 1. Significantly, the reformist lawyers 
Whitelocke, Selden and Wilde were set the task of 
amending the bill.
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other) would not determine the session of Parliament.
8 k
demands on Parliament, now renewed their cries for money, 
and urged that the treaty be ended quickly. This, they said, 
was the only way to prevent a starving army from plundering 
counties as yet untouched. They complained also that they
77had waited too long for an answer to their eighth article.
This paper could not have endeared the Scots to men who at
that moment most needed the Scots to forbear. There was now
considerable reason to doubt that the active reform party
could continue to rely on the Scots for support. Indeed, it
seemed that some of the things for which the Scots had
called in England, like the punishment of the great
incendiaries, Strafford and Laud, had diminished in
importance for the Scots. As Baillie himself said, these
78
things were now 'private1 matters for the English: the 
Scots only wanted to return home as soon as they could. In 
the meantime, they were determined to prosecute their own 
interests with a singlemindedness which informed their 
English friends they would be treated as uncompromisingly 
as the King. To exploit the crisis over the Attainder as a 
means of strengthening the Scottish negotiating position 
must have seemed to members an action unworthy of 'Brethren1. 
Under these circumstances, therefore, the attitude of the 
active party toward the Scots began to change. As I will 
show in the next chapter, the Scottish way of making their 
case with a bludgeon made the active party more suspicious 
of the Scots and more attentive to English interests. This
77* This paper was delivered to the Lords on 1 May. It was 
penned on 28 April before Charles' speech to the Houses 
concerning the Attainder. For the paper see L.J., iv, 
231-2.
78. Baillie, i, 302.
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change of attitude was evident from the moment Parliament 
returned to the treaty after Strafford's execution. The 
refusal of the Scots to relent for the sake of the active 
party even in a moment of great crisis had begun to 
embitter the reformers' affection for the Scots.
The Attainder passed its second reading in the
79
Lords on 5 May. It appeared the Bill would pass; but the
King could still refuse it. The harrowing ordeal had not yet
run its course. The Suckling Plot had been revealed and the
80
Protestation taken. Parliament was tense. The same day,
members learnt by letter of threats made against the gentlemen
of Cumberland and Westmoreland to plunder them unless they
81
provided supplies for the Scottish army. The audacity of 
the Scots knew no bounds. Many members, especially 
Northerners, spoke for the relief of the counties; and Mr.
Treasurer Vane urged the House to conclude the treaty and
82
disband the armies. However, even though the boldness of
the Scots was becoming insupportable, the active party could
8 3
not yet be without them. The debate was allowed to lapse; 
and searching about for some way to replace the tactical 
advantage they once sought in the Scots, the active party 
despatched Whitelocke to prepare a bill for the continuance
79« L.J ., iv, 235«
80. The Protestation was taken on b May 1 6m-1 s L. J ., iv, 
233-V; C .J ., ii, 132. The Suckling Plot was revealed on
5 May, before the Lords finally voted the Attainder:
L.J., iv, 233* It was a nicely timed revelation.
81. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 522.
82. D'Ewes mentions Mr. Blackiston and Sir Henry Anderson, 




of the present Parliament. On 7 May the Attainder finally
8 5
passed the Lords, and Parliament awaited its greatest test 
thus far.
The Commons thought that the King would do
anything rather than agree to the Attainder. They feared
most that the royal army would be turned against Parliament;
and that fear increased now that the bill was before the
King. Members were so absorbed by the outcome that when Sir
Henry Anderson delivered (8 May) a ’good and honest speech’
86
about the plight of the northern counties he was ignored.
The drama, however, was soon ended. On 10 May the King gave 
his assent to the Attainder.
The passage of this amazing bill does give us an 
important insight into parliamentary attitudes toward the 
Scots. The most vehemently anti-Scottish group of M.P.s who 
had been formed and isolated over the months by the 
'Brotherly Assistance', by delays in the treaty, by attacks 
on the new Irish army and on the royal army, saw the 
Attainder as the most extreme measure so far in a series of 
measures which not only affronted the dignity of the nation, 
but also might be construed as an attack upon the Crown 
itself. The Act of Attainder brought forth a tiny Court 
party which had its roots in the disagreements over policy
SV.~CYJ.'« i i ,  136.
85- L.J., iv , 238.
86. D'Ewes. B.M. Iiarl. MSS. 163, f. 537-8. The House
preferred to hear a report of a conference held with the 
Lords on 7 May about a suspected attempt to disaffect 
the army to Parliament. For details of the conference, 
see C.J. , ii, 137-8; L.J.. iv, 237-8.
81+
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toward the Scots. Nevertheless, the pro-Court party was as 
yet a small faction. This is not to say that the Scots issue 
was insignificant. Despite the weakness of the anti-Scots 
group and the reassertion of the active party's control over 
the treaty, the 9 April division over extending the 
cessation suggested that a major split might yet develop 
in the Commons over policy towards the Scots. However, the 
attack on Strafford and the fear of royal retaliation seemed 
to unite most members just when it looked that a serious 
rupture over the Scots was emerging. For the majority of 
members, Strafford was a bigger issue than the Scots.
A split, then, was averted. This is not to suggest that the 
active party's apparent attitude of solicitude toward the 
Scots triumphed also. Their behaviour, particularly during 
the crisis of the Attainder, shook the active party's 
confidence in them as an ally of reform, and sowed doubts 
among the reformers as to the nature of the Scottish 
intentions. The active party began to suspect the Scots.
This new mood began to manifest itself when Parliament 
resumed discussion of the treaty.




Now that Strafford was dead, Parliament was 
ready to return to the treaty. The active party re-embarked 
upon it conscious of the real possibility of Scottish 
intervention. It was now plain that the Scots had entered 
England partly in order to ensure that the English would 
settle their political and religious difficulties in a way 
compatible with Scottish interests. Even Englishmen who 
thought that Scottish and English interests were closely 
allied could not tolerate the Scots canvassing a 
Presbyterian settlement of the English church. Meanwhile, 
Scottish threats to advance their army diminished the 
active party's attraction to a connection in which they 
were treated less as a partner and more as a milch cow. Nor 
had the Scots' behaviour assisted the active party in holding 
its position in Parliament. The domineering ways of the 
Scots, in fact, threatened the leadership that Pym and his 
associates exercised in the Houses. Now that Strafford was 
gone, Laud imprisoned and the Act for the continuation of 
the Long Parliament given the royal assent, the Scots were 
no longer so important to the active party. I will argue in 
this chapter that the diminished importance of the Scots in 
the calculations of the active party was overtaken by an 
increasing suspicion of them. This change, facilitated by 
uncertainty as to the role of the Scots in the suspected 
royal machinations against Parliament, led even the active 
party by August 16V1 to regard almost as enemies those they 
had once greeted as friends.
Parliament at no time during this period could
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16V1 the more ardent reformers felt less need and liking for
them, and a new and widespread tone of firmness began to
characterise parliamentary dealings with them. The first
sign came with the religious problem. The Scots in their
first head under the eighth article of the peace treaty
desired that there might be unity in religion and uniformity
of church government as a special means of conserving the
1
peace between the two kingdoms. Besides the fact that
religion was a question upon which the English were not
agreed amongst themselves, to yield on the issue would be
to admit of Scottish interference in matters that were
exclusively English. Thus the Scots received their first
check when (17 May) the Commons voted
...That this House doth approve the Affection of 
their Brethren of Scotland, in their desire of 
Conformity, in Church Government between the Two 
Nations; and doth give them thanks for it: And 
as they have already taken into Consideration, 
the Reformation of Church Government, so they 
will proceed therein in due time, as shall best 
conduce to the Glory of God, and the Peace of 
the Church.2
As Clarendon observes, this signified and concluded nothing
3so far as the course of church reform was concerned; 
however, it was a blank refusal to let the Scots dictate 
the terms of religious settlement. It was a foil to the 
Scottish hopes of interfering in a crucial question of 
reform. On this point, at least, the active party and their 
opponents of the anti-Scottish faction were united. After 
many months of angry exchanges it appeared that two
afford to risk a breach with the Scots. However, by May
1. Rushworth. iv, 368.
2. C.J., ii, 1V8.
3. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, iii, 66.
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formerly hostile factions in the Commons were uniting to 
resist Scottish demands— a sign that the attitudes of the 
active party to the Scots had undergone some change. It 
looked as though both sides of the House might unite to 
free England of an army that had outworn its welcome.
Certainly the orders of the House suggest that the Commons 
was busy about the treaty and the disbanding, wherein, 
hitherto, it had delayed.
On 18 May the Commons was discussing security for 
those who would lend £200,000 !for disbanding the two armies
V
& the conclusion of the peace within one month, or sooner. 
Meanwhile, negotiations were proceeding with the Merchant
5Adventurers for the loan of the said money; and the
Committee for the Kingfs Army was ordered to consider means
6
of disbanding the two armies. The task of disbanding was 
considered so urgent that new members were added to the
committee, and these (Sir William Armyn, Lucas, Cage, and
7
Crew) were men whose connections were with the active party. 
On the following Wednesday (19 May) the debate on the armies 
was resumed, with the new members of the committee taking a 
leading part in describing forcefully the urgency and 
difficulty of raising the sums required for disbanding.
Indeed, it did seem that for the first time since November 
16V0 the Commons was uniting to speed the treaty and the 
disbandment, with prominent reformers active in the task. In
b. D ’Ewes," B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 58*+.
5. Ibid., f. 585.
6. ibid.: C.J., ii, 1*+9.
7. ibid.: D ’Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 585.
8. ibid.. f. 566-9•
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This time they were considering a Scottish
proposal that neither Kingdom should make war on the other
without the consent of their respective parliaments. Many
men objected that this was a dangerous proposal which
9
touched the King*s prerogative. Culpepper and Edmund
10
Waller were chief among the opponents of the article.
But no grave dispute seems to have erupted; instead, the
proposal was referred to a conference for discussion with
11
Lords. For a matter which was said to involve the
prerogative, the whole House was taking the business fairly
coolly. Greater difficulties, however, were in store in the
next head of the eighth article. This one— the third—
proposed that neither party should make war upon a foreign
country without the consent of the other. Many objected
strongly to this and moved that it be rejected. Once more
Culpepper— this time supported by Kirton and Hopton— led
the attack on this demand. However, despite the fact that
the anti-Scottish party and future royalists were leading
the assault against the Scots, there was not the clash on
the issue that there would have been in previous weeks.
Instead, the Commons resolved that the article be returned
12
to the Lords Commissioners for further negotiation. It is 
surely significant that despite the forwardness of the anti- 
Scots party against these articles, they did not appear to
9. ibid., f. 590.
10. ibid., f. 591.
11. ibid., f. 592.
12. ibid., f. 592-3.
this mood the House returned again to the eighth article.
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clash with the active party which once seemed set on 
delaying the treaty and on pleasing the Scots at every turn. 
It looks as if the active party shared in the dislike of 
the articles, and was prepared to let the anti-Scots group 
have the running. The Commons was surely united in a common 
determination to conclude the treaty, but on respectable 
terms.
The eagerness of Parliament, and especially of 
the active party, to be rid of the armies, became 
increasingly apparent from day to day. On 20 May a standing 
select committee of 52 Commoners and 26 Peers was formed to 
plan and oversee the disbanding of the two armies— taking 
this responsibility away from the Committee for the King!s 
Army, where formerly it had resided. Significantly, the new 
committee was directed 'to meet at all such times as they
13shall find the business to require.' A more decisive
commitment of the Commons to easing the burden of the armies
came on the same day, when the House turned to consider the
fourth head of the eighth article. The Scots wanted Acts to
be passed in both Kingdoms ratifying the treaty of peace—
to which the Commons agreed— and proposed that the armies be
1 V
disbanded only when this act had been passed in England.
The latter part of the proposition generally disturbed the 
House, for, as D'Ewes pointed out, they would be unable to 
provide for armies which were to be kept so long in being as
1 V.~~C.J. .~ii. 152; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 596; L.J.. 
iv, 25V. This committee was directed also 'to settle a 
perfect Accompt' between the Scots and the northern 
counties.
1V. ibid., f. 597.
which showed how committed they were to ending the treaty
and, especially, to disbanding the armies:
...this House desires the Armies shall be 
disbanded as soon as may be and the Articles of 
the Treaty should be presently concluded: and such 
of them, as cannot be concluded, should be referred 
by mutual Consent: That those Articles, which 
shall be concluded, shall be confirmed by Act-of 
Parliaments 6
By this the Commons declared their wish that the disbanding 
of the armies should not depend upon the final conclusion of 
the peace treaty.
A strong desire to conclude matters was gripping 
men who had been once active in delaying them. Resolutions 
which once would not have been accepted without a struggle 
now passed the House without a division— a sure sign that 
the active party and their opponents were united. Even the 
most extreme members shared in this new mood. For instance, 
on 21 May Mr. Treasurer Vane reported from the committee of 
52 (which met v/ith the Lords on 20 May) three propositions 
concerning arrangements for the payment of the Scots and the 
northern counties, and for disbanding the armies. The third 
of these proposed that when the peace had been concluded, 
and public faith had been given for the payment of the 
'Brotherly Assistance', the armies would be disbanded by
15
by this proposal. The Commons thereupon made a resolution
15. ibid. ~
16. C±J., ii, 152; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 597v.
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degrees as money was collected. This caused dispute in
the Commons because some claimed that it 'limited the time
of the disbanding the armies to the giving of publicke faith
18
and the paiment of arrears.' Henry Marten, who previously
had moved that the treaty should be laid aside until
Strafford's process had been concluded, now moved that since
the House had voted (on 20 May) the speedy disbanding of the
19armies, this latest proposition 'crossed' that vote.
Marten was right. However, the Commons realised that they 
could not separate the disbandment of the armies from 
completion of the treaty, wish all they might. The Scots 
would not leave without money and the guarantees provided 
by a formal parliamentary Act. In the meantime, England had 
to maintain its defences. Nevertheless, despite these 
contrary votes, the Commons had revealed their wish that 
the Scots should be gone; whilst Marten's motion shows how 
much the attitude of the lower House had changed. Even those 
who once had dallied were now for despatch.
17
On the day after Marten's exclamation (22 May) 
the House provided further evidence that attitudes toward
17* The first and second propositions were: i) That an 
arrear of £200,000 to be paid to the Scots for the 
counties and the 'Brotherly Assistance* of £300,000 
shall be settled and secured by the Kingdom of England 
to the Scots; ii) That if the deductions for the 
counties are more than the Scots can spare, they will be 
allowed the full sum for disbanding, and the debt to 
the counties be taken upon the Kingdom of England and 
deducted from the 'Brotherly Assistance': C.J.. ii, 153; 
L.J.. iv, 255; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 600v.
18. ibid.
19. ibid. The Commons agreed to the three proposals and 
voted that the Lords Commissioners treat over them 
with the Scots.
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the Scots were changing. A division occurred which seemed to
suggest that disagreements over the Scots, and what was fit
for England's honour, had passed from being disagreements
between the active party and the anti-Scottish group, to one
which divided the active party itself. That day Mr. Crew
reported the grand committee's deliberations on the
remainder of the eighth article. A sharp dispute erupted
over the final demand concerning the extradition of
20
incendiaries. The point in dispute was neatly expressed
by Selden, who spoke 'verie vehementlie against it: showing
it was against the law of Nations to deliver such as fledd
to them for refuge and protection...and That we should come
to be iudged by a law we know not.' Holies answered him that
though treason committed in another state under one king was
not treason in another, this did not apply to the case of
21
England and Scotland because they were under one king.
Ostensibly the issue was a legal one. However, it could not
have arisen unless a substantial part of the Commons
considered the Scots as foreigners who could not be treated
favourably, as countrymen, without dishonour to Parliament
and to England. Thus the House was deadlocked, in reality,
over an issue of honour. In the end a division settled the
question in favour of the Scots. This division was not,
however, like those of days past when the active party
marshalled against the anti-Scottish faction. This time the
active party was divided against itself. Strode and Holies
22
told against Glyn and Fiennes.
20. For the full article see Rushworth, iv, 372.
21. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 611v.
22. C.J.. ii, 15*+-5.
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This division further indicates that attitudes to 
the Scots were changing in the Commons, and that even the 
active party had become infected with dislike for the Scots’ 
demands. Prominent figures among the reformers were now 
leading the anti-Scottish vote] Even the Venetian ambassador, 
who had been reporting for months that the reformers were 
in collusion with the Scots, noted a marked change in 
Parliament. He saw that it was prosecuting the treaty 
vigorously, and that its suspicion of the Scots was growing 
apace:
Parliament has recently voted two subsidies, on 
condition that they are controlled by its 
commissioners, and employed solely for the pay of 
the armies, which they want to disband as soon as 
possible. They are actively negotiating with the 
Scottish commissioners to terminate if possible, 
all their differences and to conclude a close 
alliance, between the two crowns. The 
commissioners are apparently perfectly favourable 
to an adjustment and equally ready to withdraw 
their forces, but many feel doubtful if they will 
fulfil their promises. 23
The Scots doubtless were 'favourable to an
adjustment1; but they continued behaving in their high-handed
way. It seemed that their arrogance knew no bounds. They
were confident of the strength of their position, and used
it to make further demands which added to the store of
insults and increase of doubts which England had garnered at
their hands. The Scots accepted the proposals for
disbanding the armies and for payment of the northern 
214-
counties; but they did so ungraciously. They began to 
insist that their privation in the North could not be
23. C.S.F.V.. xxv, 153.
2V. See above, 95, Note 17.
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relieved by paying arrears of £120,000. They demanded that 
the arrears should be calculated not from 16 October 16V0 
but from the time of their first coming— 20 August. They also 
required that a proportion of the 'Brotherly Assistance* be 
paid to meet their urgent requirements: the need to 
refurbish their trade, and to compensate those who had
2 5indebted themselves to equip the expedition.
Although there were signs of an increasing
parliamentary discontent with the Scots, the mood was not
of that unbridled kind which might provoke a breach. There
were other reasons, however, for bringing the treaty to a
close besides hostility to the Scots. For one, the cost of
the armies was almost more than England could bear.
Moreover, another more serious factor was emerging: the
English army's loyalty to Parliament was suspect. Here was
a very persuasive reason for making an early settlement,
and an even quicker disbanding. Therefore, the Commons
empowered its committee of 52 (26 May) to propose to the
Lords that a sum of £80,000 should be paid upon the
26
disbandment as part of the 'Brotherly Assistance.' The
Peers agreed to the sum and proposed in reply that the
standing select committee on disbanding should meet daily
27
to discuss any difficulties as they arose. The Commons,
25» C.S.P.D., 16V0-V1, 583. The demand was not presented to 
the Commons until 22 May: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, 
f. 622.
26. C.J.. ii, 157; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 621. The 
committee was also empowered to propose a further 
cessation of 1V days from 30 May, which was granted by 
the Lords: L.J., iv, 257; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, 
f. 622.
27. ibid., f. 622v.
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now as eager as the Lords, immediately agreed. Both Houses,
despite all insults and all unreasonable demands, were
committed to finishing matters as soon as possible. On 27
May (the day Sir Edward Dering introduced the bill against
episcopacy) the Commons read for the first time a bill to
raise £*+00,000 on the English and Welsh counties for
29
disbanding the armies. Indeed, the Commons had become so
bent on freeing England of armies and obligations that,
30
after a bitter debate, it voted the coining of plate.
As I have hinted above, the active party's forging 
ahead v/ith the treaty and disbanding was motivated not 
simply by a belated sense of patriotism. They were creatures 
too politic for that. Ever since the Suckling plot and the 
days when the King's officers were telling Parliament they 
were eager to do battle with the Scots, the army had been 
under a cloud. It v/as necessary, therefore, that the royal 
army be dissolved. This meant that peace must be made v/ith 
the Scots rapidly, and their army withdrawn. For the present 
the royal army was looking riotous and insubordinate, which 
in itself was problem enough to worry Parliament and to make 
members wish it was disbanded. But wish all they would, the 
members could not solve the problem of the royal army until 
they had concluded the treaty with the Scots.
28. ibid./ f. 623v.
29. ibid* 5 f* 628. The Bill v/as called the 'Subsidy Bill'.
30. ibid., f. 65V. The debate was 'bitter* not because the 
House disagreed on the necessity to raise money and 
quickly be rid of the Scots, but because members 
disagreed about the appropriateness of the measure. It 
appeared to be very drastic.
28
1 0 0
On 7 June Sir Henry Mildmay reported to the Commons 
a letter from Hull informing members that a Captain Withers 
had been murdered by mutineers. In response to the letter
the House began arguing whether they should debate disbanding
31the armies or the 'eradication1 of bishops. It chose to
32
debate raising money to disband the armies. The Lords 
reacted a little more sharply. They decided to tell the 
Commons that as times were dangerous 'no Way is so fit to 
prevent further inconveniences as to disband both Armies.' 
They advised the Commons committee of 52 to meet on the 
unfinished articles until they were complete and speedily 
return them to the Lords Commissioners. The Lords further 
advised the Commons to think of ways to raise money for
33disbanding the armies.
The Commons did not seem to mind these sharp i/ords.
In fact some Commoners so much agreed with them that when the
House came to consider (8 June) extending the cessation
from J\b June, they flatly rejected the proposal. Others,
equally desiring peace, objected to the refusers, arguing
that it was impossible to conclude in time and that without
3 ^a cessation the armies might come to blows. Still others 
maintained that they would agree to a cessation only if the 
Commons would declare that the treaty would not continue
31• ibid., f. 665*
32. C^J., ii, 169.
33« L.J ., iv, 268.
3V. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 671.
101
beyond 28 June. In these circumstances of fear that the 
royal soldiers would turn against Parliament once the Scots 
were gone, some called for the House not to consent to a 
disbanding of the Scottish unless the English army was 
disbanded at the same time. But the Commons ended the debate
35by voting the cessation without any conditions. They 
probably understood that the Scots, though anxious to be 
home, were not going to be hustled away without their 
money; and this the English could not provide in a 
fortnight. There was, obviously, a more drastic way to 
disband the troublesome and dangerous English army than by 
ending the treaty; Parliament could disband it, peace or no 
peace.
That same afternoon (8 June) Nathaniel Fiennes
revealed an army plot against Parliament. There was supposed
to be a plan to introduce a new garrison into the Tower and
to march the royal army against Parliament supported by
36
French troops disembarking at Portsmouth. Here alone were 
grounds for disbanding the royal army. The question was, 
however, would those grounds be sufficient to overcome the 
Parliament's natural concern for England's security?
In the Commons there was no effective resistance. 
The anti-Scottish party knew well enough that it was weak. 
After June the army had no competent support in the 
Commons. This same day the Lords reported to the Commons a
351. ibidTT f. 675*36. ibid.
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letter from twenty-five officers complaining that the lower
House abused them by its accusations of disloyalty.
Furthermore, as if to verify the Commons1 suspicions of the
army, the officers outlined their own political programme.
They called for the maintenance of the bishops1 votes, the
disbanding of the Scots, and the restoration of the King's 
37
revenues. The Commons did not delay action against the
army. It sent a message to the Lords desiring a conference
about demobilizing five regiments on the plea of their 
38
expense.
The Peers were not impressed by this proposal.
They were deeply suspicious of the Scots and feared that 
they would take advantage of this weakening in England's 
defences. They believed that the Scots' invasion and the 
subsequent course of the treaty had been sufficiently 
dishonourable to England and to their own reputations. Thus, 
no matter how anxious were the Commons, nor how difficult 
the army, the Lords were determined to maintain the 
country's defences against the Scots. They informed the 
Commons (15 June) that they were ready to give all possible 
assistance to effect a total disbanding. They urged the
37* ibid.. f. 699-699v. See also: 'Those protests have only 
increased suspicions...in the Lower House...' C .S.P.V., 
xxv, 166.
38. According to the record in the Lords' Journal, the
Commons claimed that they had used their utmost efforts 
to raise money to disband the armies. Necessity 
therefore obliged them to disband the royal army as the 
Commons was able to supply sufficient money for this 
task. The Commons proposed to disband the Scots army 
later: L.J., iv, 27*+-5- According to Giustiniani, this 
plea of expense v/as but a cover behind which the Commons 
launched its attacks on the royal army: C.S.P.V., xxv, 166.
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disbanding, maintaining that when they had provided this
they would assist them eagerly to raise the sum. The Peers
warned that the Parliament's creditors would be loath to
lend for anything less than a full disbanding. Nevertheless,
the Lords did make one concession— that if only a partial
disbanding was possible, then the Scots must be persuaded
39
to make a reciprocal withdrawal* Even this concession, 
however, revealed that a mistrust of the Scots and a concern 
for England's proper defence underlay the Lords1 response to 
the 'jobbery* of the Commons. The Lords would not yield, 
wrote Giustiniani, because they did not 1 consider it safe 
or honourable to weaken the army while Scottish troops 
remain in England...’ So firm were they in this that the 
King*s supporters looked to the disagreement as that breach
Vo
between the Houses for which they had long been waiting.
For a second time divisions were appearing in Parliament 
because of different attitudes towards the Scots. After a 
few weeks of apparent and unexampled unity in handling 
treaty affairs and the demobilizing of the armies, conflict 
was renewed.
There is no doubt that the active party by this 
time wished to free itself from an association that was now 
more an encumbrance than a support. Hostility to the Scots 
was on the increase and v/as shared by the leading reformers. 
However, between the active party and those I have termed
39. L. J .~iv, 275. 
VO. C.S.P.V.« xxv, 166.
Commons to provide an estimate of the cost of a full
the anti-Scottish faction there was a difference of priority; 
a difference that was highlighted by the army plot. The clash 
was between those who thought the Scots enemies against whom 
a bulwark must be maintained; and those who saw internal 
political issues to be of greater importance than the issues 
of safety and honour provoked by the Scots, Such a difference 
was bound to aggravate incipient party divisions in 
Parliament, Some members who looked forward to reform must, 
nevertheless, have wondered what sort of reformers were these 
men who wanted to dismantle the royal army rather than make a 
defence against the Scots, Perhaps some future royalists 
asked themselves what reform was intended that was so 
important that even the country's defence stood second to it. 
It must have seemed strange to the Lords and to the anti- 
Scottish faction in the Commons that the royal army was being 
attacked for behaviour that was provoked, in part, by the long 
continuance of the Scots in England— a circumstance for which 
Parliament itself shared responsibility. Could anyone blame 
the officers for protesting at their treatment? Even in the 
Commons there was a similar manifestation of disgust. During 
Fiennes' report on the plot, Wilmot accused Goring of perjury 
(for revealing the sworn secret of the plot); and Digby 
appeared to impugn the legality of the investigation itself.
¥1. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f# 68V, Digby's meaning is 
not clear from D'Ewes. If we take only this source into 
account, Gardiner's interpretation, that Digby seemed to 
question the legality of the investigation, is the most 
plausible. However, it is worth noting that Verney in his 
notes recorded (Verney, 90) that Digby also accused 
Goring of perjury:
Lord Digby sayd of Colonel Goring, 'In my opinion 
hee is purjured.'




Some angrily called for Wilmot!s and Digby's censure; others
as angrily opposed. Scuffles broke out. Strode thought it was*+2
going to end in blood. Clearly the attack on the army was 
nettling certain members. Next day two of them, Herbert Price 
and Sir William Widdrington, both Straffordians and future 
royalists, were sent to the Tower for disorderly behaviour. 
However, friends did not fail to make a stand on their behalf. 
Hyde spoke for them; and their supporters forced a division over 
their punishment. Once again the anti-Scots group clashed with 
the active party: Strangways and Culpepper told against Holies 
and Clotworthy. The active party won again, but not without
V3underlining the divisions which had emerged in Parliament.
J+2. For an account of this incident see DJEwes, B.M. Harl. 
MSS. 163., f* 68l+-5« For Strode's comment see ibid.. 
f. 686v.
V3 . As darkness fell and the dispute was at its peak,
Herbert Price and Widdrington seized candles from the 
Serjeant and brought them into the House without order: 
ibid., f. 686-686v$ C.J.. ii, 171» Both men seemed to 
wish that Digby and Wilmot be cleared before the House 
adjourned. The division against them went: Yeas (Holies 
and Clotworthy) 189; Noes (Strangways and Culpepper)
172. The Commons1 Journal gives the tellers in reverse 
order (C.J., ii, 171 Vs but it is unlikely that Holies 
and Clotworchy would have told in favour of 
Straffordians. D'Ewes1 MS. gives Strangways and 
Culpepper as tellers for the Noes. He, however, has 
crossed out Culpepper and replaced him with Sir Robert 
Pie: D 1 Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 687v. This does not 
substantially affect my argument that this division 
reflected a clash between a future royalist party and 
the active party over the Scots. We have noted already 
that Pie was inclined to vote against the active party 
where the Scots and England's defences were concerned.
There is further evidence that the events of 
8-9 June involved a clash of different attitudes to the 
Scots. On 'l1* June Widdrington and Price petitioned the 
Commons for their release. Many argued that their 
petition was not sufficiently repentant, and it was 
rejected for the moment. During this debate Sir Robert 
Harlow supported this argument against them by 
reporting that one of the two (D'Ewes said it was 
Widdrington) had spoken 'dangerous words* to the effect 
that 'whosoever in this House should call the Scottish 
men brother should be called to the barre.* D'Ewes,
B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 696v. Widdrington and Price, 
however, were released the next day: C.J ., ii, 175*
106
However, the reformers were not content merely to accuse 
the army of disloyalty. They proposed to disband five 
regiments before the Scots were withdrawn. As Thomas 
Wiseman observed to Sir John Pennington, these were 
dangerous times and they would remain so 'till the Scots be 
sent away,'
For our present purposes the dispute which 
originated in the army plot was only a diversion (albeit a 
very important one) from the path of steadily developing 
parliamentary hostility to the Scots. It occurred on the 
verge of a new problem which was to sharpen tensions between 
the English and the Scots and raise English suspicions and 
hostility to a new height. We can find evidence of this 
tension in that despatch of the Venetian ambassador, already
V5quoted, in which he noted that there was doubt that the 
Scots would withdraw their forces as readily as they 
promised. This disquietude had its roots in months of 
unyielding Scottish insistence upon a financial settlement 
with England to be exacted by military threat. It was not 
surprising that English suspicions should increase. If one 
urgently desires to be rid of guests so unwelcome as the 
Scots, it is most natural to fear that they will not want 
to leave.
While England was embarking upon a legislative 
revolution, there were men like Montrose who thought that in
M u  c .s .p .'d . . 161+1-^3, 18.
^5. See above, 97.
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Scotland some Covenanters intended another: they believed
that Argyll planned to replace the rule of the Monarch with
that of the barons. This they did not like. A coterie of
discontented friends and relations was gathering about
Montrose, which expressed its fears and hopes in a pact
formed at Cumbernauld. Montrose had been trying patiently
(and would long continue trying) to win Charles to a plan
for ruling Scotland by keeping the fractious lairds in their
place. Letters passed between the two. Unfortunately,
Walter Stewart, bearing letters to Montrose from the King,
was intercepted and his mail ransacked. Among his papers
were discovered some letters— in particular, a mysterious
one entitled 'Instructions given by the Earl of Montrose
1+7
to the Lord Napier and the Lords of Ker, &c.' —  which 
seemed to suggest that Montrose and his friends were plotting 
with the King some coup in Scotland. Then on 11 June Montrose 
was arrested by the Covenanters upon suspicion of conspiracy.
The news of the arrest and a copy of the strange 
paper were sufficient to convince Parliament that some 
grand international plot was hatching against them: the 
Scottish army might stand with the royal army for the King.
It was not surprising that Parliament suspected the Scots, 
whose arms for nearly a year had been hovering over English 
heads. For a month now, Parliament had known that Charles 
intended a journey into Scotland; and since the discovery of 
that plan, members had had much time in which to speculate
1+6. The Cumbernauld bond was made in August l6*+0.
1+7. Rushworth, iv, 290-1.
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as to not only the royal but also Scottish intentions.
News of the planned journey had reached Parliament 
*+8
at least by 18 May. The fact that it came so close upon
the King's humiliating defeat over the Attainder and the
Parliament Non-dissolution Bill was ground enough for
suspecting the King's intentions. These bills were heavy
blows to royal authority and the effect of their passage
was plain to all men, especially the King's supporters: 'I
may live to doe you a kindnes', said the Earl of Dorset to
the King, 'but you can doe me none.' Charles intended to
restore that authority; and the prospect of a settlement
with the Scots provided him with hope of resuming the power
he had lost to Parliament. Charles had resolved on his
journey, wrote Giustiniani, 'possibly in order to set in
motion some other design by his presence and to prove his 
50
authority.* As Charles already had lost the confidence of 
Parliament (why propose the Triennial Bill or Non-dissolution 
Bill if he was trusted?) there is no doubt that his plan to 
leave London, discovered but six days after Strafford's
1+8. In a letter dated 18 May Sir John Coke, junior, wrote 
to his father: 'It is spoken that the King is resolved 
upon a journey into Scotland about the midst of July.' 
H.M.C. Cowper. ii, 282-3. Gardiner quotes from a letter 
to the Queen of Bohemia from the Elector Palatine, of 
the same date, reporting that Charles planned to visit 
Scotland as soon as the treaty was completed. Gardiner 
suggests that this news reached Pym through Lady 
Carlisle: Gardiner, History of England, ix, 375-6. Also 
about this time— 21 May in fact— the Venetian ambassador 
wrote: 'In the middle of next July the session of 
Scottish Parliament will reopen and His Majesty openly 
declares that he will go there...': C.S.P.V.« xxv, 153*
1+9. Sir John Bramston, 'The Autobiography of Sir John
Bramston', ed. Lord Braybrooke, Camden Society, xxii, 
18V5, 83.
50. C.S.P.V.. xxv, 153.
planned to strike a bargain with the Scots. Furthermore,
since it was into the arms of the Scots that Charles was
about to fling himself, it is obvious that Pym and his
friends would have asked themselves what part the Scots
might play in the King's plans. The Scots were not above
suspicion. They had been harsh and exacting, and they had
shown an inclination to interfere in strictly English
matters. As I have argued, the active party had cooled
toward them. Was it not possible that in return for a
favourable settlement with the King, the Scots might give
him their support against Parliament? The active party
believed Charles had connived in the army plot. Why might he
not try for the support of the Scots' army? Moreover, the
recent news of Montrose's suspected conspiracy gave Parliament
grounds for suspecting that Charles might find a party in
Scotland. It was, therefore, not merely necessary to disband
the English army, but also to stop Charles from joining
with the Scots. To do this the active party tried to prevent
him from departing for Scotland before both armies were
disbanded. Accordingly, on 23 June, the day following final
agreement on the articles of the treaty, the Commons resolved:
That both Houses be humble Suitors to his Majesty, 
That the Armies may be disbanded before the 
King's going into the North. That all Parts of the 
Kingdom be put into a Posture of Defence against 
all Opposition whatsoever: That all counties, 
especially the Northern, should be well stored 
with Ammunition and Arms; and that the Trained- 
Bands be exercised; That an especial Eye may be 
had over all the Counties, where the Papists are 
most resident: And that all publick Bills for
death, provoked in the active party suspicion that he
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the Peoples Satisfaction may be expedited while 
the King is among us.51
The Scots' army had been pronounced, by implication, 
a possible enemy of the Parliament, It was not just that the 
King could not be trusted to pass through the armies without 
making some bid for their support, but that the Scots' army, 
like the English, could not be trusted not to take his part. 
This seems to me a point under-emphasised by historians 
writing about Parliament's fear that Charles was going north 
to rally support against his opponents in England. Their 
interpretations emphasise an attempt to stop Charles 
recruiting against Parliament. But parliamentarians were 
equally concerned with the obverse: to frustrate those they 
feared might willingly be recruited. There is much evidence 
to suggest more attention ought to be paid to the 
Parliament's jealousy of the Scots during the weeks that 
followed, as distinct from its jealousy of the King.
The most important thing, however, about the 
worries which filled the mind of Parliament is that they 
contributed to the delay of the King's journey to Scotland. 
This, in turn, highly irritated the Scots, and was the 
immediate cause of the strains which gradually worsened 
Anglo-Scots relations and amplified Parliament's discontent 
with their 'Brethren'. On 2b June the Commons presented to 
the Lords for their concurrence the famous Ten Propositions
51. Rushworth. iv, 290-1. Rushworth gives the date of the 
resolution as 16 June. The Commons' Journal and D'Ewes 
give 23 June: C .J., ii, 1835 D 'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS.
163, f. 730.
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keep Charles in England until the armies were disbanded and
further reform measures made law. On 28 June Charles approved
the request of the Houses to approach the Scots Commissioners
52
about delaying the journey. Though the Scots were prepared 
to stay the journey, they were not happy. England was 
holding up the final settlement of Scottish affairs which 
awaited the King's arrival. The Scots warned the Parliament 
that their affairs were in no condition to suffer this 
delay; and that unless the English showed more respect for 
Scottish concerns and assented to His Majesty's departure
53on 5 August they would not consent to any delay. But the
5VCommons wanted to delay the journey until 10 August. The 
Scots Commissioners agreed to this; but they suspected that 
Parliament would make more delays. They demanded, therefore, 
that the English should commit themselves positively that the 
King would set out on 10 August and not negatively as they 
had done hitherto, saying only that he should not go before
55that day. The Houses doggedly refused to commit themselves
so far, but rather agreed
...to petition his Majesty, that he will be 
pleased to stay his Journey into Scotland until 
the Tenth of August; and that, if then he shall 
please to take his Journey, this House shall 
submit unto it.56
to be made to the King, The aim of the Propositions was to
52. L.J., iv, 291-2.
53. ibid-j 29V.
5V. On the morning of 29 June the Commons decided that the 
King should not delay his journey until 1*+ August: C .J., 
ii, 192. However, later that morning they requested the 
Lords that they should join with them to petition the 
King to delay his journey until 10 August: L. J ., iv, 29^. 
Either the record of the Commons (at C.J., ii, 192) is 
wrong, or the Commons changed its mind.
55. CjJ., ii, 193; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 7^9.
56. C.J.. ii, 193; L.J.. iv, 295.
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The departure date, then, was not finally settled, 
and the uncertainty of Charles1 departure gave further 
grounds for suspicion in a relationship that was already 
strained and over-tired. The Scots hesitated to assure 
themselves that Parliament would not interrupt or prevent 
the re-organisation of Scottish affairs; while Parliament, 
on the other hand, was perplexed by the problem of its 
survival, and gave little thought to Scotland's interests: 
even if Charles did not use the armies against Parliament the 
reform party would be seriously endangered if he returned 
from Scotland with his hand politically strengthened. In 
fact, some believed that Parliament did not want Charles 
ever to go into Scotland because it feared a restoration of 
friendship between him and his Scottish subjects— or at
57least with a party there. The King's eagerness for the 
journey did not so much sharpen Parliament's suspicions of 
Charles— who could have been suspected more?— as increase
58
fears 'of some secret intentions' nourished by the Scots.
By this time the Lords, under pressure from the Commons, had 
yielded to the disbanding of the five suspect regiments of 
the royal army, though they would not do it without some
59
reciprocal withdrawal of the Scots. Now the Earl of
Holland was in Yorkshire disbanding those regiments quietly;
but Parliament was awaiting anxiously the reciprocal response
60
of the Scottish army. The Scots, however, refused to
57." C.S.prv., xxv, 177.
58. ibid.
59. L.J., iv. 280. The Commons objected strongly to the Lords' 
proviso (C .J ., ii, 183), but eventually submitted, as can 
be seen from the first of the Ten Propositions. The Scots 
were to be asked to withdraw from the line of the Tees.
60« C.S.P.V.. xxv, 179.
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withdraw from the Tees, nor disband a proportionable number 
of their men. In the circumstances, Holland advised a
61 62
further cessation. The Houses did not hesitate; though
this time the cessation was extended not for political
advantage but for safety.
At the conference on the cessation the Commons
were visibly worried. They wanted the Scots to name a day
for their disbanding; and so that this day might be as soon
as possible, they requested that the Scots forbear £80,000
of the 'Brotherly Assistance,' However, the Scots were not
going to be trifled with over money. They curtly replied
that they would disband as soon as the articles were ratified
6V
and the money paid at Newcastle. A week later Parliament 
tried again; it proposed that payment of the £80,000 be 
postponed until 1 September, and that the Scots march away
65
on 9 August. Clearly, Parliament feared what might happen 
when Charles met the Scottish army straddled across his 
northward way. The Scots were in no mind to co-operate; 
their answer was cool and business-like. They referred the 
Houses to their former reply, and they desired that arrears 
be paid at Newcastle as arranged, reminding Parliament that 
a delay in payment would only prolong their stay. They
66
ignored the request to postpone payment of the £80,000.
On 30 July Giustiniani was writing that a messenger had
61 .~ibid.7 183-V.
62. C. J . , ii, 220; L. J., iv, 32*+. The date was 22 July.
63. ibid,, 325; C.J.. ii, 220.
64-. W . ,  iv, 32^7" 
65. ibid.. 33^; C^J., ii, 229-31 .
66. The Scots' reply was reported to the Houses on 31 July, 
164-1: L_jJ., iv, 336.
worried men, especially the Commons, even more. They pondered
how to stop or delay the King's journey 'until they have an
opportunity to discover with greater certainty the suspected
6 7
intentions of the Scots.1
The parliamentary planners did not consider only
measures to frustrate the royal visit to Scotland. It seems
possible that Parliament even contemplated military counter-
68
measures against the Scots. On 23 June, as we have noted 
already, the Commons voted that both the English and 
Scottish armies be disbanded. However, at the same time, it 
voted that the entire Kingdom 'be put into a Posture of 
Defence1 and that 'all Counties, especially the Northern, 
should be well stored with Ammunition and Arms; and that the 
Trained-Bands be exercised...1 Three weeks later the Commons 
formed a committee to prepare a bill for 'regulating* the 
arms and musters and for 'ordering' the trained bands and
69ammunition; again on 29 July, when the Commons resolved
to sit as a committee on the bishops' bill, it resolved that
no other committee would sit during the grand committee
except that concerning the securing of money to be lent on
the bill for Poll money, and the committee for the bill on
70
the trained bands. Why should Parliament plan the 
disbanding of one set of forces only to plan the raising of 
another? The resolution of 23 June declared that the nation's 
defences were to be readied against 'all opposition
67. C.S.PTv.. xxv, 196-7.
68. See above, 109-10.
69. 0.J ., ii, 236.
70. TETd., 229.
J[J\k
arrived from Scotland to urge the King on his way. This
whatsoever1. This very likely meant not only 'papists' 
and a mutinous royal army, but also the Scots, Parliament 
needed some force upon which it could rely to resist the 
Covenanters if the worst happened. Thus Parliament was 
concerned to ready the militia. Indeed, though the Commons 
curtailed committee activities to concentrate upon the 
important question of church reform, there still remained 
business which could not be sacrificed to religious 
considerations: the poll money and the trained bands— money 
to discharge the Scots* and arms to drive them out.
Parliament received news on Wednesday b August
72
that Scotland had agreed to the terms of the treaty. But 
Charles was leaving London on the following Monday. There 
v/as simply not enough time to finish arrangements with the 
Scots and to disband their array before Charles reached 
Northumberland. On Thursday the Houses were meeting to 
resolve the last minute details for the payment of the Scots. 
Parliament decided to abandon their attempt to defer the
73payment of the 'Brotherly Assistance1. However, the
attempt to make the Scots commit themselves to a timetable
for disbanding v/as renev/ed. It was proposed that they should
be requested to begin marching out within forty-eight
7b
hours of being paid the due sums. One can hardly wonder 
that the Commons had become so preoccupied with the
71 • See above, 109.
72. CjJ., ii, 236.
73* L.J ., iv, 3V3.




intentions of the Scots. Loudoun had reached London bearing
the ratified treaty and made what Giustiniani described as
'a long disquisition upon the perfect disposition of that
people for a good understanding with this crown.1 Concerning
the withdrawal of the Scots, Loudoun said that four days
after payment of the promised sums they would notify England
of their day of departure; but before payment they would
give no assurances of the time. Perhaps they did not
intend ever to name a day. Such must have been Parliament's
thoughts, because it was, wrote the Venetian,
much perturbed at such uncandid behaviour, and is 
making serious efforts to plumb the depth of the 
more secret objects of these arms, and do 
everything in their power to prevent the king 
from talcing that journey. ..7 6
On Friday 6 August the worried Commons passed a
resolution that the Scots be desired 'to give it in Writing...
that they will, within Forty-eight Hours, after they shall
77
have received the Monies at Nev/castle, march away.* This 
was not the resolution of men on easy terms with their 
allies. Nor were things much happier in the Lords. The same 
day the Lords reported at a conference the final business of 
the treaty. The Lord Wharton, a man whose politics were 
more extreme than usual among his Peers, lamented the 
shamefulness of the treaty and the negotiations which had 
been opened at Ripon and which only now were being concluded.
75. C.S.P.'V. . xxv, 198-9.
76. ibid.
77. C.J.. ii, 240; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 806v. Ho 
message seems to have borne this resolution to the Lords. 
Apparently the Commons changed its mind. Perhaps it 
thought the demand for a promise in writing was more 
likely to provoke the Scots than hasten their departure.
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There was no longer any note of thankfulness to the Scots 
for their coming. The brief blooming of fellowship which 
Baillie recorded had passed long since and had left only 
bitterness and fear in its stead. The important thing now 
for Parliament was to keep the Scots— particularly those who 
were armed or discontented— and the King separate from one 
another.
On Saturday 7 both Houses conferred about the
Commons' proposal to delay the King's departure by another
78
fortnight. They knew how this would anger the Scots, so
they resolved to send commissioners into Scotland to explain
79
things, if His Majesty agreed. By late afternoon the Lords 
had agreed to this proposal. In their urgency the Houses 
sat on Sunday 8 August and despatched an urgent request to 
the Scots Commissioners to agree to the postponement; and 
they also required to know of the Scots whether they had 80
received instructions from Edinburgh to press the journey,
Charles sent a message to the Scots Commissioners to stand
81
firm. They did. They assured the King of their loyalty and
declared their resolve to spend their lives to re-establish82
him in his authority. These words were a mark of extreme 
anger with Parliament. And it was echoed in the answer to 
Parliament itself. They gave a firm no to the proposal for 
a further postponement; and as to whether they were required 
to press for His Majesty's departure, they replied that the
76. L.J.. 'iv, 34-9.
79. ibid., 3^9-50; C^J., ii, 2M+-5.
80. L.J.. iv, 250-1; CjJ., ii, 24-5.
81. C .S. P. V . . xxv, 201.
82. ibid.
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King's promises, the assent of both Houses and the resolution
83of the Parliament of Scotland were sufficient command. 
Parliament had no choice but to conclude the treaty bill 
before the King's departure, and await in trepidation his 
passage of the armies.
Even if Charles should pass through the armies 
without incident there were still the problems of disbanding 
the Scots, and of what might pass between Charles and his 
subjects in Scotland, Whether Parliament heard of the Scots' 
declaration of readiness to spend their blood in His 
Majesty's service, we cannot tell. But it is clear that 
Parliament felt itself suspected of some crime against the 
Monarchy which England shared with the Scots. During the 
first clashes over Scottish policy some men had not tired 
of telling their anti-Scottish critics that the Scots were 
no foreigners but, being under the same Crown, one people 
v/ith the English. Thus the active party, in particular, 
could have readily understood that the Scots, as well as 
Court supporters at home, might have seen in Parliament's 
recent legislation an attack upon Monarchy which concerned 
Scotsmen as v/ell as Englishmen. It v/as clear also that the 
Commons believed these suspicions of treason had something 
to do with the plots said to be forming against Parliament. 
For instance, on 23 June, when the Commons resolved to
$3. L.J..~iv, 351; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 81 Tv.
8m-• The treaty bill had originated in the Lords and passed 
the first, second and committee stages on 9 August:
C .J ., ii, 2^7-8. It was passed the next day together 
with a bill giving public faith for payment of the 
remainder of the 'Brotherly Assistance.' L.J,, iv,
357; CsJ. , ii, 250.
119
disband both armies and to take precautions against 
conspiracies feared to be hatching in the North, the House 
also voted very self-consciously, and in answer to its 
critics:
That we might /assure/ ourselves that we have 
desired nothing but what is just from the King 
during this Parliament & not taken anie advantage 
upon any pretended necessities as hath been 
falslie bruited at home & in other parts of
Christendom,85
By 16 August it was clear that Parliament
suspected the Scots of being influenced against them by
such charges. On the same day the Houses conferred about
instructions for a committee to go into Scotland to observe
what passed there between the King and his countrymen.
Significantly, the fourth instruction empowered the
committee to clear Parliament of any imputation made against
86
its proceedings. Parliament did not trust the Scots not
to be persuaded by adverse interpretations of Parliaments
activities. Indeed, as the Parliament already thought that
the Scots were as likely to remain in England as to leave,
it is probable Parliament also suspected the Scots of
believing that the Houses had diminished the dignity of the
Crown, and that they were preparing to reach an understanding
with Charles to restore his authority. Parliament was now
very much afraid of the Scots. Accordingly, the English were
eager for them to withdraw and disband their army. As soon,
87therefore, as the Treaty Bill and the Public Faith Bill
85. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 730.
86. L.J.. Iv, 366; C.J.. ii, 259.
87. Bill to secure payment of the remaining £120,000 of 
the ‘Brotherly Assistance.1
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informing them that the £80,000 of the ’Brotherly Assistance'
had been paid and that the remainder of the sum had been 
88
provided for, and the peace, thus, was concluded. In 
view of this the Commons requested the Lords (10 August)
that their Commissioners ask the Scots to march away within
89
forty-eight hours of payment. Two days later the Commons
resolved that the Scots had until 25 August to complete the
90
evacuation.
had passed, the Commons sent a message to the Lords
The Scots did cross the Tees as ordered by 25 
August, but the days of waiting were ones of high tension. 
The Earl of Holland went to disband the truncated royal 
army but, unfortunately for the nerves of members, he wrote 
back a despatch saying the Scots had reinforced their
91
soldiers, and hinted that their motives were the worst.
Sir Edward Nicholas observed that the despatch filled
92
Parliament with 'very great jealousies* for the Scots.
Nor were the Scots in any doubt that the Parliament feared 
them. Years later, David Buchanan, defending his countrymen 
against the renewed enmity of the English, observed that 
once before Parliament had been duped by the enemies of 
reformation who raised and spread
66. The Commons informed the Lords that they had paid the 
Scots part of the £80,000 of the ‘Brotherly Assistance* 
at Newcastle, and part to the Scots Commissioners in 
London. The remainder was, of course, to be secured by 
the Public Faith Bills L.J.« iv, 357; C.J.. ii, 250.
89* ibid.: L.J.. iv, 357*
90. C^J., ii, 253.
91. C.S.P.V.. xxv, 205-6; Sir Edward Nicholas to the Earl 
of Arundel, ‘Nicholas Papers*, Camden Society, new 
series, xxxx, 1886, 15-16.
92. ibid.
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jealousies of the Scots, among the people of the 
Countrey and City, namely in and about the Houses 
of Parliament; who having not before their eyes, 
the reall Honesty and Integrity of the Scots, 
known by so many faithful and loyal expressions; 
and not keeping in their mind the many good 
offices done to them by the Scots; giveth, in 
sillinesse of mind, ear and place to the crafty 
tales and apprehensions invented by the Agents of 
the Common Enemy, to bring them to confusion and 
trouble.
So the Plot taketh by the silly ones, and is 
set forward by the hid Malignants. Yea, in a word, 
it is managed with such addresse and successe, 
that the Scots must go home; and till they had 
done it, there could be no quiet, but increase of
jealousies.93
What is surprising is that the Scots seem to have done 
nothing to allay these fears but rather, by keeping their 
counsel, to have done everything to increase them. When 
Parliament heard that the Scots had re-crossed the Tweed 
there must have been sighs of relief as members began 
unburdening themselves of the fear that the Scots were to
91+
turn instruments of the King’s counter-stroke.
Having come so far in our description of 
parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots it is well to 
pause and reflect upon what conclusions we can make about 
those attitudes, and what bearing they might have on the 
future course of the conflict between the King and the 
Parliament.
When the Scots invaded England on 20 August 16^ +0
93* David Buchanan, Truth its Manifest, London, 16*4-5, 19* 
9*+. C.S.P.V. . xxv, 212.
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they brought with them the necessity to call Parliament, and, 
with this, the opportunity to reform the government of church 
and state in England. The interests of the Parliament and the 
Scots were so bound up that it appeared as if Parliament 
would work with them as a close ally for the sake of reform. 
But this did not happen. For Parliament to have taken 
advantage of such an opportunity as that provided by the 
Scots' occupation, besides appearing to countenance 
invasion, would have looked like an attempt to awe the King 
and effectively to take away his prerogative by preventing 
his exercise of it over measures proposed by Parliament.
The fact of invasion and defeat made an immediate 
impression upon a large number of members. Their honour would 
not permit them readily to accept what had happened. Some 
felt that, if a fair peace could not be negotiated, the only 
recourse v/as to battle. Initially their number v/as probably 
very small. However, the treaty dragged on and the more 
active reformers proved ready to pay the Scots reparations. 
This offended a large part of the Commons and sparked a 
revolt against the leadership of the House. For two and a 
half months a protracted campaign was waged by a group—  
consisting largely of future royalists--in the first place 
attempting to reject the unacceptable demands, and then, 
when they had lost that point, to conclude the treaty and 
send the Scots from England as quickly as possible. So 
strong was the assault that the active party's leadership 
of the Commons was threatened and the survival of the 
reform programme jeopardized. To survive it was necessary 
for the active party, having beaten narrowly the anti-
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Scottish party on the floor of the House, to let treaty 
affairs go forward, but under their own control. Yet, even 
as the active party tightened its grip on the treaty, the 
Scots' army continued to prove itself a great divisive 
force in Parliament; for even the bogy of the Catholic 
menace, exemplified in the new Irish army, could not prevent 
the Lords, and many Commoners, desiring to keep that army 
as a bulwark against the Scots, For the moment the Scottish 
menace was more clearly recognizeable than the Catholic.
When one considers these events one must conclude 
that the Scots were of great importance in the early months 
of the Long Parliament, not only because they gave England 
the chance to reform, but also because hostility to the 
Scots called into question the leadership of the most 
determined reformers at a time when reform had barely begun.
Even though the active party restored its position 
by permitting the treaty to proceed under the auspices of 
reform, the treaty could not be concluded too quickly. The 
battle over Strafford had not been finished. For a month 
the treaty was at a standstill because of the supreme 
importance of Strafford's prosecution to the entire 
parliamentary body. The treaty took second place in the 
minds of most men while the Attainder was battled out. 
However, to that dedicated band of gentlemen most opposed 
to the Scots and to those parliamentarians ready to 
countenance them, the Attainder proved a device of the same 
kind as the Scots' army. The Straffordians* vote against
12b
the Attainder signified a moral alienation from a certain 
kind of political mentality. This was the mentality which 
was prepared to breach sacred canons of conduct, or so it 
seemed, for achieving some political advantage. It horrified 
the Straffordians as much to think that men would tolerate 
national humiliation for the sake of political reform as 
that they would destroy a man by legislative act to effect 
an overthrow that was failing the test of law. For the 
embryonic royalist party the significance of the Scots is 
essentially the same as that of the Attainder. It marks 
their identification of, and break with, a mentality that 
would not be restrained by traditional canons of patriotism, 
propriety and honour. The men who were most fiercely 
opposed to the Scots and most attached to Strafford were the 
first parliamentarians to become opponents of the reform 
party. The Scots issue is important because it outraged 
conservative consciences, and thereby set in train the 
formation of a royalist party.
The conservative conscience v/as not limited to 
royalists. Some later supporters of the parliamentary side 
also shared it. We have observed that some of the less ardent 
of the later rebel party, like Sir John Holland and Sir 
Robert Pie, shared the hostility to the Scots. Therefore, 
they also were likely to have been dismayed that others 
were prepared to take stich drastic steps to prosecute 
reform. We should not be surprised, then, that men like 
Pie and Holland, who shared with Straffordians their 
distaste for the Scots, were later among the least militant
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of the parliamentary party. Just as they were shocked that 
some could tolerate the Scots during the early months of 
the Long Parliament, they were also shocked later when they 
saw how eager were their associates for war. Peace Party 
men like Pie and Holland, as well as royalists, were 
appalled by those who were prepared to go to extremes, and 
were fearful of what their unbridled spirits might do.
But the significance of the Scottish intervention 
does not end with its effects on the more conservative 
members. It also had important effects on the active party. 
The uncompromising stands taken by the Scots, and their 
threats of force, wearied those who had hoped to benefit 
from their alliance. Moreover, Scottish behaviour sparked 
such a reaction in the Commons that instead of aiding the 
reform cause the Scots did much to disadvantage it. The 
active party in time came to regard the Scots as a liability 
rather than a help. This aversion intensified as it came to 
appear that the Scots would become increasingly a danger 
the longer they stayed, for they had shown a propensity for 
interfering in English matters. Thus, after Strafford’s 
death, the active party led Parliament in concluding the 
treaty and sending the Scots home. Accompanying the wish to 
be rid of the Scots went an increasing toughness in 
negotiation with them. Above all the English rebuffed them 
on the question of religion. The relationship between the 
Scots and the English, and particularly between the Scots 
and the active party, became strained.
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Meanwhile, fears of plots against Parliament had 
their effect upon a relationship now rendered more 
susceptible to graver suspicions. The remoteness of the 
Scots and their refusal to disclose their intentions added 
to the doubts. Nov; the former saviours of England were feared 
to have some design against Parliament. Nothing came of 
those fears; but the effect of the decay in relations 
between the English and the Scots in the period from May to 
August 16VI is nonetheless important. The active party came 
to understand that the Covenanters were ready to play a part 
in England's reformation in so far as it served their own 
interests; and, therefore, it became conceivable, to Pym 
and his company, that Scottish policy could easily run counter 
to the interests of the English reformers. This was of no 
little importance to the future of parliamentary relations 
v/ith the Scots. For though they had been regarded as friends 
in 16^, from late 16*+1 they were seen as potential allies of 
the Crown. The parliamentarians, as a party, could no longer 
assure themselves that the Scots understood English reforming 
activities, or that they would not turn hostile to them. Even 
if the Scots did not take the King's part, there was no 
guarantee that they would not attempt to impose their own 
idea of reform. They had already attempted to make the 
English commit themselves to Presbyterianism. The experiences 
of 16^ +1 could not but affect the shape of future parliamentary 
policy toward the Scots. They had to be treated v/ith the 
greatest caution for, either as allies or enemies, they 
might be a danger to the parliamentary cause.
Chapter IV 
Still a Natural Ally
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For the moment Parliament breathed relief. The 
Scots were gone. On the appointed day of thanksgiving for 
peace (7 September 16*+1) Stephen Marshall and Jeremiah 
Burroughs preached sermons of delight. They proclaimed the 
year an annus mirabilis. No doubt it was more wonderful 
because the Scots had departed without incident. Everyone, 
the active party included, was relieved.
Two years were to pass before a faction of 
parliamentary rebels recalled the Scots, and this time 
publicly concluded v/ith them a treaty for the defeat of the 
King. In the meantime Parliament remained anxious to 
discover what attitude Scotland might take to the continuing 
struggle in England. The problem created by the obscurity of 
Scottish intentions did not cease to worry the parliamentary 
opposition even though England v/as no longer occupied.
Despite the celebrations there v/as still a cloud over 
Parliament's relations v/ith the Scots. The problem had not 
disappeared v/ith the withdrawal of Scottish soldiers; it had 
entered into a new phase. Even before the politicians at 
Westminster had begun to v/orry about the prospect of civil 
v/ar and the Scottish role in it they contemplated the 
immediate problem of whether or not the Scots would reach 
an understanding with Charles, now in their midst. As yet 
the conflict in England was being waged only on the political 
level; but a political victory in Scotland for Charles would 
give him an advantage over Parliament which might prove 
decisive should the conflict grow to a crisis. This concern 
for the Scots, and for whom they favoured, exemplified the
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active party's continuing conviction that Scottish goodwill 
toward Parliament, or at least their neutrality, was 
fundamental to the success of the parliamentary cause. The 
active party^ in particular, understood, as had Bacon 
before them, that whoever designed to change the face of 
things in England must win the confidence of the Scots. They 
may have been an ancient enemy, a grasping and difficult 
people; but they were fundamental to the political strategy 
of both King and Parliament.
Accordingly, as we have observed in the previous
chapter, Parliament sent a committee to Edinburgh to report
on affairs there, and to deflect any innuendoes that Charles2
and his supporters might make against Parliament. In addition
to this, on 9 September, Parliament formed a committee to
meet during the recess of the parliamentary sitting. This
committee was designed to oversee Parliament's affairs
during the recess, and in particular was empowered to maintain
contact with the other committee in Edinburgh, to send it
3instructions, and recall it if necessary. It is evident 
from the brief given this important committee for the recess 
that events in Scotland were being treated with concern at 
Westminster.
The active party v/as troubled now just as it had 
been throughout the past months. First they feared that a 
revolt of the proto-royalists within Parliament would
7T Sir Francis Bacon, The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, 
ed. James Spedding, London, 1868, iv, 73»
2. See above,119.3. C.J.T ii, 288; L.J.. iv, 39h.
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deprive their leadership of credibility as well as of
Scottish support. Now the active party was worrying that
the Scots might be won by Charles and might assist him to
re-establish his authority in England. Indeed, we can say
that the committee to meet during the recess represented,
among other things, the particular concern of the active,
and future parliamentary, party for developments in Scotland:
out of forty-eight Commoners who sat on that committee, only
b
seven were identifiable royalists. Though the active party 
was clearly relieved that the Scots had evacuated the North 
and were disbanding their army, it v/as still gravely worried 
by the mysteries of Scottish policy. On 8 September 
Parliament went into recess full of doubt. The Venetian 
embassy reported that though the Scots had disbanded, the 
parliamentarians still were not reassured about the 
intentions of the King and of the Scots. News that they had 
given him a tumultuous and festive welcome alarmed leaders 
of the parliamentary opposition, who were now meeting 
earnestly and in private. Giustiniani could not say what 
they were discussing, but he said that it v/as widely agreed 
they were planning to counter any attempt Charles might make
5against them should he return triumphant from Scotland.
As events proved, Parliament did not need to worry 
about a mass Scottish movement in favour of Charles. But 
they soon discovered their enemy in the form of an anti-
b.  The future royalists were Culpepper, Bridgman, Sir
Richard Cave, Sir Thomas Bowyer, Sir Edward Hales, Lord 
Falkland and Edmund Waller: C . J .« ii, 288; Brunton and 
Pennington, op. cit., 225-^5*
5. C .S.P.V., xxv, 21W-15.
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covenanter faction of discontented nobles and soldiers, 
perhaps with English connections. Their activities were 
revealed in that fiasco known to us as The Incident. On 
the night of 11-12 October 16^1 there was an attempt to 
seize the Marquis of Argyll, the Duke of Hamilton, and the 
Earl of Lanark: men thought to be the King's chief 
opponents in Scotland. The conspiracy failed; but it focused 
the attention of Parliament on that faction from which they 
had most to fear in Scotland. The vague suspicion of the 
Scots was transformed into one directed more precisely 
against those who, if they ousted the Covenanters, might 
lead Scotland into the royal camp.
The Incident fitted well with the conspiracy
theory by which the active party (and indeed everyone else)
explained the politics of the day. Parliament declared that
a network of malignant plotters was extended throughout
both Kingdoms, and that they would soon attempt something
6
similar in England. The active party claimed that the 
existence of a common conspiracy ought to unite the 'well- 
affected ' of both Kingdoms; and they were to continue arguing 
this case until they secured the firm alliance of the Scots 
in 16^ +3. The conspiracy theory served as a vehicle to 
establish the active party's claim that the Scots 
Covenanters were the natural allies of reform in England.
Unfortunately for the active party not everyone 
was convinced that there was common ground for co-operation
cVj. TTi. 293. The date was 22 October 16M-1 .
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with the Scots. The events of early 16^1 had shown that some 
men were unwilling to use the Scots against Charles. Some 
had thought them even more dangerous than the Irish army. 
Now, toward the end of that year, when the active party 
began to propose the need for renewed co-operation with the 
Covenanters, the 'well-affected1, there were still 
parliamentarians who were not prepared to co-operate with 
them even for the sake of threatened national interests.
On 28 October 16^1 messengers informed Charles
that a rebellion had broken out in Ireland. Later, when he
had finished his round of golf, Charles took the news to
the Scottish Parliament, which offered to assist England
7
should the King and the English Parliament desire it. It
was known at Westminster by 3 November that the Scots had
made an offer to aid England in suppressing the rebels, but
that the Scots would do nothing until they understood the
8
wishes of Parliament. The next day the Commons decided to
9request Scottish help under the articles of the
10
Pacification.
To make an appeal to the Scots on the basis of the
7. Rushworth, iv, /bO£/. This offer of aid was reported 
officially in the Lords on 5 November by a letter from 
one of the committee at Edinburgh, Lord Howard of 
Escrick: L.J. . iv, *+23#
8. Sir Richard Cave reported to the Commons that he had 
received a letter from the Prince Elector Palatine, 
with Charles in Scotland, in which the Prince informed 
Cave of the offer: D 1Ewes, Coates, 77.
9« ibid., 81!-; C. J .« ii, 30^.
10. ibid. According to D'Ewes, the committee for Irish 
affairs was ordered to prepare instructions to the 
parliamentary committee at Edinburgh: D'Ewes. Coates, 96.
133
Pacification was significant. Now that it was clear, to the 
minds of parliamentarians, that there really was a popish 
plot being hatched against the peace of the kingdoms, they 
asked Scotland for aid according to its commitment in the 
treaty to defend the peace recently re-established. The 
active party did not wish that its dealings with Scotland 
should appear an extension of some conspiratorial league. 
Co-operation was now going to be placed upon the public and 
respectable foundation provided by a treaty. The active 
party was saying, in effect, that it was natural and legal 
that England and Scotland should co-operate in suppressing 
the dangerous forces that threatened to overwhelm the 
Protestant Kingdoms. The argument, for the present, was not 
intended so much for the Scots, because they were already 
eager to go to Ireland. It was rather intended for 
parliamentarians who might be squeamish about further 
entanglements with the Scots. The argument v/as certainly 
needed, especially in the Lords, where opposition to the 
presence of Scottish forces in Ireland proved most 
intransigent.
In the Commons the idea of renewed engagements
with the Scots, particularly in Ireland, England’s
treasured possession, roused something of the old anti-
Scottish sentiment. Even though the Commons had ordered its
committee for Irish affairs to prepare instructions for the
parliamentary committee In Scotland to request its military
11
help, the committee baulked at its charge. Early on the
11. See above, 132.
13^
opposed the vote to ask for Scottish aid. Such a request
was dishonourable to England. The committee’s report sparked
a debate in the Commons, with Sir John Hotham and Lord
Falkland leading the attack on the request for Scottish
12
soldiers. Both men had shown themselves previously averse
to those whom others called 'Brethren1. Their arguments
were of little avail, however, and were quickly swept aside
as the Commons resolved to ask, for the present, for a
13regiment of a thousand men. Another problem which
concerned members was the pay of these soldiers. Men were
still aware of the continuing financial difficulties which
the Scots' invasion had occasioned. They were reluctant to
burden themselves v/ith any new obligations when they had not
discharged the old. There was still the remnant of the
1*f
'Brotherly Assistance' to pay. Culpepper and D'Ewes 
objected that England should not commit herself to paying 
the Scots. This argument v/as also rejected; and the House
15resolved to pay. The protest begun in a committee was 
crushed in the Commons. By 9 November instructions to the
16
committee in Scotland were voted and sent up to the Lords.
The whole business was conducted successfully under the
17
management of the active party.
raorning of 5 November a 'thinne' committee voted that they
12. D 'Ev/es, Coates, 92.
13« ibid.: C. J . , ii, 3°6.1h . D'Ewes had just finished speaking for Scottish aid.
15* D 1Ewes, Coates, 93"^•16. C.J., ii, 303; D'Ewes, Coates, 110-12.
17- C . J ., ii, 308. I conclude that the active party v/as
guiding the House in this business since Pym, Strode and 
Holies we re appointed, along v/ith Sir John Hotham, to 
manage the conference with the Lords at which the 
instructions were presented.
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The parliamentary leaders, however, who sought to
establish a co-operative friendship v/ith the Scots did not
neglect England’s interests. They seem to have done
everything possible to pre-empt the hostility of the Lords.
For instance, in the fifth article of the instructions, the
Commons declared its wish that the Scots 'shall upon all
Occasions persue and observe the Directions of the Lord
Lieutenant, his Lieutenant General, or the Governors of 
18
Ireland...' The actice party was showing itself careful
of the Lords' sensitivities, and also shrewdly aware that
the Scots might be tempted by their sojourn in Ireland. The
active party was completely awake to the possible ambitions
of the Scots. For the moment the Commons appeared to have
been completely successful, because the Lords agreed to
these instructions, and in particular to the request that a
19thousand Scots go into Ireland.
But on 11 November the Commons increased the
20
number of soldiers to be requested of the Scots to 10,000.
It was done very carefully so as to take account of the anti-
Scottish sentiments present in both Houses. It v/as also
done v/isely, reflecting the active party's appreciation
that English and Scottish interests could possibly clash in
Ireland. On 5 November, having given themselves the option
21
of asking for more Scots, and having succeeded in obtaining 
the Lords' consent to the original request for Scottish aid,
18. L.J., “iv, 1*31.
19. ibid., b^b.
20. C.J., ii, 312; D 'Ewes, Coates, 12^; L.J., iv, *+35.
21. See above, 13*+«
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10,000 men, hut 'under such Conditions, and upon such
Cautions, as shall be honourable and safe for this22
Kingdom.' They also assured the Lords that 'unless the 
Scotts condescend to be commanded by the Government of 
English settled in Ireland that there is no Intention that
23any should go at all.' The active party was making every
attempt to assure the Lords that it did not intend to
neglect English interests in Ireland, that it v/as under no
misapprehension as to possible Scots' ambitions there.
Nevertheless, the Lords v/ere still reluctant to go so far
as 10,000 men. They clung to their vote for a thousand
Scots and proposed only to intimate a desire for a further
2b
9,000— 'if Occasion be.'
the active party now thought to accept of a Scots offer of
The Lords' reluctance provoked a resurgence in the 
Commons of hostility to the Scots. On 12 November the 
Commons heard the Lords' resolution to request only a single 
regiment. But instead of rejecting this proposal, the Commons 
itself divided over whether it should insist also on its
25former request for a thousand Scots. Sir Ralph Hopton and 
Giles Strangways, who had distinguished themselves earlier
22. C^J., ii, 312.
23. ibid. The Lords reported the proposals of the Commons 
in the following terms: 'That the House of Commons 
voted, to desire the Assistance of our Brethren in 
Scotland against Ireland, for Ten thousand men, not 
presently to be sent, but at such Times, and in such 
Manner, as shall be agreed upon by Articles and 
Conditions of both Parliaments, according to future 
Occasions.' L, J .« iv, *+35-
2b. ibid.
25. That is, the resolution to make a request for a single 
regiment made by the Commons on 5 November. See above, 
M b .
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for their antipathy to Scotland, led a party of similarly
disposed members to a thirty-five vote victory against the
active party. The House resolved again to request one26
regiment. However, the recovery of anti-Scottish feeling
was too weak to withstand the shock of worsening news from
Ireland. On the following day a letter was read in the
Commons describing conditions in Ireland. After considerable
debate the Commons voted, without a division, to ask for
275,000 Scots. The anti-Scottish feeling of the Commons was 
still strong, though it was clearly weakening under the 
shock of rebellion.
The important point to consider when examining 
these votes, both in the Commons and the Lords, is that 
co-operation with the Scots could not necessarily be 
guaranteed by either a treaty or a common foe. Many men 
were still reluctant to accept that England had anything in 
common with the Scots except mutual hostility. Just as 
earlier in the year the Lords were as impressed by an 
immediate threat from the Scots as by a supposed threat 
from the Irish army, now in November they were reluctant to 
employ the suspect Scots against the very real and terrible 
uprising in Ireland.
Unfortunately, S. R. Gardiner fails to assist our 
understanding of these November disputes just as he failed
26. The vote was: Yeas, 122; Noes, 77. Sir Walter Erie and 
Henry Martin told for the Noes: C .J ., ii, 313-1^5
D'Ewes, Coates, 130.
27. C .J., ii, 31^5 D 1 Ewes, Coates, 137-8.
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Too insistent that the fundamental conflict at this time 
was between puritan and episcopalian, he is compelled to 
argue that the division of 12 November was an attempt by 
the episcopal party to prevent the religious scales in
28
Ireland being tipped by the Scots in favour of puritanism.
The point is not convincing. As we have seen, if a man
opposed the Scots and also was an episcopalian, this does
not imply that his hostility was caused by his preference
for bishops. Furthermore, as Secretary Nicholas observed
to His Majesty, some men believed the presence of the Scots*
forces would only exasperate the Irish more and make them
29
more resolute in rebellion. Moreover, when still other men 
rendered their opposition in terms of honour and disgrace we 
might reasonably conclude that the love of country, rather 
than love of episcopal government, was at the bottom of their 
resentment. Certainly it was upon the ground of dishonour 
that Hotham, Falkland and other members of the Committee for 
Irish Affairs made their protests. Even the active party was 
alive to the dangers involved in permitting a Scottish army 
to operate in England’s Ireland. Gardiner, by being too 
determined to emphasise the religious factor in English 
politics, has concealed a powerful motive for English 
hostility toward the Scots.
Though it is true that there were men in both 
Houses averse to renewed entanglements with the Scots, the
28. Gardiner, op. cit., x, 70.
29. Secretary Nicholas to Charles I, 18 November 16V|, Sir 
John Evelyn, Diary and Correspondence, iv, 132-8,
us in the clashes we have discussed in previous chapters.
139
pressure of events was wearing down that opposition. On
Saturday 13 November, when instructions to the Edinburgh
committee were reported to the Lords, the figure of 10,000
had been inserted in the instructions, of which, for the
30
moment, only 5,000 were requested. The Lords also agreed
31to these figures. However, their resistance was not 
finally broken.
The second of December saw the arrival of new
Scots Commissioners to treat with Parliament about aid for
32
Ireland. The Scots came ready to treat for 10,000 men, the 
least number, according to their reckoning, capable of
33mounting an effective operation against the Ulster rebels.
Soon after, the Commons, where the active party had always
intended that 10,000 should go, voted to empower its committee
3b
to treat with the Scots to negotiate for 10,000. But the 
Lords directed their committee to request that the Scots 
Commissioners send to Edinburgh for power to treat for a
35lesser number. Naturally the Scots were annoyed. However, 
it was only after a conference, on 13 December, and a long 
debate in the Lords, that the Peers yielded to the desires 
of the lower House and similarly resolved on seeking the
30. L.J,, iv, 1+38; R.P.C.S., vii, 150-3- Although there is 
no record in the Commons1 Journal, the Commons must have 
assented to this figure despite the vote earlier in the 
day for 5*000 Scots.
3 1. ibid.
32. C.J.. ii, 331-2.
33- L. J .« iv, 4-71 ; C.J., ii, 339.
3b. ibid.: D fEwes« Coates, 27li~5. This committee was firmly 
in the hands of the active party. Its members were: 
Nathaniel Fiennes, Sir William Armyn, Sir Philip 
Stapleton and John Hampden: C. J .. ii, 332; L.J.. iv, +^61.
35. ibid. , *+7 1 .
11+0
yet another course for preventing the Scots, as they thought,
37from annexing Ulster to themselves. On 18 December the 
Earl of Bristol and the Lord Saye, the latter a man of the 
active party, presented a paper to their House in which 
they proposed that the Scots should not go into Ireland 
unless an equal number of English were sent, and unless 
money for this expedition were assigned equally as for the 
Scots. With the memory of how the royal army had been 
impoverished to supply the Scots1 army of occupation 
doubtless still fresh in their minds, the Lords recommended 
that
the Proportion as belongeth to the English be not 
meddled withall upon any Occasion, but be employed 
for raising and sending away the Ten Thousand 
English...38
36
support of ten Scottish regiments. But the Lords attempted
Meanwhile, the Scots were complaining bitterly 
about delays in this new treaty; and on Monday 20 December
39
the Commons reiterated these complaints to the Lords. The
Lords refused to budge. They completely rejected the sending
of an army of Scots to Ulster before an equivalent army of
*+0
English was sent. The Commons were furious. When on the
following day the Lords persisted in their demands, the
Commons declared that they were free of all responsibility
*+1
for whatever disasters now might befall Ireland; and
36. ibid.7 472.
37. C.S.P.V., xxv, 267.
38. L^J., iv, 481.
39. C.J.. ii, 350; L.J.. iv, 482.
4-0. ibid.
41. C\J., ii, 252.
later the same day they declared that they would not be
'capitulated with' and that the Lords must vote the 10,000
b2
Scots independently of the 10,000 English. The Lords were 
in a difficult position. They were accused of frustrating the 
succour of Ireland. Whatever their attitude to the Scots they 
could not hold out long in these circumstances. Thus they 
soon yielded to the fury of the Commons. Despite the 
strength of opposition that had prevailed in the Lords at 
first, there was in the end scarcely a half-dozen voices
M fopposed to it.
The collapse of the Lords, though complete, did 
not represent a change of heart. They had been bludgeoned 
into submission. Their revolt was supported in the Lords 
even by one accounted among the leaders of the active party, 
the Lord Viscount Saye and Seal. The defeat of the Lords on 
this point does not diminish the fact that they did not 
believe that a supposed threat to the peace of both Kingdoms 
was sufficient ground for calling upon Scotland for aid. Nor 
were they impressed by the argument of the Commons that the 
treaty bound the Scots to aid Parliament. The Peers 
preferred that the Commons should not attempt to bind the 
Scots to interest themselves in English and parliamentary 
interests and affairs. As far as the Lords were concerned 
the Scots were better out of it. However, in the Commons the 
parliamentary party was determined to seek active co-operation
*+2. ibid. , 253; D'Ewes, Coates, 332; L. J ., iv, *+86.
1+3. L.J., iv, h-8S^
M+. Sidney Bere to Sir John Pennington, 23 December I6*f1,
C.S.P.D. , 161+1-1+3, 211.
1V|
1^ -2
Nobody really believed that King and Parliament 
would come to blows. Events, however, rapidly were 
approaching that crisis in which the most stalwart 
opponents of the Crown believed the role of the Scots would 
be vital. But what considerations would shape parliamentary 
policy toward the Scots? Would native English suspicions 
cause Parliament to neglect the Scots? Or would wisdom 
demand that they cultivate the friendship of the Covenanters? 
Would shrewdness conquer the national passions? The test of 
these questions was near. On *+ January 161+2 Charles made his 
abortive swoop upon Parliament. Within a few days he was 
retreating from London. On 11 January from Hampton Court 
he issued instructions to secure Hull for himself.
Unluckily for the royal cause Parliament moved more swiftly. 
The younger Hotham took command of Hull in Parliament’s
1+5
name before Will Legge could execute the King's command.
Two days later Charles had retired himself to Windsor.
England was slipping into civil war.
The Scots were concerned with the worsening 
situation in England. The unsettled circumstances of English 
politics might prove a threat to the future stability of 
the settlement recently made in Scotland during Charles'
with the Scots*
Gardiner, op. cit., x, 152-3.
14-3
visit. For the moment they did not wish to take sides, but 
only to interpose in a conciliatory way that agreement might 
be reached. The Scots commissioners, therefore, sent the 
Commons a paper expressing their regret at the 1 emergent 
distractions' afflicting England, and gently suggested that 
as Parliament had mediated in their own 'late troubles', so 
now the Scots might render the same service. Their paper was 
even-handed. They told Parliament that they had advised the 
King to seek a composition of the dispute, and recommended 
that Parliament do likewise.
b6
It was soon evident, however, that the Commons did 
not prefer even-handedness. They wanted the Scots to take 
Parliament's side, naturally enough, and to persuade or 
compel Charles to return to Parliament. Certainly the 
Scots received no thanks for their unsolicited advice to 
Parliament. On the other hand, the Commons thanked them 
heartily for the advice they had given Charles. This was 
evidence of their 'Fidelity and Affection' for England, an 
act acceptable to the Commons. Moreover, the Scots were
4-6. As the Scots said in their advice, soon to be delivered 
to His Majesty, the mutual relationship of the two 
Kingdoms was such that 'as they must stande or fall 
together, and the Disturbance of the one must needs 
disquiett and distemper the Peace of the other, as hes 
bene often acknowledged by thame both, and especially 
in the late Treaty...soe that they are bound to 
maintaine Peace and Liberties of on another, being 
highly concerned therein, as the assured Meanes of the 
Safety and Preservation of thaire own...': L.J., iv,
525; To the Kings Most Excellent Ma.iestie: the Humble 
Desires of the Commissioners of His Majesties Kingdom 
of Scotland, London, 16^2. 
if7• The Commons received the paper on 15 January l6*+2: C . J., 
ii, 383. It was presented to the Lords on Monday 17 
January.
...that, according to their Affections already- 
expressed, they will continue their Care and 
Endeavour to remove the present Distractions 
amongst us; as also to preserve and confirm the 
Union between the Two Nations, so happily begun.*+8
With that, Pym, Vane the younger, Stapleton, Goodwin and
Long were despatched to the Scots Commissioners with these 
i+9thanks. The leaders of the parliamentary opposition clearly 
meant that the Scots should take side with Parliament and 
continue their advice to the King.
The struggle for the adherence of the Scots had 
opened, and it was not to be resolved until 16^ +3 when the 
Solemn League and Covenant was signed and the Scots began 
mobilizing an army to aid the beleaguered Parliament. In 
the meantime there was a continuous struggle between King 
and Parliament to convince the Scots of the righteousness 
of their respective causes. Charles, too, had opened his 
campaign for the minds of the Scots. He probably realized 
that his settlement of affairs there had not been 
satisfactory to himself, and that he could not command the 
Scots to arm in his cause. But he could attempt to keep 
them at home and to counter the influence of parliamentary 
propaganda by the intricate web of his own diplomacy.
Charles sent from Windsor (27 January) a letter to his 
Privy Council in Scotland expressing his wish that they 
would display their loyalty to him and shim the disputes
i+£>. ibid., 386. The Commons received the Scots Commissioners' 
advice to His Majesty on 17 January: D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. 
MSS. 162, f. 322v; C.J. , ii, 386. The paper of advice to 
His Majesty is referred to above, 1 ^ 3? Note *f6.
1+9. C.J., ii, 386.
further desired
1^5
Though Parliament earnestly set about ensuring 
that Scotland should adopt an attitude favourable to the 
parliamentary cause, its proponents were not prepared to 
slacken their watchfulness upon English interests or upon 
those of the Scots for the sake of reaching an agreement 
with them. As the crisis deepened Parliament continued to 
discuss arrangements for the Scottish force designed for 
Ireland. But the increasing need for an ally against Charles 
did not move Parliament to render the terms of the treaty 
more generous. For example, the Scots proposed that they be 
rewarded out of the lands of the rebels for the forecast 
success of the Scots in Ulster. The Commons rejected this 
presumptuous idea. It had made 'no such Condition with any 
of the English Forces employed in Ireland; and therefore 
they hold it not fit to be obliged in any such Condition,
51unto them.'
However careful Parliament might be to guard 
England's interest against the acquisitiveness of the Scots, 
it was not blind to the part the Scots must play in the 
struggle to persuade Charles to submit to Parliament, As 
relations with the Crown grew worse, and Henrietta Maria 
prepared to embark with the crown jewels for the Continent, 
the significance of the Scots for the success of the 
parliamentary cause increased. Some sort of appeal to the
50. R.P.CTS.. vii, 191-2.




Scots was needed. However, there is little doubt that some
men were reluctant. As if to ready these backward fellows
for the struggle and to brace them for the unpalatable
measures that would be required, Edmund Calamy adverted,
one Friday fast day, to how Scotland had been a strange
instrument of God's merciful but inscrutable providence.
Calamy seemed to imply that men must again be prepared to
accept this unusual agent of good as an ally in the
deepening conflict with the King:
God hath delivered us not only by little meanes, 
by unlikely meanes, but by contrary meanes; he 
hath brought unity out of division: The 
indeavours to divide the Nations of England and 
Scotland, have been the meanes of their farther 
union...Scotland hath been the cause of a great 
deale of good to England, God hath brought liberty 
out of oppression, ,.5 2
There was good reason at this time to reiterate 
the importance of the Scots to the parliamentary cause. 
Recollections of the recent embarrassing treaty negotiations 
and of the vast sums consumed had not been dimmed. Everywhere 
there were signs that people remembered. Many had been 
galled by Parliament's dealings with the Scots. During late 
16*+1 placards appeared, particularly in London and Yorkshire,
53accusing Parliament of treason; and a set of satirical 
questions was circulated asking how far Parliament used the
5*+
Scots or was used by them. Charles also later sought to 
recall memories of the treaty in his attempt to defame the
$2. Edmund Calamy, 'Gods Free Mercy to England', 23 February 
16*4-1 , 11, Fast Sermons, ii, 137-193*
53. C,S.P.V. . xxv« 226: C.S.P.D. , 1 1 -*+3, 13V.
5m-. ibid. , 113*
Parliament. From York he issued a declaration (9 March 
16^ -2) maintaining that the Grand Remonstrance actually 
admitted his acts of grace, and had said that the Kingdom 
was better thereby. But all Parliament had done in return, 
said Charles, was to impose upon the land subsidies and 
poll taxes to the extent of £600,000, and had contracted a
55debt of £220,000 to the Scots. With wounding accusations 
like these in circulation some members may have shrunk from 
renewing overtures to the Scots. By reviving past dealings 
with Scotland they may have thoiight they risked the 
suspicion of conspiracy and treason, which could do serious 
harm to Parliament's cause. And there v/as still the simple 
English distrust of the Scots to consider. Well might 
Calamy discover a providential role for the Scots, for as 
weeks passed Parliament felt increasingly the need for 
providential help.
As the year entered into March, Parliament began 
to discover that the entire country was not at its back. 
Petitions came in from Chester and Cornwall protesting at 
puritan, rather than Laudian, innovations in religion. They 
protested, too, against the diminution of the royal 
prerogative. These petitions were printed and circulated 
throughout the country, filling the parliamentary party
56
with fear of what further opposition they might arouse.
At the same time reports were circulating that the Prince of 
Orange intended to aid Charles. Parliament had cause for
55* Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, v, 9.
56. C.S.P.V,. xxvi, 17.
1^7
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concern. On 29 March directions v/ere sent to the younger
58
Hotham to reinforce the garrison at Hull. Parliament v/as 
quickly discovering the need for friends. Thus, on 6 April, 
it was ordered that a committee (Stapleton, Hampden,
Fiennes, the younger Vane, Sir William Lewis and 
Pierrepont) draw up a declaration to the Scots designed to 
preserve the ’brotherly Affection and near Union' between
59England and Scotland. The time had come to ensure that the 
Scots understood affairs in England.
The task was to convince the Scots of Parliament's
interpretation of the struggle in England. Parliament as
yet was not confident that the Scots v/ould not harken to
the King's arguments. Therefore, when the Commons conferred
with the Peers (8 April) about maintaining 'a good
correspondency between the Two Kingdoms...', the emphasis
v/as on refuting the claims made on the King's behalf against
the Parliament. The Scots were to be 'rightly informed of
the Proceedings of Parliament' to prevent the rise of
'jealousies' in a time when malignants desired to set the
60
Kingdoms against each other. Both Houses resolved to send 
the declaration to the Scots, advising them that a fuller 
explanation of affairs v/as in preparation, but assuring 
them that Charles had not abandoned Parliament on account 
of anything the Parliament had done, but solely because of 
evil counsellors v/ho had 'disaffected' His Majesty with
57." ibidTT 1 9.
58. Gardiner, op. cit., x, 18^.
59. C .J . , ii, 513. The declaration of the Parliament to the 
Scots v/as reported to the Commons on 8 April: ibid., 517.
60. L.J., iv, 70o.
57
Parliament’s proceedings. The tenor of the conference and 
the declaration indicated that Parliament was not at all 
certain that it could retain the goodwill of the Scots. The 
fact that the English were eager to send the Scots even a 
preliminary declaration implies that they were not simply 
sensitive to royalist imputations, but that they feared the 
Scots would be beguiled by them. This urgency of conference 
and declaration was not a sign of confidence in the Scots.
As to the declaration itself, D ’Ewes protested that the
62
sharpness of the language against the King was unseemly.
Although perhaps the language was unseemly, it was the
language of men earnest not to be enemies of both the King
and the Scots. It v/as the language of protest; a protest of
innocence to a party which, they did not doubt, might be
swayed by the royal arguments. D'Ewes also complained that
it was superfluous to send to the Scots another declaration
when they had already seen the ’Remonstrance on the State of
the Kingdom and the late Declaration sent to Nev/market. *
But the number of protests, however indiscreet, serves to
indicate how anxious Parliament was about the disposition
of the Scots. All D'Ewes' objections were ignored, and the
63
Commons hastily adopted the main declaration.
While Parliament v/as beginning its attempt to 
keep the Scots out of the royalist camp and secure, at least, 
a neutral friend to Parliament, Charles declared his 
intention to go to Ireland and personally suppress the
61. ibid., 707; C .J., ii, 520 -1.




rebellion there. It is not surprising that Parliament did 
not wish him to go. The further Charles removed himself from 
London, the less able would Parliament be to watch over him 
and prevent his preparing some stroke against itself. On 15 
April Parliament sent to the King a protest against his 
decision to go into Ireland and noted that, should he go, 
the papists would be encouraged in their efforts to destroy 
Protestantism, which even now v/as only prevented by the
65
union of England and Scotland. The document clearly 
implied that Charles would be acting contrary to the efforts 
of the two Kingdoms to preserve the Protestant religion if 
he went to Ireland. Charles1 proposal to go to Ireland would 
be seen to countenance the rebels, and would hinder further 
reform. On the other hand, it v/as England and Scotland which 
stood united against those forces which assailed the 
Kingdoms. Clearly Parliament regarded Scotland as a desirable 
ally against 'Papists’ and 'Malignants'.
The Scots, however, were not inclined, for the
moment, to enter into any agreement v/ith either the King or
the Parliament. On 22 April the Privy Council of Scotland
sent to both King and Parliament letters recommending that
they seek a reconciliation. They particularly urged Charles
not to risk his life in Ireland when he was urgently
66
required in England. But this Scottish impartiality and
6>b. Both Houses received the King's notification of his 
intent for Ireland on 11 April 16^2: C.J., ii, 522;
L.J., iv, 709-10; D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. ^63.
65. C .J ., ii, 527-8; L.J.. iv, 719-20; Clarendon, History 
of the Rebellion, v, o^ f.
66. R.P.C.S., vii, 2*4-9-51. These papers were presented in 




in the Commons, the Scots* unsolicited advice (read on 9
May) was ignored except where they also advised Charles to
return to Parliament. For this alone did they thank the
67
Scots, Moreover, the Commons resolved to reiterate their
case to the Scots by sending them a further declaration
relating all that had passed between King and Parliament,
and to ask of the Scots an account of what information they
68
had received from the King about Parliament's actions. 
Evidently Parliament believed that if the Scots only 
properly understood the real state of affairs in England 
they would abandon their apparent impartiality and whole­
heartedly adopt the parliamentary cause. Nor did they doubt 
that the Scots were being influenced by communications from 
Charles. His arguments had to be met and answered. Hence the 
extraordinary demand that Charles' correspondence with the 
Scots be revealed to Westminster.
preference for mediation did not suit Parliament. Especially
Because the Scots had not openly taken part with
Parliament, the rebels feared that they did not understand
the justice of the parliamentary case. In fact the Commons
thought that the impartial content of these letters could only
69
have been founded upon misinformation provided by the King.
67. C.J.. "ii, 265.
68. ibid.
69. On 11 May the Commons reported to the Lords their
observations on the Scottish paper read in the lower 
House on 9 May. It is clear from the report that the 
Commons did not like the tone of the papers and thought 
them mistaken in their impartial view of events because 
the Commons informed the Lords of a resolution to ask the 
Scots upon what information supplied by the King did 
they base their paper: L.J.. v, 59*
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In these circumstances, while the King's accusations went
unchallenged, they wondered whether the Scots, labouring
under misapprehension, might not be inclining towards the
Grom. On 18 May the declaration to the Scots passed the
70
Commons, and, on the following day, the Lords. It was sent
to the Scots, protesting that Parliament had never given the
King any cause for offence, and requesting intelligence of
of Charles' correspondence with the Scottish Privy Council.
There was also a strangely expressed, almost threateningly
worded, desire that the Scots
Suppress Attempts of those who, upon causeless 
Pretences and Suggestions, shall persuade them to 
interpose in those unhappy Differences, in such a 
Manner as may weaken the Confidence or endanger 
the Peace of the Two Kingdoms...71
This expression made it clear that Parliament thought the
Scots were being seduced by the royalists, and felt that the
Scots needed to be warned against endangering the defences
that had been raised against mischief in church and state by
the late treaty. Given this fear that the Scots were growing
cooler toward Parliament it is not surprising that a few
days later a committee was established to meet constantly to
secure payment of the debt to the Scots so that 'public
72
Faith' might be kept with that people.
The Parliament was not mistaken in suspecting that 
things were going awry in Scotland. In late May Baillie was 
writing to Lady Montgomery of his fear that
70. C .J ., ii, 578. The paper did not pass without opposition, 
but all we know about the opposition is that Sir R. Duke 
spoke against it: D 'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 515*
71. L.J., v, 7^5.
72. ibid., 78.
I153
..•these whom the King and /Scottish/ Parliament 
has entrusted to be our Counsellors, will be loath 
to engadge in a new warre with our best friends... 
for we believe, that none can be so blind bot they 
see clearly, /if/ the courtiers, for anie cause, 
can get this Parliament of England overthrown by 
forces, either at home or abroad, that all, either 
they have done, or our Parliament has done alreadie, 
or whatever anie Parliament should mint to doe 
hereafter, is not worth a figg.73
Apparently he was referring to plans afoot in Scotland to
force the Privy Council to declare for the King. A few days
later a petition was delivered to the Privy Council of
Scotland in the name of nobles, gentlemen, burgesses and
ministers, protesting against the meeting of fIncendiaries!
in Edinburgh, as also against conducting negotiations with
the King that might lead Scotland into conflict v/ith the
7k
English Parliament.
For the moment it seemed that Charles was having 
the greater success v/ith the Scots. He sent from York (9 
May) to the Scottish Privy Council an order that they should 
study all the messages that had passed between himself and 
Parliament so that in Scotland they wxmld rightly understand 
the issues disputed in England. When the Scots knew this, 
intimated the King, then they would know how they were 
obliged to his service. Charles also rebuffed their attempts
75at mediation. The Scottish Privy Council, for the moment,
bowed to Charles and replied to Parliament's request for the
76
fang's letters with a refusal. This answer must have
73« Baillie, ii, 3^«
7k. R.P.C.S., vii, 260-3.
75• ibid., 256. His Majesty's wishes were strongly reiterated 
in another letter from York dated 20 May 164-1 : ibid., 
257-3.
76. L.J., v, 135.
confirmed all Parliament's fears that the Scots might yet 
lend their support to the Crown. It seemed that Charles and 
his supporters in Scotland had gained the upper hand. There 
was only one course. Parliament must appeal from the Scottish 
Privy Council directly to the Covenanters themselves. Both 
Houses, therefore, sharply protested against a pamphlet 
entitled 'A Letter sent from the King's Majesty to the
77Lords of the Privy Council of the Kingdom of Scotland.'
They also declared that the difficulties between King and
Parliament were not of their doing, nor had they calumniated
His Majesty, but had only blamed his evil advisers. Moreover,
they thankfully appreciated the work of those Scottish
petitioners who had protested to the Privy Council against
aligning with the King, saying that the petitioners showed
genuine affection for England, and that their petition was
78
a firm foundation for the unity of both Kingdoms. This
declaration was not only to be sent to the Privy Council,
but was to be printed for the information of the 'whole
79
Kingdom of Scotland.' Parliament was striving for some 
kind of commitment from the Scots because it wanted to deal 
with the King without fear of intervention on his behalf. 
Parliament calculated that their hope of concluding the 
conflict by negotiation depended in part on keeping Charles 
weak through lack of Scottish support.
Whilst Charles and Parliament struggled for the
77* Reported in the Commons on 1^ June l6*+2: C.J.« ii, 623-*+.
78. L.J.. v, 136-7.
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negotiated with the Scots for the relief of Ireland was
neglected. Nevertheless, despite the fact that it was not
80
concluded until 6 August 164-2, Scottish soldiers, paid and
81
supplied by England, were already in combat with the rebels.
On 7 June the Scots informed Parliament that the bulk of82
their forces was in Ulster. That Parliament was able to 
organise with Scotland the complex task of conveying an army 
into Ireland, as well as maintaining it, without there being 
any formal treaty arrangements, suggests that a certain 
degree of confidence and co-operation had been established 
between the two. It must be remembered, though, that in 
164-2 the Irish rebellion became a secondary concern for 
Parliament, while the attitude of the Scots to the struggle 
in England was the crucial and unresolved issue between 
Parliament and Scotland. As the parliamentarians at first 
feared, and then beheld, the marshalling of royal arms,
Ireland diminished in importance: Parliament itself was
advantage and vied for Scottish support, the treaty being
80. L.J.,~v, 268-9; G^J., ii, 707-8.
81. On 13 May 164-2 Parliament resolved to begin paying the
10,000 Scots for a period of three months beginning 1 
June: G . J . . ii, 570. However, as early as January and 
February 1 b4-2 arrangements were made for sending an 
advance party of 2,500 into Ulster. On 24- January the 
Scots Commissioners agreed to approach Edinburgh to 
consent to this proposal, and Parliament agreed to 
propositions concerning their payment and supply: L.J., 
iv, 530, 532; C.J. , ii, 392. By 4- February Parliament 
completed arrangements for handing over Carrickfergus 
to the Scots as a base of operations for the advance 
party and the rest of the Scottish force: L.J., iv, 
562-3; C. J ., ii, 4-12—13. By 2b February an agreement 
was completed for supplying the English and Scots' 
forces in Ulster at Carrickfergus: C. J. , ii, *+53- For 
an account of Scottish operations see A True Relation 
of the Proceedings of the Scots and English Forces in 
the North of Ireland, London, 8 June l6li-2.
82. L.J.', iv, 115.
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directly threatened. In these circumstances, when England 
was unable to do much for Ireland, Parliament was only too 
pleased that Scotland should step into the breach. On the 
other hand, the Covenanters, and especially Argyll, 
preferred to fight the Irish threat in Ulster than in the 
western highlands. This exemplary co-operation over Ireland 
can be explained, then, in terms of the limited mutual 
interests involved and the crisis of the moment. As I have 
said, the real issue between Parliament and the Scots was 
still in doubt. The Scots were not committed to Parliament’s 
cause by an agreement with the Kingdom of England to defend 
its Irish settlement.
Understanding that the Scots Covenanters could
more readily be won by proof of Parliament’s religious
credentials, Nathaniel Fiennes, on behalf of the Committee 8jof Safety, recently formed to direct Parliament’s defence, 
reported that as the General Assembly of the Kirk of 
Scotland v/as due in a few days to meet, Parliament ought to 
send the Assembly a declaration to satisfy it how much 
Parliament v/ished not to spill Christian blood. He presented 
just such a declaration to the House, which above all gave
83. The Committee of Safety was formed on h July 164-2 about 
a fortnight after the King put into execution his 
Commissions of Array: C .J ., ii, 651; L.J .. v, 178. 
Initially, the following men were appointed by the 
Commons to the Committee: Holies, Stapleton, Marten, 
Fiennes, Hampden, Pym, Pierrepont, Glyn, Sir William 
Waller and Sir John Merrick. The Lords appointed were: 
Northumberland, Essex, Pembroke, Holland and Saye. 
However, as Lotte Glow points out, the despatches of 
the Committee reveal that many more members than those 
originally appointed served on it: Lotte Glow, ’The 
Committee of Safety', The English Historical Review, 
lxxx, 1965, 299-300.
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evidence of Parliament’s zeal to reform religion. But 
merely to assure the Covenanters that Parliament was 
resolved to settle matters in church and state 'by the 
Advancement of the true Religion, and such a Reformation
84-
of the Church as shall be most agreeable to God's Word1, 
was not the way to win the firm friendship of men who were 
fiercely certain of their peculiar brand of religion. 
Parliament might silence vociferous vicars for preaching
85
against the Scots, and permit presbyterian English 
ministers to declare to the Assembl in Scotland their zeal
for a perfect union with that Kirk, but this was no real 
encouragement to the Scots. The Covenanters wanted something 
more definite from Parliament itself. Parliament was not 
going to obtain cheaply a commitment from the Scots. They 
understood how much Parliament needed them, and were 
prepared to exert pressure on their would-be allies to get 
the things they wanted.
Assembly's reply to their declaration they did not discover 
in it any offer of support. The Scots sent only the 
conditions for an understanding. From the Privy Council and 
the General Assembly of the Kirk came the advice that the
84. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 669v; C.J.. ii, 683.
85. On Saturday 30 July 164-2 the Commons sent for Mr.
Barrell, Vicar of Maidstone, as a delinquent. Pie was 
accused of making 'scandalous1 utterances against the 
Scots on the previous Sunday: ibid., 698.
86. Also on 30 July Baillie rccords that the General Assembly 
of the Kirk received from some presbyterian ministers in 
London letters expressing 'their desyre of Presbyterian 
Government, and a full union with our Church.' Baillie,
ii, 50.
When Parliament at last received the General
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was to establish 'One Confession of Faith, One Directory of
Worship, One Public Catechism, and One Form of Kirke
G o v e r n m e n t ' What hope, they asked, was there of
Unity in Religion, of One Confession of Faith,
One Form of Worship, and One Catechism, till 
there be one Form of Ecclesiastical Government? 
Yea, what Hope can the Kingdom and Kirke of 
Scotland have of a firm and Durable Peace, till 
Prelacy, which hath been the main Cause of their 
Miseries and Troubles...be plucked up Root and 
Branch...?
Without episcopacy it would be easy to establish in England
87the government of 'reformed Kirks by Assemblies1. In
short, the basis of an understanding between Parliament and
the Covenanters was a Presbyterian Church settlement in
England. One newsbook noted that in Parliament the Scots'
offer of assistance (which was never made) was not liked
88
because it came upon conditions.
only way of preserving the unity and peace of both Kingdoms
There is little doubt, however, that the news­
mongers reported Parliament's feelings accurately. 
Parliament had rebuffed the Scots in the previous year on 
the same issue; and, as historians have never tired of 
pointing out, the English did not know what religious 
settlement they wanted. For that matter, they were even at 
loggerheads over what they did not want. According to 
Gardiner, this is why many members finally broke with 
Parliament and went over to Charles. However, though the 
onset of civil war had drawn from Parliament the vehement
87. L.J., v, 32*+.
88. A Continuation of Certaine Special! and Remarkable 
Passages, no. 25-30 August 16^2, 3«
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episcopalians, this did not mean that Parliament was 
become more sure about what it wanted so far as religion 
was concerned, and, in particular, did not make Parliament 
more prepared at this time to accept Presbyterianism. As 
Charles himself pointed out to the Scots, Parliament was 
so far from desiring unity of religion that he was confident 
•that they who make the fairest pretences to you of this
89
kind will no sooner embrace presbytery than you episcopacy.1 
However, as war loomed up more threateningly, Parliament’s 
need to keep the Scots friendly increased. Something had to 
be done urgently; and although Parliament might not be 
ready to commit itself to a Presbyterian recasting of the 
English church, they certainly could indicate a willingness 
to abolish the bishops. On 26 August the Commons received 
the Scots1 declaration on uniformity in religion; and on 1 
September they unanimously resolved that the episcopal
90
government of the Church of England would be abolished.
Whatever other factors contributed to the making of this
decision, it was, in part, a war measure. However much
Parliament v/as convinced, on other grounds, of the necessity
to abolish episcopacy, the timing of the decision suggests
that it was designed to keep the Scots friendly towards
91
Parliament and hostile to the royal cause.
Although the foreshadowed abolition of episcopacy 
v/as inspired partly by the exigencies of war, Parliament was
89. R.P.c Ts ., vii, 331-2.
90. C.J. . ii, 74-7-8; D 1 Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 163, f. 698.
It v/as further resolved that the decision should be one 
head of a reply to the Scottish declaration.
91» C.S.P.V. , xxvi, 163.
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not frightened by the prospect of war into yielding everything 
to the Scots, Parliament’s declarations to Scotland were 
models of circumspection. Episcopacy was to be abolished as 
a witness to their desire for reform; but Parliament refused 
to yield an inch on Presbyterianism, Parliament rejected 
any attempt by the Scots to dictate a religious settlement 
in England. To the General Assembly Parliament replied that 
reform would be secured ’punctually and exactly1, but that 
they would reform the Church where it was ’offensive to God, 
or justly displeasing to our Neighbour Church and other 
Reformed Churches, in all substantial parts of Doctrine, 
Worship and Discipline...’ For this purpose Parliament 
proposed to consult with an assembly of divines to which 
some Scottish clerics were invited. With this advice they 
would settle religion in such a way as to be not only 
’agreeable1 to the word of God and conducive to unity v/ith 
Scotland, but also ’most apt to procure and conserve the 
Peace of the Church at home*. In religion they might yet 
decide that Presbyterianism was unsuited to England. 
Parliament, a secular body, by reserving to itself the 
final decisions on religious reform, was exemplifying an 
erastian concept of the church hostile to Presbyterianism, 
which claimed for the Kirk an independent authority 
reminiscent of that claimed by the Roman Church. Such a 
statement of English principles of reform could hardly have 
consoled the Covenanters. Moreover, Parliament was not 
interested in a religious but in a political alliance. Thus 
it wrote to the Privy Council of Scotland that as those 
who were inciting the King against Parliament were the same
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men who had incited him against Scotland, they might be as
careful of England's peace as they were of Scotland’s. They
did not ask the Scots to show their ’Brotherly Kindness* by
entering into an alliance with them, but that they might
only suppress those ill-disposed persons in their midst
92
*that they may not foment our Troubles. * So Parliament 
only desired a political alliance, an agreement that the 
royal party was dangerous to the interests of both 
parliamentarians and Scots. So long as the Scots stayed 
benevolently neutral Parliament would remain satisfied.
It was now early September, almost exactly a 
year since England had celebrated the withdrawal of the 
Scots. Throughout that time the active party (now the 
parliamentary party) had been attempting to construct a 
basis for co-operation with the Scots. They had been 
educated during the months of Scottish occupation to the 
fact that the Scots pursued a policy which did not necessarily 
correspond with the interests of the reform party in England. 
It v/as conceivable, in the minds of parliamentarians, that 
the Scots might go so far as to give their support to 
Charles. However, they believed that the Scots were crucial 
to the success or failure of the parliamentary cause. Hence 
the effort to consolidate an understanding with them. The 
understanding they sought to establish consisted in the
92. For these declarations in reply to those of the General 
Assembly and the Privy Council of Scotland see L.J., v,
34-8-50. They were agreed to by the Lords on 10 
September 164-2. The declarations we re delivered to the 
Lord Maitland at 5*00 P«m. the same day, before he set 
out for Scotland the following morning.
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recognition by both parties of their mutual interest in 
co-operating to defeat certain forces. These forces were 
said to be threatening reforms established in Scotland and 
being established in England. Furthermore, the 
parliamentarians said that the Scots were bound to assist 
England in this work according to the treaty of pacification.
This policy was not without its opponents. There 
were men (like Sir John Hotham, Lord Falkland and Sir John 
Culpepper) who did not see that England needed to establish 
a modus vivendi with the Scots. Even if there was some enemy 
threatening the reform or the peace of England or her 
dominions, they did not see that it was necessary to have 
the support of the Scots. It was dishonourable for England 
to seek the support of a nation which had humiliated her.
This resistance persisted longer in the Lords, but eventually 
it, too, was forced to yield. The Peers feared to be blamed 
for neglecting the colonists of Ireland.
As the crisis deepened and parliamentary reform 
was threatened in England by the growing military power of 
the King, Scotland became more important. The enemies who 
were said to be threatening the peace of both Kingdoms now 
openly had drawn the sword in England. Parliament strove to 
counter the royal threat not only by military preparations 
but also by arguments designed to persuade the Scots that 
Parliament had been wronged. Parliament did not seek an 
alliance with the Scots. They only sought that the Scots 
should understand the 'real* position in England so that
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they would not be deceived by the King’s arguments. 
Parliament thus decided to abolish episcopacy partly in 
order to convince the Scots that Parliament’s cause was 
genuine. However, Parliament was not prepared to let the 
Scots dictate the model of church reform in return for 
their support. The parliamentarians were determined that 
they and they alone would decide the nature of religious 
reform. By promising to abolish episcopacy the Parliament 
intended to offer the Scots a hope of Presbyterian 
reformation sufficient at least to secure their benevolent 
neutrality and to l:eep them out of the King’s camp.
As the crisis of 164-2 developed there was not, 
until November, renewed opposition to closer ties with the 
Scots. This is not surprising. As members drifted away from 
Parliament, betaking themselves to a country seat or to the 
royal camp, the most outspoken opponents of the Scots would 
have been leached from Parliament. Guided by the example of 
the Commons, where a man's hostility to the Scots was 
usually indicative of his royalist inclinations, we can 
conclude that it was likely that, as royalists gathered 
around Charles at York, both Houses were emptied of the 
more resolute opponents to friendship with the Scots. Thus 
it was that those who remained supported the policy of 
attempting to prevent Charles from turning Scotland against 
Parliament.
However, the temporary unity within Parliament on 
this particular issue did not survive the shock of Edgehill.
164-
Kany who remained at Westminster were amazed when the 
conflict between King and Parliament developed into a full- 
scale war. They were completely surprised, too, by the 
strength of the royal forces. In this moment of extreme 
danger something more was needed of the Scots than their 
goodwill and understanding. The obvious conclusion, for the 




The battle of Edgehill transformed the
parliamentary attitude to the Scots. Whereas before
Parliament had been united in its attempt to keep the Scots
well-disposed towards it, now the reality of war began to
weaken that unity. Now the attitudes taken toward the
Scots began to differ between parties according to whether
they were more or less fierce in prosecuting Parliament’s
cause. It was one thing to convince the Scots of the
rectitude of the cause and to keep them from the clutches
of the King; it was another to invite them into England as
allies. In this chapter I will argue that, whereas the Middle
and War Parties (for convenience I will refer to them as the
1
Military Party ) tried to establish a military alliance with 
the Scots from the very first days of the civil war, the 
Peace Party resolutely resisted the plan, even after 
commissioners had been dispatched to negotiate the alliance 
in 164-3; so that Parliament engaged itself to the Scots 
despite the unwillingness and reservations of nearly half 
the parliamentary party.
Not long after Edgehill Parliament quickly 
divided between those who sought to resolve the conflict by 
peaceful negotiation, and those who believed that only the 
defeat of the royal forces would induce the King to come to 
terms with Parliament. Those who supported negotiation saw
U  I have adopted the new term as both these groups
supported an alliance with the Scots. It was probably 
proposed by Pym, the leader of the Middle Party: see 
J. H. Hexter, The Reign of King Pym, London, 194-1 , 29-30. 
Hexter is more definite about the authorship of this 
proposal than I think the evidence permits.
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the development of a military alliance with Scotland as an 
extension of a policy that already had proved disastrous.
These men of the Peace Party did not believe that the 
issues between King and Parliament could be resolved by 
continuing that intransigent policy which so far had prevailed 
in the Commons and had contributed much, it was thought, to 
precipitating the disaster of war. On the other side were 
men who believed only firm measures would induce the King 
to return and submit to Parliament’s advice: this was the 
Military Party. They saw the Scottish alliance as necessary 
to the successful defence of the Parliament's position.
During the attempt to settle matters by negotiations (which 
stretched from November 164-2 to May 164-3) the Peace Party 
strove to combat what they regarded as the uncompromising 
spirit of the Military Party, and sought to delay the 
proposed league with the Scots because they believed it 
harmful to the cause of negotiated peace. Meanwhile, the 
Military Party awaited the collapse of the peace negotiations 
to implement fully their own policy of calling in the Scots.
Only six days after the battle of Edgehill a 
proposal was made in the Lords which upset Parliament's 
recent agreement over Scottish policy. On Saturday 29 
October 164-2 the Lords voted to consider how to prevent 2
further bloodshed, and to find 'some Means to beget Peace.'
On 31 October the more pacific members of the Commons—
Waller, Bagshaw, Rudyard and others— moved that the Commons 
should join with the Lords in seeking negotiations v/ith the
2. L.J. ~ ,  4-24-.
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King. The motion, however, was opposed chiefly by the more 
warlike of Parliaments leaders, who at this time dominated
>+
the Committee of Safety. According to Whiteacre, the
committee, having notice of Waller's motion, sent the
younger Vane to the Commons to dissuade them from so rash a
proposition. Vane told the House that the committee itself
was considering this very proposal, but
they did assure us that there was jgo gause o£ 
feare, as we might conceive; for y y Parlt 
Army was in a very good condition.../so/ they 
desired we would not yet enter into debate of 
y business...
Strode supported Vane, saying that the proposal to send a 
peace petition to the King would only be a discouragement to 
the Lord General and to the Army. For the moment the tide of 
opinion was still running in favour of the tougher measures 
advocated by the Commoners on the Committee of Safety, and
5the peace proposal was dropped.
3
It was clear by 2 November that this difference 
between the Houses over peace negotiations had serious 
implications for the future of Parliament's Scottish policy. 
Having rejected the peace proposal, the Commons voted 
instead to accept the Committee of Safety's proposal to 
engage a Scottish army to quell forces being raised by 
Newcastle in the North. Pym, one of the Vanes (probably the 
younger), Whitelocke and Glyn— all at this time associated
3. A Perfect Diurnal of the Passages in Parliament, no. 21 , 
31 October-7 November 16^2. The news item is given under 
the date 31 October 164-2. See also Whiteacre, B.M. Add. 
MSS. 31,116, f. 5. 
bm See above, 156, Note 83.
5* Whiteacre, B.M. Add. MSS. 31,116, f. 5*
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with the war "policy— were sent to deliver this resolution
6
at a conference with the Lords.
At this conference the policies of the Military 
and Peace parties clashed. Itfhereas the Military Party, 
presently in control of the Commons, wanted to strengthen 
Parliament’s position by an alliance with Scotland before 
Parliament contemplated an attempt to negotiate with the 
King, the Lords were reluctant to accept this constraint 
and wished to open talks with Charles immediately. Thus the 
Lords, in exchange for the declaration to the Scots, 
delivered to the Commons a petition to His Majesty ’for
7composing the Differences and Distractions of the Kingdom. 1
The Lords* action had pre-empted the plans of the
Military Tarty, which did not intend, as Vane had indicated,
that Parliament should consider a peace treaty at this time.
In an attempt to reaffirm their strategy, the Military Party
induced the Commons to accept the peace proposal only on
condition that all appropriate defence measures should
8
proceed without hindrance. This broad declaration clearly 
included the proposal to seek military assistance from the 
Scots. The Military Party in the Commons was relectantly 
prepared at this stage to negotiate, but only so long as it 
was from a position of strength. The difficulty, however, was 
to persuade the supporters of negotiation also to support the
6. C. J .V ii, P>32. For the declaration itself see L.J.« v,
1*3 0 -1.
7. Ibid.: G.J., ii, 832.
8. ibid.
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extremely unpopular suggestion of calling in the Scots. 
Nevertheless, the Military Party did persuade their opponents, 
for the moment, that they must proceed with the request for 
Scottish aid to make Parliament’s power formidable, and
10
thereby to obtain better conditions in any negotiations.
11
The Lords accepted this condition; but their agreement did
not mean that they had suddenly adopted the war policy.
Probably they accepted the condition to ensure that the
peace petition would reach the King and negotiations begin.
At least this is what one might conclude from the Lords'
resolution that debate on the proposal to request Scottish
12
aid 'be respited for a time.' So, while the policy of the 
Military Party was held up in the Lords, Parliament selected
13peace commissioners to the crown.
9
Things at first went badly for the Peace Party,
The King rejected Sir John Evelyn as a peace commissioner,
14-
Evelyn being one whom Charles had declared traitor. The 
Commons responded that now it was clear that Parliament had 
tried every means to procure peace, and yet Charles had
15refused to grant a treaty. There now seemed only one course
9. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vi, 102.
10. ibid., 103.
11. U J . , v, 431.
12. ibid. , 1+30-1 .
13* Peace commissioners were named on 3 November. For the
Lords were the Earls of Northumberland and Pembroke (L.J.,
v, 4-32); and for the Commons, Lord Way man, Pierrepont,
Sir John Ashley, Sir John Evelyn and Sir John Ilippisley:
C .J . , ii, 834-. For the events of 2-3 November see 
England's Memorable Accidents. 31 October-7 November 
1642, 69-70: Special Passages, no. 13, 1-8 November 
164-2, 107-8.
1L>-* v , 4-35-6; CjmJ, , ii, 838.
1 5. ibid.
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with the Scots, The Commons sent to the Lords to expedite
1 6
the declaration to the Scots, The Lords agreed. They 
probably thought that in the circumstances they had no 
choice. For the moment it looked as if the war policy had 
triumphed. The treaty would not begin and Parliament would 
still call in the Scots.
open to Parliament, and that was war and a military alliance
However, the Military Party did not exercise
decisive control in the Commons. Sir John Evelyn v/as very
reluctant that an opportunity for peace should be lost on
his account, so he voluntarily withdrew from the peace
commission on 9 November. The objections of the Military
Party suddenly disappeared. There was now nothing to prevent
1 8
the peace petition being sent to the King. It was sent on
11 November. However, on the following day Rupert attacked
Brentford, decimated the parliamentary force there and looted
the town. Charles was accused of deceiving Parliament. It
seemed that the peace policy had crashed again. There v/as
every sign that the war policy was in the ascendant.
Preparations for an appeal to the Scots went ahead. On 15
November Parliament declared all intercourse between England
19
and Scotland 'shall be open'. On the seventeenth the 
Commons began hunting up the Merchant Strangers who had
16. ibid.7 838-9} L.J.. v, M-37.
17« Special Passares. no. 1*+, 8-15 November 16*1-2, 115-165 
C.J., ii, Sir John Evelyn was a firm supporter of
the Peace Party in the Commons until the negotiations 
collapsed. Then he sv/itched allegiance to the War Party.
18. The petition v/as delivered to Charles at Colnbrook on
11 November: Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vi, 
130-1.
19. C.J,, ii, 851; LfiJ., v, M-i6.
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promised to lend £4-0,000 toward payment of the 'Brotherly
20 21 
Assistance', Finally, on 18 November, Mr. John Pickering
was chosen to deliver the declaration to the Scots. The
Military Party also was sharpening up its arguments ready
for the Scots and for the opponents of the Scots in
Parliament. The Commons renewed the claim that the Scots were
obliged by the Treaty to assist Parliament, by resolving:
That such Officers, and other Soldiers, of the 
Scotts Nation, that are come to the Assistance of 
the Army raised by Parliament...have done nothing 
but according to their Duty; and what is agreeable 
to the Articles of the Treaty...22
Yet the momentum of the war policy and of bringing 
in the Scots was not sufficient to resist the widespread 
yearning for peace. There was an unwillingness to advance 
the war policy and to compound the evil of civil war by 
negotiating the support of an allied military force— a 
measure which Clarendon tells us 'was as unpopular a thing
23as could be mentioned,..' The Venetian embassy also
echoed the worry that very likely was preoccupying many
parliamentarians:
If the Scots are disposed to declare themselves 
and to take the side of Parliament it is not 
possible to escape the fear that prolonged and 
deplorable calamities are in store for these 
states,, .24-
Gn 21 November the Commons voted, despite the Brentford 
affair, to consider the King's reply to Parliament's peace
20. C.J., ii, 853.
21. Sir William Armyn was also chosen to deliver the 
declaration to the Scots Commissioners in London: 
C. J ., ii, 854-; L.J., v, 4-51.
22. C.J. , ii, 854-,
23. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vi, 102.
2*+. C.S.P.V., xxvi, 199.
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propositions to be made to the King. The House was very full
that day. There were near 200 members at times sitting in
the Grand Committee, which sat all that day until 7 p.m.
D'Ewes observed a profound change in the Commons:
Hr Denzill Hollis, Mr Whitelocke, Mr Perepoint &
Mr Glyn amongst others who had formerlie 
been verie opposite to an accomodation...did now 
spake earnestlie for it. Mr Hollis was much 
cooled in his fierceness by that great slaughter 
made in his regiment at Brainford. . .2 5
This changed mood in Parliament was implicitly hostile to
further engagements of a military kind with the Scots. As
the days passed and the Houses preoccupied themselves with
peace propositions their readiness for the alliance
diminished.
message. Having done so, the Commons began to debate peace
If Parliament had been anxious to enlist Scotland's
assistance it would not have waited long in making a request.
But in fact Parliament did delay. It was 2 November when the
Commons delivered to the Lords the request for Scottish 
26
help. Yet the Commons waited five days before they asked
27the Lords to expedite that declaration. Moreover, the
Commons did not appoint a messenger to the Scots until 18
28
November; and the messenger (John Pickering) was still in 
London on 8 December. Meanwhile the Commons had voted that 
the Earl of Lindsey, one of the Scots Commissioners, 
recommend the declaration to the kingdom of Scotland, and
25. D'Ewes. B.M. Ilarl. MSS. 1 61k, f. 903-903v.
26. C.J., ii, 332.
27. C.J.. ii, 838-9; L.J.. v, 1+37.
28. C.J.. ii, 85>+; L.J.. v, 1*51
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Scotland. Neither business was finalised by the Lords until
29
8 December. As Baillie observed:
There was a great word of commissioners coming 
from them to our Council!, and it was a great 
wonder, if they desired anie help, that they 
denyed not to use some better means for its 
obtaining.
Bot such v/as their, (as I take it,) oversight, 
that they used no other meanes bot a declaration of 
their desyre to have our help according to the 
late Treatie.30
After Lindsey had received the declaration, the Scots heard
no more of it until the Sari of Lanark came to the Scottish
Privy Council bearing the declaration, together v/ith the
31King's letter attacking it — it was 20 December and still
Pickering had not prosecuted Parliament's cause before the
32
Privy Council of Scotland.
that Hr. Weldon accompany Pickering on his mission to
The whole business appears very curious. The 
declaration is an unmistakeable request for military aid.
33
Therefore, the fact that Pym’s agent-at-large in Scotland, 
Pickering, did not press the matter, suggests that Pym and 
the leaders of the Military Party appreciated that Parliament 
v/as not yet prepared to accept such an arrangement. 
Pickering's task, then, seems to have been to sound out the 
Scots as to their intentions, and to counter the influence
29. C.J.. ii, 878; L.J,. v, 1*83.
30. Baillie, ii, 58,
3 1• ibid.
32. R.P.C.S., vii, 359-63.
33* On 6 December the Commons resolved that Weldon assist 
Fickering 'in Delivery of the Declaration...and in the 
Prosecution of all business there concerning the 
Parliament. And that it may be left to Mr. Pickering to 
return home when he shall think fitting...' C.J .« ii, 
878. This commission v/as approved by the Peers on 8 
December: L.J ., v, 4-83.
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of royalist propaganda until that time when Parliament 
would be prepared to enter into a military alliance.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the 
Military Party was ceasing to press Parliament to commit 
itself to an alliance with the Scots. On 1*+ December a 
committee was established in the Commons to consider hoi; a 
force could be raised out of the counties to oppose 
Newcastle's army— the very task for which a Scottish army 
had been requested earlier. The committee consisted of
3 ^leading figures from both the Military and Peace parties. 
Clearly, both factions in the Commons were inclined not to 
commit the northern defences to the Scots. Scotland, of 
course, might not wish to engage itself in Parliament's 
struggle, but, more importantly, Parliament might decline 
to press its request for Scotland's active intervention. 
Indeed, the previous weeks had indicated just this 
possibility to the Military Party. Its strong representation 
on this committee, to raise an English army for the North, 
can be seen as a further admission that, for the time being, 
Parliament must look within England itself for the solution 
to its military problems. Furthermore, Parliament seemed to 
be turning away from the prospect of a Scottish alliance at 
the very time its military position was rapidly deteriorating. 
Alarming news flooded in from every front. By this time it 
was known at Westminster that the Lord Fairfax had been
3^+". Sir Philip Stapleton, Holies, St. John, Lord Grey,
Purefoy, Glyn, Sir Thomas Barrington, Marten,
Fierrepoint, Knightley, Sir Thomas Dacres, Whitelocke:
C.J., ii, 890.
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beaten from Tadcaster by the Earl of Newcastle; that Lord 
Herbert was raising a second Welsh army; that the Earl of 
Stamford was in retreat from Hereford to Gloucester; and
35that Hopton was threatening Exeter. There was a motion
36
for a Scots army; but it did not recommend itself to the
House. On 16 December the Commons settled simply for a
declaration of their preparedness to receive Scottish 
37volunteers. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude, 
given that Parliament v/as ignoring the proposed alliance 
with the Scots at the very time when its defences were 
crumbling, that it must have discarded the Scottish policy, 
at least for the moment; and that the Military Party was 
compelled to suffer a setback.
The reluctance of Parliament to recall the Scots 
reminds us of the resistance of the Lords to the Scottish 
assistance for Ireland. Just as the Lords, late in 164-1 , had 
been unready to admit that the plight of Ireland and the 
mutual interests of England and Scotland were sufficient 
grounds for sending into Ireland a Scottish army, so also 
now. Even though Parliament itself was threatened by powerful 
forces, it was in no mind to grant a mutual interest with the 
Covenanters in crushing these forces within England. 
Parliament did not see at all that the pacification had
3!;. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, i, 76.
36. Yonre, B.M. Add. MSS. 18,777? f• 9^6-96• Because of the extreme difficulty of reading this MS. I relied upon 
extracts taken from Yonge by Dr. Patricia Crawford of 
the University of Western Australia. I am most grateful 
to Dr. Crawford for her help in this matter.
37. L.J., iv, 4-96; C.J., ii, 891.
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rendered the Scots their firmest ally in this dangerous time.
It is naturally difficult to tell just how much simple
native hostility or pragmatic considerations played in this
evaluation of the Scottish alliance. Gardiner says that it
would have been a confession of weakness to call upon the
Scots; and this, of course, would have been something
3 8
parliamentarians were loath to admit. It is very probable 
that many could not stomach calling again upon the help of 
those who had once humbled them. Could they be trusted again 
on English soil? What temptations might not civil war 
provide them? Had not the Scots already indicated that the 
price of their support was a Presbyterian reform of the 
English Church? Doubtless these were questions members asked 
themselves. But in addition to these considerations there 
was, for men who wished that matters might be settled by 
negotiation, another factor.
The Peace Party probably realised that to call in 
the Scots would be to endorse a strategy which would 
undermine their peace policy before negotiations could begin. 
It would be a provocative act of war which would make the 
King all the more intransigent, and negotiations futile. Of 
course, if there were to be negotiations, Parliament would 
attempt, if it were able, to negotiate from strength, lest 
all the reforms recently gained be thrown away. Therefore 
Parliament could raise an English army to oppose Newcastle; 
and it could organise county associations for self-defence; 
but to call in a foreign army was too aggressive an act. It
33. Gardiner, op. cit., i, 76.
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was the last expedient should all else fail. As the weeks 
vent by some of these considerations emerged in the words 
and actions of Parliament.
Fortunately, at this point in the story of the 
Long Parliament Sir Simonds D'Ewes plaj^ed his most prominent 
part. He was one of the leading spokesmen for the Peace 
Party. Therefore his views might suggest something of the 
opinions held by that group.
Sixteen peace propositions, having passed the
39
Lords, were taken into consideration by the Commons on 22 
4-0
December. Gardiner rightly observes that these proposals,
though the work of the Peace Party, called for a settlement
of church and state to which Charles could not have agreed.
'No wonder,' Gardiner writes, 'that those who kept their
heads clear in the Commons thought it useless to engage in
4-1
negotiation on such terms. ' The younger Vane v/as first 
among the opponents of the peace propositions. He argued 
that, by entering into negotiation, Parliament would neglect
1+2
its defence and bring Itself to 'utter ruin and desolation...' 
Gardiner claims, however, that Vane's clear reasoning v/as
4-3
overmatched by a general desire for peace. Even so, clear 
reasoning v/as not the exclusive province of the Military 
Party. When D'Ewes replied for the Peace Party, his speech
39. For the peace propositions see L. J ., v, 504-. They were 
communicated to the Commons on 20 December, 16H2: C.J.,
ii, 897; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164-, f. 1067-1067v.
4-0. C.J., ii, 699-901.
4-1. Gardiner, or>. cit., i, 79.
4-2. D'Ewes, B.M. Iiarl. MSS. 164-, f. 1070.
4-3* Gardiner, o p . cit., i, 79.
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reason to attempt to negotiate peace, especially when one
contemplated the dire consequences of war. In particular,
he contended that negotiation must be tried before the war
policy inevitably escalated the conflict beyond the point
where reconciliation was possible, and after which the
country would be subject to unimagined ravages. He pointed
out that prosecution of the war policy contained four great
dangers for England. The fourth and greatest of these was a
military alliance with Scotland:
...For certainly if we shall call in our neighbour 
nation the Scotts to our aid on the one side we 
cannot doubt but that the other nation /Ireland/ 
will also be called in on the other side and we 
have already just cause of fear to be visited both 
by the Danes and the French...M+
In brief, D !Ewes declared that the policy of negotiation
excluded the Scots, since the intention of negotiation was
not to escalate but to end the war; whereas to call in the
Scots would deepen the struggle. D ’Ewes1 speech ended amid
l>-5applause, some calling out ’well moved, well moved. 1 We 
can assume that the applause was in part an indication of 
the strength of opposition to an alliance with the Scots, as 
well as of support for the peace propositions. These latter 
were carried on the voices — an indication of that strength 
of opinion which obliged the Military Party to relax its 
efforts for a Scottish alliance.
Two days later D ’Ewes gave further evidence of,
Mi. D'Ewes. B.M. Ilarl. MSS. 16^, f. 1071v.
1+5. ibid. , f. 1072.
!|6. ibid.
was not without its logic. He argued that there was every
1 8 0
and reason for, the strong opposition to the alliance. Two 
papers were delivered from the Scots Commissioners 
representing the plight of their army in Ireland. They 
desired the prompt payment of £^0,000 of the ’Brotherly
1+7
Assistance’ due at midsummer last. During the debate on
these papers some of the radical members, like Bond of
Dorchester, proposed that Parliament should tell the Scots
that Parliament could not pay because of the ’army against
us & the papists ioning them. . . 1 Thus they proposed that the
Scots be invited to come in and aid Parliament and satisfy
their needs out of the estates of ’Papists’ and
'Malignants' in the North. The suggestion horrified D ’Ewes:
But in this ther is not onlie hazard of the expence 
of monie but of blood alsoe. Now wee know what we 
ow Scotts; but if we shall call them in againe, we 
must bear the charges, & to what a vaste expence 
that may amount unto we cannot foresee or 
calculate: soe as if we be not able to pay them 
what is now due, we shall be much much lesse able 
to satisfie them when our charge is growing to a 
greater encrease...& whereas it is saied that 
they should levie this money upon papists and 
delinquents: but I must desire this house to 
consider, that warre is justly called a destroying 
monster, & cann scarcely distinguish betweene 
friends & foes: for when the Scottish array shall 
Z _/ have advanced into this kingdome they must 
have foode for themselves & meate for their horses, 
w h they must have from such as cann afford it, & 
soe those who are innocent & whome we desire to 
protect shall be undone as well as the malignants...
D'Ewes had in mind the problems created by the recent
Scottish occupation of the North, and how these problems
would be aggravated by war. He did not wish to see the
misfortunes of the past amplified and superimposed on those
of the present. Contrary to Bond's suggestion, D ’Ewes
proposed that
W / cV J m  ii* 901.
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..•we return answere to the Scotts, that the 
present paiment of this monie is rendered 
impossible in respect of the present distractions,.• 
but that wee weere now advizing about a way of 
peace & accomodation by which we did assure 
ourselves that we should be enabled within a short 
time to pay them & this I am confident will be a 
very welcome message to them. ^8
The Commons did not see fit to accept Bond's advice, and made
a committee from men of every opinion, including D ’Ewes, to
*+9prepare an answer to the Scots' papers. The answer they
50
proposed v/as much as D'Ewes had suggested. The Military
Party had yielded again to the unwillingness of the Commons
to engage themselves with the Scots.
D'Ewes' speeches of 22 and 2k December are important. 
They give us an indication of the reasons why the return of 
the Scots to England was resisted; and the favour with which 
these speeches were received is an indication of how widely 
accepted were the ideas they contained. The speeches tell us 
that the Scottish alliance was disliked because of its 
threat to the effectiveness of the peace policy, and because 
of the difficulties that paying and controlling such a 
force would present. Furthermore, the favourable reception 
granted these speeches suggests that opposition to the 
alliance was closely related to the strength of support for 
the peace policy. The Military Party would not be able to 
proceed with its proposal to treat with the Scots for
^3. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 16>+, f. 1072v-1073.
*+9. The committee consisted of Pym, Holies, Sir William 
Armyn, Wilde, Sir Peter Wentworth, Sir Henry Heyman, 
Marten, Grimston, Cage, Sir Henry Vane, Goodwin, Holland 
and D'Ewes: C .J .« ii, 901.
50. The answer was reported in the Commons and approved on
29 December 16^ -2: C. J .« ii, 906. It passed the Lords on
3 January 16^ +35 L.J,, v, 52^-5*
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The success of the Military Party in its policy 
toward the Scots depended ultimately on the outcome of the 
treaty negotiations. While Parliament was discussing the 
peace propositions and, then, actually negotiating with the 
King, the Peace Party would not hear of negotiations with 
the Scots. For instance, on 3 January 16^3 Pym attempted to 
revive the Military Party's plan for an alliance with 
Scotland, calling for a 'nationall association between us 
an Scotland as the papist ptie beyonde sea did unite themselves 
against the protestant to overthrow our religion.' Nothing, 
however, came of this proposal. While negotiations were 
still in the air the House was unwilling to adopt the measure. 
Holies stated the case of the Peace Party that 'the best
51means of peace is to suppresse that which hynders yt.'
The fact that the Peace Party did not, in the end, yield 
ground on the Scottish issue until after it was clear that 
the negotiations had failed, emphasises that the Scottish 
alliance was considered an extreme measure incompatible 
with the peace policy.
Negotiations began on 1 February 16^3 and 
continued in a desultory way until 15 April 16^ 1-3• They 
broke down ostensibly because Charles and Parliament could 
not agree on the terms of a cessation that was to precede 
the negotiations. Although discussions were to continue for 
a few days more, it was clear by the end of March that no
military aid until the vigour of the Peace Party was broken.
51. Yonre, B.M. Add. MSS. 18,777, f. 112.
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agreement could be reached. On 3 April the Commons resolved
that their commissioners should return on Saturday 8 April
unless the King had given a satisfactory answer to
52
Parliament's proposal for a cessation. In the event the 
vote was reversed, and the commissioners granted an
53extension. But despair of the negotiations had struck 
the Peace Party. It was only now that it began to yield to 
the Military Party's policy of a Scottish alliance. Thus on 
7 April a committee was formed out of the leaders of both 
factions in the Commons to select, and to -prepare 
instructions for, agents to go into Scotland. The next 
day the Parliament rejected finally the King's terms for a
55cessation. As the negotiations were ended the Scottish 
policy was re-asserted.
Charles replied to Parliament's rejection of his 
terms for a cessation on 12 April with a declaration of his 
conditions for a peaceful settlement. He demanded that his 
revenue be restored; that his ships, forts and magazines be 
commanded by his nominees; that the members expelled since 
January 1 6Lr2 be restored; that Parliament adjourn itself to 
some place twenty miles from London to be free from the 
threat of mob violence. These were terms that Parliament
~l)2. C.J. , iii, 28; L.J.. v, 687.
53* The extension v/as agreed to by the Commons on 6 April: 
C.J. , iii. 33* It v/as agreed to by the Lords on 7 April: 
L . J., v, 095.
Sb. The Committee was made up, on the one hand, of Holies 
and Glyn; on the other, of Pym, the younger Vane and 
St. John: C .J ., iii, 3*+.
55* The Parliament rejected the King's terms and demanded 
that he give an ansv/er to their original proposal that 
there should be a disbandment of both armies before 
negotiation: Rushworth, v, 191; L.J., v, 70k*
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peace commissioners were ordered to return. The treaty came
56
to an end on 15 April. The policy of the Peace Party 
seemed discredited. The success of the parliamentary cause 
now appeared to rest upon the strength of its arms. It was 
time to execute the war policy and summon the Scots.
could not accept. They were rejected on 15-!- April and the
The Military Party, which now held sway in the 
Commons, was eager to begin the work. The Commons sought a 
conference on 1 May to desire that both Houses send members
57to Scotland. Their task would be to 'acquaint that State
58
how affaires stood heero & to desire ther aid...' Pyn
59himself was to manage the conference. But the Lords were 
not so eager. In the upper House the Peace Party still 
dominated. The Peers were going to prove a determined 
opposition to the Scottish alliance. It was chiefly their 
intransigence which delayed the malting of the treaty. 
Meanwhile, the Covenanters were readying themselves to meet 
with the commissioners from England who seemed as if they 
would never arrive.
For some time now the Covenanters had been aware 
of the necessity to come to some arrangement with Parliament. 
They had been concerned to see a peaceful settlement of 
differences in England, but so far their efforts had been
1)6. Gardiner, o d . cit., i, 108-9.
57. C.J. , i i i , “"5bl58. D 'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 161*, f. 1181. The conference was 
actually held on 2 May: C.J., iii, 66; L.J.« vi, 6.
59. C .J., iii, 66. Sir Henry Mildmay went up to the Lords 
with the message desiring the conference: ibid.; L.J., 
vi, 6.
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rebuffed by the King. The Covenanters, however, did not 
wish to see Charles triumph in England, for then he would 
doubtlessly turn his victorious arms against Scotland to 
settle old scores there. If Charles continued to refuse 
their mediation they would be obliged to take Parliament's 
side. But the Covenanters remained quiescant until shocked 
into action by the growing influence of royalists on the 
Privy Council in Scotland.
On 20 December 16^ +2 the Privy Council of Scotland
received from the King his reply to the Parliament's
November declaration to Scotland, together with that
declaration itself. It had been delivered by the Earl of
Lanark. The same day the Council resolved not to print the
60
Parliament's declaration. However, they ordered that the
61
King's reply be printed. This decision awakened the
Covenanters to the growing influence of the royalists, and
made them fear an attempt v/as afoot to raise a levy of62
soldiers for the King. But by February the Covenanters had 
won back sufficient ground to return to their former policy 
of attempting to restore peace in England by mediation. To 
this end they sent commissioners to the King at Oxford, in 
their final bid to settle the affairs of England peacefully. 
Charles, however, rejected their overtures to make peace 
between King and Parliament on the basis of a Presbyterian 
church settlement, and refused to let them present these
60. R.P.cTs.. vii, 361-3.
6 1. Baillie. ii, 58.
62. ibid.
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proposals to Parliament. After this rebuff the Scots
6k
returned home in a very discontented state of mind. How 
that Charles had rejected both Presbyterianism and the offer 
of conciliation itself, the Covenanters had no alternative 
but to seek an agreement with Parliament.
63
To prepare themselves for this crucial step the
Privy Council of Scotland sent a letter to Charles on 12
May 16k3 advising him that it was necessary to call a
Convention of the Estates. The Council claimed that the
neglected condition of their army in Ireland, and the
inability of the English Parliament to provide for it,
required that Scotland itself take steps to maintain that
army. More ominously, though, the Council added a suggestion
that it was disturbed also by a 'sense of the danger of
religion, of your Majesties royall person and the common
6 ?
peace of your kingdoms...' Charles would not assent to the
meeting of the Estates. However, the continuing war in
England, with its attendant dangers for Scotland—
dramatically emphasised by the recent discovery of the Earl
of Antrim's invasion ulan— moved the Scots to defy Charles
6 6
and call the Estates. The declaration proclaiming this 
decision represented the triumph of the Covenanters, and 
expressed their willingness to take action against the forces 
which they feared were about to destroy both Kingdoms.
>^3. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vi, 368.
6Lr. C . S. P. V . , xxvi, 262 .
65. R.P.C.S., vii, k28.
66. ibid.V kkk: A Declaration of the Lords of His Majesties 
i-rivie Conncell in Scotland and Commissioners for the 
Conserving of the Articles of the Treaty, London, 27 June
—
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The Scots were willing to discuss an alliance with 
Parliament. The Military Party was eager that Parliament 
should send to the Scots. But the Lords, dominated by a 
desire for peace, were not.
Although the Commons requested the Lords on 1 May
• 67to join with them in sending commissioners into Scotland,
it was not until 30 May that the Lords agreed to appoint a
68
commissioner— the Lord Grey of Wark. In the meantime the
Commons sent up a stream of messages urging the Lords to
hasten their answer to the resolution of the Commons. But
69
the Lords gave no reply. They were unmoved also by the
pleas of Lord Fairfax who, under increasing pressure in the
70
North, was urging Parliament to secure a Scottish army.
On 17 May the Lords even agreed to instructions to Mr.
Ueldon to inform the Scots, among other things, that
71
parliamentary commissioners were on their way. Yet it still
72
took another conference and a further thirteen days before 
the Lords appointed a commissioner. This month's delay is a 
measure of the degree to which the Lords were opposed to
67. C.J.'; iii, 66.
68. ibid., 109-10; L.J.. vi, 69-70.
69. For example, messages went to the Lords on 5 May (C.J.«
iii, 72; L.J., vi, 32), but there was no reply. There 
were also messages on 11 and 13 May about expediting a 
narrative of the recent treaty with Charles to be sent 
to the Scots: L.J.« vi, li-2 , Ml.
70. See his letters of 1 and 6 May from Leeds, as reported 
by D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 164, f. 118A-5.
71. L. J., vi. 1+9; C . J ., iii, 90.
72. 20 May 15^3. The Commons resolved on 19 May to seek a 
further conference: C.J., iii, 92. On Saturday 20 May 
the Lords resolved to vote on the Tuesday following 
whether commissioners should go to Scotland: L.J., vi, 
55-6. Presumably the conference preceded this second 
vote.
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extending the alliance with the Scots. And when the Lords 
did yield, it was thought they had done so not out of 
genuine agreement with the Commons, but becau.se they feared 
the Commons would proceed without them in this and all other
73business.
The Commons might threaten to go on without the 
Lords, but that step was one for which the lower House, as 
yet, was not prepared. So while the Military Party was leading 
the Commons and v/as eager to forward the request to the 
Scots, they had patiently to bear v/ith the resistance of the 
Lords. The unwillingness of the Lords and the Peace Party in 
the Commons had forced the Military Party in November l6*+2 
to postpone making a request to the Scots. Now, in June 
161+3, when the Scots we re waiting for Parliament's 
commissioners, the Military Party v/as obliged to suffer 
further delay.
It is difficult to tell what v/as behind the 
backwardness of the Lords. Were they simply resisting the 
dictatorial Commoners? V/as it a longing for peace? Was it 
an intense dislike of the Scots? Or a question of honour?
Was it all these? Whatever the Lords thought of the Scots 
themselves, there is much in addition to suggest that 
their hostility to an alliance v/as connected with their 
desire for a negotiated peace. On 23 May the Lords received 
a message from Charles which seemed to hold out the hope of 
further negotiation. Yet even when the royal messenger,
7^. cTs. P. V., xxvi, 277-
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Plot, the Lords remained unmoved. Though the Waller Plot
had unmasked the fraud in the royal peace offering, still
the Lords did not budge in their preference for negotiation,
and in their refusal to call in the Scots. Moreover, the
Military Party well appreciated just how chary the Peers
were. Though the Lords had appointed finally a commissioner
on 30 May* and though the Waller Plot was exposed publicly
on the thirty-first, the Commons did not bother to send
again to the Lords about the Scottish business until 9 June.
The Military Party seemed to be relaxing its pressure on the
Lords, even though the recent plot had provided an opportunity
to exert more. When the Commons did send again to the Peers
they only desired that the Lords name another commissioner
7k
to match the extra two appointed by the Commons. There 
was nothing significant in this, nothing to commit the 
Lords further. It was a mere administrative detail. The
75following day the message was reiterated by conference.
But the Lords were dogged, and they gave no reply. By 16
June the Commons was getting agitated. Sir Henry Mildmay (a
frequent messenger in this business) went again to the
Lords requesting that they consider that, as the time for
sending the commissioners had long passed, they would
76
appoint that day another Lord. The Peers replied that
77
they would send an answer by their own messenger — a 
parliamentary way of saying they might send him, and when
7h. C.J.,"iii, 121 .
75. ibid. , 12*t.
76. ibid., 1315 L.J... vi, 97.
77. C.J,, iii, 131.
Alexander Hampden, was discovered a party to the Waller
1 9 0
they did, it would be in their own good time. The following
day the Commons sent another message. This time the Lords
gave the obstreperous reply that they would appoint an 
78 79
Earl. In fact they did not name him until 11 July.
Apparently not even disaster would shift the Lords. 
On 18 June Rupert routed a parliamentary force of cavalry on
Chalgrove field, where John Hampden received his fatal
80
wound. On the nineteenth the Antrim plot to invade
81
Scotland v/as known in London; and on the twentieth Charles
declared that Parliament v/as no longer free. According to
D'Ewes, the news of Antrim's plans
did more worke upon most men then anything that 
had happened during these miserable calamities 
and civill warres...because it seemed now that 
their was a fixed resolution in the popish party 
utterly to extirpate the true Protestant religion 
in England, Scotland and Ireland.82
Presumably he did not include the Lords in this. On the same
day that the Antrim plot was discussed in the Commons (27
July) the Lords agreed to another declaration to the Scots
83
excusing Parliament's failure so far to send commissioners.
A commitment someday to send commissioners to Scotland was 
the best the Commons could extract from the Lords even in 
this moment of drama.
This latest declaration to the Scots epitomised
78. ibidVT 132; L.J., vi« 97.79. ibid. , 128; 'C'.'<I., iii, 162. They appointed the Earl of 
Rutland.
80. Pie died on 2b June l6*+3-
81. Certain Informations.no. 22, 12-19 June 16^3? 173.
82. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 16^, f. 1199.
83. C.J.„ iii, 1^6; L.J.« vi, 111.
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towards the Scots laboured on account of the Lords. Though
it had been clear for some time that the Military Party
wished for the succour of Scottish arms, yet even at this
late hour of deepening crisis Parliament was unable directly
to make the request. Although this declaration was
accompanied by that of November l6*+2— perhaps by way of
providing a very broad hint— the most Parliament actually
asked for in the new declaration was that the Scots
consider what aid they could give Parliament in suppressing
8 l f-
its enemies in England. The Military Party was straining 
for a Scottish army, the need for which the Lords was
refusing to admit.
This stubborn resistance by the Lords was not 
limited to the Scottish issue alone. It was manifest in 
other areas of disagreement, and, in particular, was 
reinforced by a dispute over the proposed ne\7 Great Seal 
which occurred about this time. Cn 15 May the Commons 
decided, after what Whiteacre described as 'a very Long &
35
Solemn Debate', that a new Great Seal should be made 'to
attend the Parliament, for the Dispatch of the Affairs of
86
the Parliament and the Kingdom. 1
Since the Lord Keeper Littleton had spirited away 
the Great Seal to York in May 16*4-2, Parliament was deprived
81:. ibid.7 1 1 2-1 3.
85. '..Tiitoacre, B.M. Add. MSS. 31,116, f. 50.
86. C.J., iii, 86.
the restraint under which the Military Party's policy
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of the authority which that Seal might have lent to their 
ordinances and commands. Instead, the seal of royal 
authority was now endorsing the acts of 'Papists' and 
'Malignants'. Hot surprisingly, the more conservative rebels 
opposed the idea of a new Great Seal from the time it was 
first mooted. It seemed to them an attempt to dethrone the 
King on whose behalf they were fighting, a grab for 
sovereign power itself which they ought only to be defending 
against the wiles of evil counsellors. As Maynard said in a 
speech against the proposal: 'it was all one as to desire 
another King: because the K did not sneak but by his Grt.
87Seale...' It was a very serious business. When the Commons
finally voted on the question (15 May) it was the Peace
88
Party which led the opposition.
The issue of the Great Seal wras closely connected 
v/ith the proposed alliance v/ith the Covenanters. To make an 
alliance v/as an act of sovereignty; and for Parliament to 
make one without the King v/as to deprive him of that same 
authority which Parliament claimed to defend. In order to 
make the proposed pact v/ith the Scots legal and binding, the 
Military Party required the stamp of the Great Seal, or at 
least some pseudo-Seal, to lend the alliance the semblance 
of legality. Altogether it looked as if some new principle 
of authority v/as being formulated. Of course there was none-- 
it m s  the dilemma of a conservative rebellion. However, the
'&7. Whiteacre, B.M. Add. MSS. 31,116, f. h?v.
88. When the question of the Great Seal v/as put the House 
divided. The vote v/as: Yeas (Clotworthy and Goodwin),
86; Hoes (Holies and Evelyn), 7*+.
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irrepressible Henry Marten was bold enough to suggest one.
On 1 May, when the Commons was debating a request to the
Lords to join the lower House in sending emissaries to
Scotland and Holland, Marten proposed that Parliament could
not send ambassadors !in the condition wee weere now in: but
that wee should give our selves power to send as from
ourselves, & to declare publiclie that we will take the
people into our protection. . . 1 He made, in effect, a
revolutionary proposal that Parliament assume the sovereignty
which such a sovereign act required. The idea was anathema
to the Commons, and, as D'Ewes observed, Marten was even
'slighted by Pym himself & other violent spirits as tending
89to the utter subversion of this Monarchic.' Marten, 
however, had emphasised the serious implications of making 
an alliance with the Scots. The twin problems of the Scottish 
alliance and the new Great Seal provided reasonable grounds 
for the more fearful members to believe that continued 
military struggle could send the Parliament hurtling toward 
revolution.
In these circumstances, the Lords, who certainly
were no revolutionaries, furiously resisted the Commons on
the issue of the Great Seal. On 19 May the Commons requested
90
the Peers to agree to the making of a new Seal. After a
week the Lords voted unequivocally to reject the Commons'
91proposal. Moreover, the Commons were not able to elicit 
an answer from the Lords for another fortnight; but when it
897 D 'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. f. 1181.
90. C .J ., iii, 92: L.J., vi, 55»
91. C.J., iii, 127.
Realising that the Lords were adamant, the Commons let the
issue drop for a month. Then the Ling's declaration (20
June) that Parliament was unfree renewed the efforts of the
lower House, which sent again to the Lords on 27 June to
93agree to the new Seal. A week later the Lords reulied
* 9bthat they would adhere to their former resolutions. The 
Peers seemed unshakeable. Confronted with such opposition, 
the Commons dropped the matter until October when the Lords, 
weakened by desertions to the King, had accepted the Solemn
95
League and Covenant. Since by making a treaty with 
Scotland Parliament, in effect, had assumed de facto 
sovereignty, there was no longer left much reason to object 
to the new Great Seal. However, during those months from 
May to July, when the Lords were still resisting the Military 
Party over the Scottish alliance, they opposed also over the 
Groat Seal; nob only because it was an extreme policy which 
threatened to convert the parliamentary cau.se into a 
revolutionary one, but also because the problem of the Great 
Seal stressed that the proposed alliance with the Scots 
assailed the royal sovereignty in a manner nearly as 
revolutionary.
T./hat v/as it, then, that the Lords wanted, if the 
parlous state of the Parliament's cause did not persuade 
them of the necessity for Scottish military assistance? If
92. ibid. , 130; L.J,, vi, 96.
93. ibid. , 111-12; C.J., iii, 1*+6.
9>i. L.J. , vi , 119.
95* The Lords agreed to the proposal for a new Great Seal 
on 11 October: ibid., 253; C. J ., iii, 275.
19b
92
did come it was as unequivocal as the former vote.
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the crisis of Parliament's predicament v/as not teaching the 
Lords the need for arms, it v/as teaching them the need for 
peace. Historians traditionally argue that Parliament at 
last resolved to call upon Scottish aid only upon the verge 
of defeat. This is too simple a view of affairs. The 
Military Party had decided on an appeal to the Scots soon 
after Edgehill, because they believed firmly that the Scots 
held a key to Parliament's victory. As for the rest of 
Parliament, they did not share this conviction; rather, 
the plots and defeats of 16^3 were driving them in a 
different direction, towards peace. The trail of disasters 
from Adwalton Moor to the fall of Bristol did not induce 
the Peace Party to call in the Scots. It convinced them, 
instead, of the necessity for negotiation. The Peace Party 
accepted the inevitable alternative of a Scottish army 
only after the Military Party (aware that Parliament v/as in 
too weak a condition to negotiate favourable terms, and 
believing that even the Peace Party's proposals would be 
unacceptable to the King) had deprived the Peace Party in 
August 16^3 °f the option of negotiation. Even in 
Parliament's darkest hour the Peace Party struggled against 
the advent of the Scots because it represented a permanent 
commitment to a military solution which so far had brought 
Parliament nearly to ruin.
Adwalton Moor was fought on 3° June l6lf3* News of
the Hothams* attempt to deliver Hull to the Queen v/as
96
reported in Parliament on 3 July? and by the sixth the 
96. D'Svres, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1121v ff.
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defeat of the Fairfaxes was being published abroad in
97
London. It was on the fifth that the Commons renewed the
Military Party's resolution
That the Scots be forthwith desired to send 
in Aid and Assistance for the Preservation and 
Maintenance of the Pieligion and Liberties of the 
Kingdom; and that the Lords concurrence be 
desired herein...98
The Lords were to be pressed at a conference to nominate
their committee for Scotland and to appoint immediately a
day for their departure. Instructions were to be prepared
99
in haste. At the conference the Commons emphasised to the
Lords the extreme danger of the times. They read a letter
describing the defeat of Fairfax, and a narrative of an
1 0 0
attempt to blow up the magazine at Lincoln. Reeling under
the shock, the Lords yielded, directly voted their agreement
v/ith the resolutions of the Commons, and resolved that
their committee for Scotland should set out on 12 July, or
10 1
sooner. But were the Lords really reconciled to calling 
in the Scots? Their actions during the next month suggest 
the contrary. Under pressure of defeat the Peace Party in 
both Lords and Commons was rejuvenated, and it attempted to 
pre-empt the proposed talks with the Scots by renev/ed 
negotiations with Charles.
Inspiration for a new peace endeavour came from a
97* The Parliament Scout« no. 2, 29 June-6 July 16^ +3, 1V-15*
98. C^J-j iii, 15Zl
99. ibid.
100. L.J., vi, 121.
101. ibid., 122. Actually, instructions for the committee 
v/ere not delivered from the Commons until 13 July
(C .J., iii, 165), and not finally agreed to by the 
Lords until 15 July, when the Lords also resolved 
that the committees should set out on 20 July.
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powerful quarter: the Earl of Essex, Lord General of the 
parliamentary armies. Although various parliamentary
commanders— like Fairfax and Sir William Brereton — had 
been urging Parliament to bring in the Scots, the Lord 
General did not appear to agree. In his famous letter of 9 
July to the Speaker of the Commons, in which he recommended 
to Parliament his solution to the civil war, he supplied no 
place for the Scots. The alternatives were either 
negotiation or a trial by battle between royalist and 
parliamentary armies. There was no room in this romantic
the settlement of the civil war in simply English terms. 
Apart from anything else, he was a man very jealous of his 
honour. He was especially determined that his authority and 
dignity as Lord General should not be diminished by the 
multiplication of armies. He was presently engaged in an 
acrimonious dispute with Waller, whose increasing popularity 
and relative success threatened Essex's position. No doubt 
he regarded the prospect of a Scottish alliance similarly—  
as a reflection on his competence and vigour.
an appeal for help, many Peers agreed with Essex's call for 
negotiations and his implicit exclusion of the Scots from 
English affairs. They had been in contact with the Earl and
102. Some of Sir William Brereton's letters to this effect 
were intercepted by the royalists and were reported in 
'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 27, 2-9 July 16^ +3, 3?8-9, 
Newsbooks, I. Oxford Royalist. 371-86.
103. The Earle of Essex, His Letter to Master Speaker,
T  ^ ~ J ^ 1, 1643; D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS.
102
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scheme for Scotland. It is not surprising that Essex saw
Although the Lords had voted to send to Scotland
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Commons. These Lords moved that peace propositions be sent
to the King; but the House rejected the proposal by nine
10lf
votes to seven. However, the vote showed that the House 
of Lords was by no means firmly committed to a Scottish 
alliance. Four days later, on Saturday 15 July, the Lords 
acted to cross the intentions of the Military Party. In the 
instructions to the English commissioners to Scotland was an 
article which bound the English never to make peace with 
the King without the consent of the Scots. The Lords had no 
intention to allow the proposed alliance to interfere with 
possible peace negotiations, so they amended the
105
instruction accordingly.
If one accepts the traditional interpretation 
that Parliament’s call for Scottish aid was made in response 
to military disaster one might suppose that another defeat 
would have been sufficient to cast out the last inhibitions 
of the Peace Party, and particularly of the Lords, against 
a Scottish alliance. Exactly the opposite happened. Rather 
than hasten their embassy to Scotland, the Peace Party 
turned about and sought to beg the King for peace. The 
decision to send committees to Scotland did not represent a 
strengthening of parliamentary will to resist the royal 
power.
Certainly there were a few members of Parliament,
had received a letter from him similar to that sent the
10^. ibid7« f. 1230.
105. ibid. , f. 1231.
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whose names have not reached us, who seemed to have little
confidence in Parliament's resolution for tougher policies.
Despite the fact that the Lords had voted to send a committee
into Scotland and had agreed on instructions for them, there
were some who still did not think that defeat would force
the Peace P a r t y  to embrace the war policy. They knew how
reluctantly the Lords had made this decision, and feared
that further bad news would unfix their resolution. And on
13 July the worst did happen. Caught between Hoptonfs army
in Devizes and Wilmot's relieving cavalry upon Houndway
Down, Sir William Waller was routed. His baggage and ordnance
were taken and his infantry cut down. D'Ewes' diary indicates
that there were many members who feared what the effect of
this news upon Parliament might be. He recorded that he knew
of many men who were carrying about letters in their pockets
from Bristol and Shaftesbury relating Waller's defeat. Yet,
even as late as 17 July, the matter was ignored in the
1 0 6
Commons, which fell instead upon 'ordinary business'.
Clearly there were men at Westminster who believed that 
Parliament's cause could not be advanced unless Parliament 
pretended that Roundway Down had not happened.
Pretences, however, were not going to save the
policy of the Military Party. In the Lords there were signs
that the war policy was coming unstuck. The Lord Grey of
Wark was sent to the Tower for refusing the order of his
1 0  7
House to go into Scotland; and on the following day (18
106.' ibidT. f. 1232.
107. L.J., vi, 1 3h-*
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July) the Lords informed the Commons that their committee
for Scotland should leave without the Lords as Grey was in
the Tower and Rutland was too ill to go. They promised to
appoint another Lord in the place of Grey and to send their
1 0 8
committee as soon as possible. In fact the Lords did not 
appoint another peer, and their committee never set out.
Despite the protests on behalf of their health,
Grey and Rutland were suspected of hostility to the Scots
alliance. To outsiders there appeared to prevail in
Parliament not only a thirst for peace, but a dislike of the
Scots as foreigners, involved in this reluctance to align
with Scotland. According to Clarendon, the request for
Scots' aid was considered such a desperate measure that
...the Lords naming the earl of Rutland and Lord 
Grey of Warke for that ambassy, the earl upon 
indisposition of health procured a release, and the 
other, who never declined any employment they would 
confer on him, so peremptorily refused to meddle in 
it that he was committed to the Tower, and in the 
end they were compelled only to depute commoners to 
that service...upon which they who sent them were 
so far from being confident, and so little satisfied 
that they should be driven to bring in foreign 
forces...that there was, (some few desperate persons 
only excepted) even a universal desire of peace. . . 109
105. C. J .', iii, 17^ -; L.J., vi, 13&.
109. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, vii, 135* According 
to Mercurius Aulicus, the Scots alliance was of 'so 
odious and base a nature, that the Lords who were 
designed for the same imployment, viz the Earle of 
Rutland and the Lord Grey of Warke, resolving to 
decline the infamy and dishonour of it, pretended only 
a regard for their bodily health which might have been 
endangered by so long a voyage. But now the Lord Grey 
doth not sticke to say, that he deserted the imployment 
for no other reason, but because he could not have it 
stand upon record to succeeding ages, that he had a hand 
in so foule a business, as to bring in a foreign Nation 
to invade his Country.' See 'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 3*+? 
20-26 August 16V3> w +-5* Ilewsbooks, I, Oxford Royalist,
i, V79-9*+* Agostini, the Venetian Secretary, reported
2 01
It vas this widespread yearning for peace that the
Military Party set out to stem. Both the twenty-first and
the twenty-sixth of July were fast days; and on both days
the preachers turned on fierce sermons propounding the
necessity for the most ruthless measures. Thomas Hill
throughout his sermon of 21 July developed the theme that
the 'Church shall not be delivered from the servitude of
Egypt* but by violence and force, and with the bloudy 
110
sword.' Five days later Sidrach Simpson maintained that 
the disasters had not deprived Parliament of ultimate 
victory:
You have many ways before you for our safety, as 
the speedy execution of justice on offenders...the 
vigorous prosecution of the war; the taking hold 
of all advantageous opportunities. . . 1 1 1
These militant sermons were designed to stir up spirits that
were flagging. But the attempt to galvanize the waning
parliamentary cause only served to provide evidence that
Parliament was deeply divided on the issues of war and
peace; and over whether the Scots should be called or not.
Even in Scotland, where now men were anxious to 
take Parliament's side, the Covenanters grieved that so many 
parliamentarians were hostile to them and feared the supposed
that some of the English commissioners to the Scots 
'have cried off under various pretexts, either because 
of the difficulties they foresee or because they see 
some advantage on the side of the king.' C .S.P.V.. 
xxvi. 306.
110. See the 'Epistle Dedicatory' to his sermon 'The 
Militant Church Triumphant over the Dragon and His 
Angels', Fast Sermons, vii, 228-65#
111. See the epistle to his sermon, 'Reformation's 
Preservation', Fast Sermons, vii, 359-9^-.
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in wonder at the delay of Parliament's commissioners:
Yet the most thought the greatest cause of their 
irresolution to flow from division. The House of 
Lords was said to be opposite to the Commons 
conclusion of craveying our help. Their fear if 
they did begin to employ strangers, that hereby 
the King should be excused to fetch in Irish,
French and Danes; their foresight of 
impossibilitie to get our armie maintained, and 
most of all, the constancie of most of them to 
doe the Queen better service at London than they 
had been able to do at Oxford or York, made them 
peremptorilie resolve to send no commissioners to 
us at all. It had been a pitie matters had been so 
carried, for I saw in all our nation at this time, 
a very good will to the Parliament's cause...bot 
this unexpected neglect of the Parliament hes made 
other thoughts begin to arise in the hearts of 
manie; yet what the event shall be, I know not.112
And in the postscript to this letter Baillie further observed:
The jealousie the English have of our nation, much 
beside all reason, is not well taken. Alwayes the 
report of Fairfax's defeat has been a spurr at 
last to that Parliament, much as it is thought 
against the stomackes of many, to send message on 
message to us of their Commissioners...Their 
slowness in all their affaires is marvellous. 113
To Baillie it was clear that the ultimate conclusion of the
war policy— alliance with the Scots— was highly unsatisfactory
to many parliamentarians. It was apparent, too, in Scotland
that men at Westminster did not relish the thought of Scots'
arms, not only because they were Scots' arms, but also
because the alliance would be costly and more likely to
confirm than finish the war. The sentiments of the Peace
Farty as propounded by D'Ewes were well understood in
Scotland. To take up arms in self-defence was a measure
drastic enough for men who wanted peace; but to declare war
disadvantages of Scottish help. Baillie wrote on 26 July,
112. Baillie.» ii, 79-80.
1 1 3. ibid., 80-1 .
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on the King with the help of an ally, mistrusted and 
resented, was unthinkable. War v/as not driving the 
Parliament into the arms of the Scots. As the delay of the 
commissioners to Scotland shov/ed, the bent of the Lords was 
for peace. They recently had attempted to make a peaceful 
address to the King, and had nearly succeeded. Another 
military disaster v/as not going to assist the plans of the 
Military Party, but hinder them. Another defeat in fact 
produced a revolt in both Houses against the policy of the 
Military Party, and with it the Scottish alliance.
On 26 July 16^ +3 Prince Rupert captured Bristol.
It was the same day that the commissioners from the Commons
11*f
set out for Scotland. However, the Lords and the Peace 
Party in the Commons did not intend that they should be 
committed to war by this departure. As the parliamentary 
cause was crumbling about them, the members of the Peace 
Party could not but doubt the efficacy of the war policy, 
and seek once more the solution in peace. It v/as 31 July
115when the Houses received nev/s of the surrender of Bristol;
and on 2 August the Lords appointed a committee to consider
116
propositions to the King. The committee reported its
117
propositions on the fourth, and they were accepted.
T P n  'Mercurius Aulicus', no. 31? 30 July-5 August, M O ,
Newsbooks, 1% Oxford Royalist* i, ^31-^6. According to 
the Commons' Journal the commissioners were to set out 
on 27 July: C .J ., iii, 1 71*.
115» Clarendon, History of the Rebellion« vii, 165*
116• The Earls Northumberland, Holland, Pembroke, Bedford, 
Sarum and Lord Viscount Saye and Seal were the 
committee: L.J ., vi, 163#
1 1 7 . ibid., 1 7 1.
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the Military Party— Denis Bond and Cornelius Holland chief
among them— moved that the House refuse to confer with the
Lords about the peace proposal. But they were strongly
opposed by the Peace Party, so that after a long debate the
118
House resolved to meet the Lords at 9*00 a.m. on 5 August.
It was the same day that the English commissioners arrived 
at Leith. But while Parliament's embassy was preparing to 
negotiate war, voices at Westminster clearly cried for peace. 
For instance, Benjamin Rudyard opposed the radicals in plain 
terms:
when we were first drawen to undertake this warre, 
we weere told that wee should neither want men nor 
money, but now we saw to what a passe we weere 
growen; & that we wanted not bloud.119
The next day the hope of peace was registered in votes and
victory for the Peace Party. The Scots alliance took a
battering. There was a desire to take refuge not in the
Scots, but in peace.
On the fifth, when the peace propositions were
reported in the Commons, one of the chief objections of the
Military Party was
that we had lately sent to the Scots to come in & 
assist us and therefore we should abuse them in 
making a Treaty without first acquainting of them 
with it . 120
This argument was opposed by many, including D'Ewes. He said 
that the claim did not hold. He called upon men to consider
In the Commons some of the 'violent spirits' of
118. D'Ewes. B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f- 12*tOv-12»f1.
119. ibid.
120. ibid., f. 12^3v.
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how farre wee have engaged ourselves to the Scotts 
but onlie to satisfie them for their expenses & 
service: wch doubtless we will be better able to 
satisfie them now & make them greater gainers then 
if we proceed v/ith the warre, & make ourselves 
less able to recompense them. 121
It is clear the Peace Party wanted nothing to do with the
Scots if alliance with them was going to bind them to war.
There was no doubt in their minds that if the Military Party
won on this issue, then Parliament would be committed to a
war that the Peace Party did not wish to fight. When it came
to the vote whether the House consider the propositions
further, the Peace Party won. The vote went against the war
1 2 2
policy and the Scots alliance 9^/65*
Monday 7 August saw the decision reversed, but 
narrowly. On the sixth the Military Party stirred up their 
city friends, and from pulpit and placard defamed the Peace 
Party. The 'well-affected* citizens were urged to besiege 
Parliament on Monday and oppose the passage of the
123
propositions. There was even supposed to be a plan to
seize the leaders of the Peace Party if they successfully
steered the propositions through Parliament that day. The
Earls of Northumberland and Holland, together v/ith Holies,
Pierrepont, Sir William Lewes, Sir John Evelyn, Grimston and
124
Maynard, were marked out for violence. As planned, the
1 2 1. ibid7, f. 1245v-1246.
122. ibid., f. 1247; C. J . * iii, 96.
123. D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1250v; Clarendon, 
History of the Rebellion, vii, 170. See also L.J .,
vi, 173, where it is recorded under 8 August that 
Richard Ward (minister), Samuel Pickering (clerk), 
and Thomas Underhill (stationer) were examined for 
printing and publishing bills urging people to come 
to Westminster on 7 August.
124. D *Ewes- B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1250v.
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The main reason he gave against the new propositions was
that Parliament had sent for the Scots. He argued, as it was
argued on Saturday, that Parliament could not enter
honourably into a treaty without first informing the Scots.
Again the Peace Party answered this argument, D'Ewes among
them. He stated clearly the priorities of the Peace Party
and their attitude to the Scots alliance. He argued that
Parliament should attempt to make peace before resolving on
war. This would save the Scots !much danger and hazard1. If
Parliament gained by negotiation what it had previously
fought for, it would not have departed from any of the
propositions sent to the Scots. Parliament, he argued, had
1 2 5
not committed itself to seeking first their consent. For
D'Ewes and the Peace Party, the Scots alliance and peace
negotiations were incompatible policies. And since they
preferred peace, they now refused to grant that they were
committed to the Scots. The Military Party, however, had
done their work well. The House came to the question whether
the propositions be considered in detail. This time the Iloes
1 2 6
carried it 88/81.
This was the last serious stand of the Peace 
Party before the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant. 
There was now no choice left for them but to accept the 
Scottish alliance. The Military Party had committed 
Parliament to war, so Parliament could not be without the
1 25. ibid.", f. 1252v-1253.
126. ibid., f. 1253; C.J., iii, 97.
mob arrived; while in the House Pym was foremost in attack.
2 0  7
It is important to remember, however, that
Parliament had not been driven by defeat to call for
Scotland's aid. This is too simple and inaccurate a view.
The Military Party had decided upon the Scottish alliance
as early as October l6*+2, when the parliamentary cause was
in good heart; and the Military Party continued to prod
Parliament in that direction until the Covenant was signed.
On the other hand, the Peace Farty from the time of Edgehill
preferred negotiation to war. VJhen negotiation collapsed the
Military Party was able to revive the proposal for a Scottish
alliance. However, the continuous success of royal forces
throughout the summer of 16J+3 ^i^ not assist the Military
Party to execute that policy. Contrary to the view normally
taken of these months, the collapse of Parliament's armies
rather persuaded men of the necessity for negotiation and
made them disinclined to protract the war by importing
foreign armies. So disagreeable was the idea of a Scots army
to the Peace Party that when negotiations for it were about
to begin an attempt was made to settle things by negotiation.
Parliament did not go to the Scots with a united conviction
of the need for an alliance. On Saturday 5 August more than
half the Commons was opposed to extending the war effort;
while on the seventh the peace proposals were rejected only
1 27
by dint of threat, and then only by seven votes.
aid of Scotland. The Military Party had won.
127. D'Ewes said that Sir Christopher Yelverton, Sir William 
Mailer and Mr. Jepson changed their votes from what 
they had been on Saturday 5 August to vote with the 
opponents of the peace proposals on the Monday. Several 
other members were deterred from coming to the House: 
D'Ewes, B.M. Harl. MSS. 165, f. 1253v.
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Technically, Parliament had chosen the war policy and the 
Scottish alliance. In reality it was deeply divided, and 
entered into the Scottish alliance with profound misgivings.
Conclusion
2 1 0
This thesis draws to its conclusion at the point 
at which historians usually begin seriously their treatment 
of Parliament's relations with the Scots, that is, with the 
formation of the Solemn League and Covenant. As I observed 
in the Introduction« historians, prior to discussing the 
Solemn League, usually content themselves with a sketch of 
English attitudes toward the Scots. They note that the 
reformers happily greeted the Scots in l6*+0, but that by 
16^3 it was not friendship so much as military circumstances 
which pushed Parliament into alliance with Scotland. All 
this is true as far as it goes. However, by filling in the 
history of parliamentary attitudes toward the Scots, as I 
have attempted to do in this essay, and by showing that 
Scottish policy was a divisive subject in Parliament from 
the first, we begin to appreciate that Parliament's problems 
with the Scots did not begin in late 16^3. Indeed, the 
differing attitudes toward the Scots had been an important 
item in the factional politics of Parliament for nearly 
three years before the Covenant. During that time Parliament 
had grappled continuously with the problem of its relations 
with the Scots and their part in the success, or failure, of 
the reforming cause. This long debate issued ultimately in 
the conclusion that, whatever the native regard of 
Englishmen for the Scots, their support was crucial for the 
parliamentary party. In a sense, the Solemn League and 
Covenant merely registered the triumph of this policy; the 
League was the natural culmination of a strategy upon which 
John Pym and his supporters had been operating since 
November 16^ +0, if not from even earlier.
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The debate concerning what part, if any, the 
Scots should play in the conflict between King and 
Parliament was, then, a debate over strategy. It was a 
strategic issue with such profound implications that it 
contributed markedly to creating and accentuating divisions 
within the parliamentary ranks. This issue gives us an 
insight into one of those curiosities of political life, 
especially of movements for reform, where procedural matters 
can develop into issues as important as those for which the 
reform was undertaken; or, to put it in other words, the 
very process of reforming, not just the content of reform 
itself, can make its own significant impression upon 
political conflict. For three years prior to the Solemn 
League and Covenant, Parliament had been disputing the role, 
if any, which should be allowed the Scots in the 
parliamentary reform of England; and the debate had 
contributed, firstly, to the dividing of royalists from 
rebels, and, later, to a sustained struggle between the 
peace and military factions of the rebel party itself.
As I suggested in the Introduction, the debate 
over the Scots had begun even before the Long Parliament 
met. At one extreme there were those who supported the 
King's policy toward Scotland; who were appalled-by the 
Treaty of Ripon; and who were eager to do battle with the 
Scots. At the other extreme were those who welcomed the 
Covenanters for giving England the chance to transform its 
spiritual and temporal government. But when the conflict 
appeared in Parliament itself, it did not begin as one
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between easily discernible groups of Court supporters and 
ardent reformers. When Parliament first met such clear 
divisions were not at all evident. In fact, there was a 
widespread feeling of relief that a prospect of change had 
darned; and many of the later prominent royalists, at this 
time, were supporters of reform. However, despite the general 
inclination for reform, one of the first divisive issues in 
Parliament was that one already being debated: that of the 
Scots.
Whereas some members wanted to exploit the presence 
of Scottish forces to assist the process of reform, there 
were men who thought it dishonourable to treat an invader 
as a friend. Even if a man was a reformer this did not 
exclude him from the ranks of those hostile to, or at least 
concerned about, the Scots. In many minds the Scots raised 
a question of honour; and this sense of aggrieved honour v/as 
something shared by men who later served the parliamentary 
side as well as by those who served the King. There were 
men, both future parliamentarians and future royalists, who 
were glad enough that the Scots had given them a Parliament, 
but who were not prepared to countenance the highest flights 
of pro-Scottish feeling. These men were ready to join the 
more vehement enemies of the Scots in attempts to secure 
the speedy evacuation of their army from England. This 
opposition to attempts at delaying the treaty conflicted 
with the plans of the active party to use the Scottish 
occupation as a means of exerting pressure on the King. It 
involved a large party both of future royalists and of
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future parliamentarians which was strong enough at times to 
exercise considerable influence in the House, and which even 
threatened briefly to topple the leadership of the foremost 
reformers. The existence of this anti-Scottish group is, I 
believe, of considerable importance. It indicates not just 
that there was a Court group which opposed the soft treatment 
the Scots were receiving, but, more importantly, that there 
were many reforming parliamentarians who believed that, 
however desirable was change, Parliament should not employ 
the Scottish occupation as a support to that policy. Tiro 
other features of the anti-Scottish group are also worthy 
of comment:
Firstly, it was led by men who later became 
prominent royalists: Digby, Capel, Hyde, Hopton, Culpepper 
and the Strangways. All these were moderate reformers during 
Parliament's early days, a fact emphasised by their 
attitudes to the Scottish question. They favoured reform, 
but were not prepared to prosecute it by what they saw as 
the dishonourable means of cultivating the Scots. They 
wished simply that the reform should proceed 
'constitutionally1, and should not be exacted from the King 
by the use of threat. It was not surprising, then, that the 
anti-Scottish group was able to attract the support of other 
cautious men who, like Sir John Holland and Sir Robert Pie, 
were later parliamentarians. It is not unworthy of comment 
that these two gentlemen supported the Peace Party which in 
l6*+3? by opposing the Scottish alliance, sought to restrain 
the more extreme reformers just as the anti-Scottish faction
had attempted to do in 1 6*+0-16LKl. The issue which troubled 
the opponents of the Scots in these early days was similar 
to that which troubled the Peace Party in 16Ii-2-16V3.
The second important feature of the anti-Scottish 
faction v/as that its hard core seemed to be made up of 
Straffordians. As I argued in Chapter II, the active party 
reasserted its threatened leadership in April and May of 
1 6M , and the treaty went forward for the moment, but under 
the auspices of that group. This reassertion of leadership 
reduced the strength of the anti-Scottish faction. However, 
clashes over the treaty were renewed, and there was further 
delay in concluding it. These events refined the anti- 
Scottish group so that its strength and character depended 
now upon its most reliable and most conservative supporters. 
Finally, the proceedings against the Earl of Strafford 
consolidated the core of the anti-Scottish party which, with 
the passage of the Attainder, became the embryo of the 
Court party. The Attainder had this effect because, to the 
satisfaction of some, it illustrated perfectly the same 
extremism that they already had seen at work in the attempt 
of the active party to wring concessions from the King with 
the help of the Scottish army. The Straffordians could with 
reason argue that these attempts to coerce the King and to 
despoil him of his chosen minister by such an unrelenting 
campaign was an unparliamentary proceeding which concealed 
an attack upon Monarchy itself. In these reactions to the 
Scots and to the Attainder we observe a gradual shift from 
a sensitivity to dishonour to a suspicion of treason. In men
21*+
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of conservative instincts such a development was natural—  
what after all is treason if not to dishonour the King? 
Before the Militia Bill and proposals to control the choice 
of Privy Counsellors, the Scottish issue, emphasised by the 
Attainder, had filled some men v/ith the fear that a 
constitutional revolution, more radical than they had 
contemplated, was under way. It was this belief that 
alienated the Straffordians from the reforming party.
However, as I have pointed out, the active party's 
attitude toward the Scots also underwent a change. By 
August 16*+1 the active party had become openly distrustful 
of the Scots, fearing that they might take the King's side 
against them. Yet, even though awakened to the Scots and 
increasingly sceptical about their reliability as allies, 
the active party did not change its view of the strategic 
and tactical importance of the Scots in the struggle between 
Crown and Parliament. On the contrary, as fear increased 
that the Scots might desert Parliament, so the active party's 
perception of their importance became more acute. Thus 
Parliament moved quickly to counter in Scotland any adverse 
interpretation of Parliament's conduct originating from 
Charles and his Court. Both in late 16V1, when Charles v/as 
in Scotland, and in l6*+2, when he had withdrawn from London, 
Parliament strove to check the influence of royalist 
propaganda in Scotland, and to keep the Scots at least 
benevolently neutral. The reformers' discovery that the 
Scots might prove a fickle people did not cause them to 
lose interest in the Covenanters, but rather increased
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Parliament's attention to Scottish affairs, which now 
appeared more important than formerly, when Scottish hostility 
to the Crown had been assumed.
This concern to strike up an understanding with 
the Scots was illustrated by the 16^ +1 -16^+2 negotiations to 
send a Scottish expeditionary force into Ulster against the 
rebels there. Uhat is important in this business is not so 
much that Parliament sought Scottish aid but, rather, the 
reason for seeking that aid. It was argued that the Scots 
were obliged, on account of the late treaty of pacification, 
to assist in preserving the peace of the Protestant Kingdoms 
against all enemies. This was: not just a statement that the 
Scots were a useful and convenient ally to have against the 
Irish rebels. Rather, it was an expression of general 
policy, directed at opponents of any Scottish connection by 
those who believed that the Scots had an important part to 
play not only in crushing this particular Irish threat, but 
in defending the Kingdoms against enemies in general. This 
was a statement of the strategic principle upon which the 
active party had been working since November l6*+0, and which 
it would continue to employ for some time to come.
I do not think that the House of Lords, which at 
this time expressed the most frankly anti-Scottish sentiments, 
ever accepted this strategic doctrine— not even later, when 
its numbers were depleted by the revolt against the King.
The discussions over the Scottish expeditionary force 
served to highlight the natural inclination of the leading
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reformers to look for support from Scotland, as well as to 
underline the natural reluctance which moved other members, 
especially in the Lords, to avoid entanglements with a 
people they did not trust. Later in l6*+2 the dwindling House 
of Lords joined with the Commons, likewise shrinking, in a 
campaign to keep the Scots at least favourable, if not 
openly allied, to Parliament. This does not present us with 
an interpretative difficulty: after all, keeping friendly 
with an old and suspect enemy is not the same as letting 
him loose with one's treasured possessions.
The Lords' open hostility to the Scots was revived 
again, however, in the period stretching from the battle of 
Edgehill to the Solemn League and Covenant, during which 
time a military alliance with the Covenanters was proposed. 
This time the Lords were not alone, but were supported by a 
strong Peace Farty in the Commons. The proposed military 
alliance raised again the issue which had been debated 
between the pro- and anti-Scots factions in 16^0-16Vl, as 
to how far Parliament should go in its attempts to defend 
and prosecute the policy of reform. Just as the anti-Scots 
faction in 16^ +0—16^ +1 opposed using the Scots to overawe the 
King, so in 16^2-16^3 the Lords' and Commons' Peace Party 
maintained that Parliament should not engage the military 
support of the Scots to crush the King in the field. The 
move to bring in another Scottish army seemed to them 
(particularly to the Lords) to contain a veiled attack upon 
Monarchy, just as the attempt to delay the treaty of 
pacification had seemed to do in 16^ -1. In the later period,
however, there were new factors which indicated to opponents 
of the alliance just how serious were the constitutional 
implications of an alliance v/ith the Scots. There were, in 
the first place, the theoretical implications of Parliament 
making an alliance without the King. Such an act seemed to 
be an assertion of parliamentary sovereignty, an act that 
v/as truly revolutionary. Secondly, there v/as a political 
issue# If Parliament called in the Scots it would seem to 
have abandoned completely the v/ay of negotiation for that of 
war# For the Lords and the Peace Party in the Commons this 
was just as serious a matter as the simply constitutional 
one. If Parliament chose the war policy, then not only would 
the King be driven finally to reject all possibility of 
negotiating an end to the conflict, but, more importantly, 
the resolution of the conflict in v/ar (by v/hich Parliament 
might force its v/ill upon the King) would involve such a 
severe blow to the royal prerogative that the authority of 
the Crown would be diminished, if not wholly destroyed. The 
problem envisaged by the anti-Scottish group in earlier days 
had been raised once more, though more dramatically. The 
Scottish problem seemed throughout to illustrate the 
predicament of rebels who detested the idea of revolution: 
how could they continue to defend their cause before a 
hostile king without undermining the authority of the 
monarchy they wished to preserve?
These grave implications of the pro-Scottish 
policy moved a majority of the Lords to continue to resist 
the Military Party even after the collapse of the Treaty of
219
Oxford, when it seemed the anti-Scottish sentiments of the 
Peace Party in the Commons had weakened. The Lords 
maintained their resistance for nearly four months until 
August, when, joined by the rejuvenated Peace Party of the 
Commons, a great effort was made to re-open negotiations 
with the King. As we know, this pacific policy narroi^ly 
failed to win the support of the Commons, and so 
negotiations with the Scots continued uninterrupted.
General historians seem to have glossed over this 
drawn-out clash over Scottish policy. Because in their 
accounts the Scots do not become significant until after 
the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant, the 
historians usually content themselves with observing that 
the pressure of war gradually and inevitably forced the 
Parliament into alliance with Scotland. But such a simple 
explanation prevents us from understanding not just that 
Scottish policy was a divisive issue, that that it was 
vitally important to the Long Parliament at war. If the 
problem the Military Party had to overcome in proposing the 
Scottish alliance had been nothing more than English dislike 
for the Scots, then the prospect of defeat would have 
removed that difficulty quickly. But this did not happen, 
because the difficulty was not just a matter of getting used 
to an unpleasant but necessary ally. The more defeat 
threatened, the more stubborn became opposition to the 
Scots alliance, because the apparently merely practical step 
of bringing in the Scots seemed to be, in fact, full of 
revolutionary constitutional consequences. As I have said,
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the clash between supporters and opponents of the proposed 
alliance mirrored that 'which had occurred between the pro- 
and anti-Scots groups in 16^0-1 6Vl over the role of the 
Scots in the attempt to reform England by parliamentary 
proceedings. Like these earlier debates, the later ones 
over the war and peace policies saw the transformation of 
strategic and tactical problems into a constitutional one.
What this thesis shows, then, is that the Scottish 
issue was a well-established and important one for three 
years before the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant. 
Parliament's Scottish problems did not begin with the 
Solemn League, but rather entered a new phase. Already the 
Scottish issue had been significant in developing the classic 
antagonisms of the time: between rebel and royalist; and 
between proponents of the peace and war policies. Already 
the Scottish question had raised some of the crucial issues 
and problems of the Puritan Revolution: on religious matters 
it had shown that Parliament was not prepared to accept a 
Presbyterian settlement of the English Church. It had 
revealed, most importantly, the seemingly insoluble 
difficulty of attempting reform of a revolutionary character 
within the conservative intellectual and constitutional 
restraints which the reform party refused to reject. The 
Scottish question highlighted these restraints and acted as 
a warning against revolution, causing men to turn aside from, 
or attempt to divert, the direction of the reforming party.
When Parliament began negotiating the Solemn League
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and Covenant, it had behind it a long experience of the 
troubles the Scottish question could bring. Hence 
Parliament's envoys, as we well know, attempted to avoid 
the avowedly religious character which the Scots wanted to 
give the treaty and make it, rather, a purely military 
alliance; and to limit the role of the Scots in England to 
that of mercenaries. After three years of debate and 
division, Parliament knew enough about the effect of 
Scottish issues upon its internal cohesion to wish to 
confine the activities of its would-be allies as much as 
possible. The Scots already had much vexed Parliament, and 
there was no reason to expect that in the future they would 
be any less troublesome. It was in this atmosphere that the 
Long Parliament negotiated with the Scots the Solemn League 
and Covenant.
Appendix I
The Articles of Cessation signed at Ripon 
26 October ^J+O
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1• That there be a Cessation of Arms both by Sea and Land 
from this present*
2. That all Acts of Hostility do henceforth cease.
3. That both Parties shall peaceably retain, during the 
Treaty^ whatsoever they possess at the time of the 
Cessation.
b. That all such Persons who live in any of his Majesty's 
Forts beyond the River Tees, shall not exempt their 
Lands which lie within the Counties of Northumberland 
and the Bishoprick from such Contribution, as shall be 
laid upon them for the Payment of the 850 1. a day.
5. That none of the King's Forces upon the other side of 
Tees, shall give any Impediment to such Contributions, 
as are already allowed for the Competency of the Scotch 
Army, and shall take no Victuals out of the Bounds, 
except that which the Inhabitants and Owners thereof 
shall bring voluntarily to them: And that any Restraint 
or Detention of Victuals, Cattle and Forage, which 
shall be made by the Scots within those Bounds for their 
better Maintenance, shall be no Breach.
6 . That no Recruits shall be brought unto either Army from 
the time of the Cessation, and during the Treaty.
7. That the Contribution of 850 1. a day, shall be only 
raised out of the Counties of Northumberland, and the 
Bishoprick, Town of Newcastle, Cumberland and 
Westmoreland; and that the not Payment thereof shall be 
no Breach of the Treaty; but the Counties and Town so 
failing, it shall be left to the Scotch Power to raise 
the same, but not to exceed the Sum agreed upon, unless 
it be for the Charges of driving to be set by the 
Commissioners of the Forage.
8 . That the River of Tees shall be the Bounds of both 
Armies, excepting always the T o m  and Castle of 
Stockton, and the Village of Eggscliffe: And that the 
Counties of Northumberland and the Bishoprick of Durham 
be the Limits, within the which the Scotish Army is to 
reside; saving always Liberty for them to send such 
Convoys, as shall be necessary for the gathering up only 
of the Contributions which shall be unpaid by the 
Counties of Westmoreland and Cumberland.
9. If any Persons commit any private Insolencies, it shall 
be no Breach of the Treaty, if (upon Complaint made by 
either Party) Reparation and Punishment be granted.
10. If Victuals be desired upon that Price which shall be 
agreed upon, and ready Money offered for the same, and 
refused; it shall be no Breach of the Cessation, to take 
such Victuals, paying such Price.
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11* No new Fortifications to be made during the Treaty, 
against either Party.
12. That the Subjects of both Kingdoms, may in their Trade 
and Commerce freely pass to and fro, without any Pass 
at all; but that it be particularly provided, that no 
Member of either Army shall pass without a formal Pass 






















The Eight Heads of Demands 
of the proposed Peace Treaty- 
presented to the Lords Commissioners by the Scots 
and reported to the House of Commons
17 December 16^ -0
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First, That his Majestie will be graciously pleased to 
command that the last Acts of Parliament may be 
published in his Highness Name, as our Sovereign Lord, 
with the Estates of Parliament convened by his 
Majesties Authority.
Secondly, That the Castle of Edinburgh, and other Strengths 
of the Kingdome of Scotland, may according to the 
first Foundation be furnished and used for our Defence 
and Security.
Thirdly, That our Countrymen in his Majesties Dominions' of 
England and Ireland may be freed from the Censure for 
Subscribing the Covenant, and be no more pressed with 
Oaths and Subscriptions unwarranted by our Law, and 
contrary to the National Oath and Covenant approved by 
his Majesty.
Fourthly, That the Common Incendiaries who have been the
authors of this Combustion in his Majesties Dominions, 
may receive their just Censure.
Fifthly, That our Ships and Goods, with all the Damages 
thereof, may be restored.
Sixthly, That the Wrongs, Losses and Charges, which all 
this time we have sustained, may be repaid.
Seventhly, That the Declaration made against us as Traytors 
may be recalled.
Eighthly, And in the End, by Advice and Consent of the
Estates of England convened in Parliament, his Majestie 
may be pleased to remove the Garrison from the Borders, 
and any impediment that may stop the Free Trade, and 
with their Advice to condescend to all Particulars 
that may Establish a Stable and well grounded Peace, 
for enjoying of our Religion and Liberty against all 
fears of Molestation and Undoing from Year to Year, or 
as our Adversaries shall take advantage.
/Nalson* i, 682/
Appendix III
S. R* -Gardiner's Treatment of Parliamentary 
Attitudes toward the Scots,
November 165+0-March 16*+1
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As I argued in Chapter I. by March of 16*+1
moderate and conservative members of Parliament had been
angered by the progress of the treaty to such a degree that
they threatened the leadership of the active party. S. R.
Gardiner observes this conflict, but mistakes its
significance. To his mind the really important event of the
first months of the Long Parliament v/as the debate on
episcopacy occasioned by the London Petition. Gardiner
interpreted this debate of 8 February 16**1 as the birth of
the parliamentary parties— as the first occasion upon which1
they opposed one another.
There is no doubt that this debate was significant, 
for it foreshadowed conflict over church government and 
divisions along civil war lines. However, there was another 
problem just as evident and about which the angriest debates 
were blazing already. There was no division over the 
commitment of the London Petition against episcopacy, but 
there was one over the two additional subsidies (Saturday 
20 February 16VI) which were proposed to meet Parliament's 
obligations towards the Scots. And if the great parties 
were facing one another on 8 February, then they were also 
in opposition on 22 January and 3 February over the 
'Brotherlie Assistance'. Gardiner notes the debate on the 
subsidies. He notes the hostility it manifested toward the 
Scots. But he thinks it was overshadowed by the 'momentous' 
debate of 8 February. He regards the issue of the subsidies
1. Gardiner, History of England, ix, 115*
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as almost an extension of the debate on episcopacy. He
observes that men prominent in debate for episcopacy also
argued for the subsidies. 'Naturally,* he comments, 'the2
episcopalians most disliked the Scots intervention. '
It is true that those vehement against the Scots 
often were ardent for the bishops. It is very likely that 
their fervour for one charged their hostility to the other. 
But opposition to the Scots, though related, v/as quite a 
separate issue from, and not merely an extension of, the 
other. The Scots were seen as obnoxious because they were 
Scots; dealings with them were hateful because England's 
honour v/as involved; the active party was suspect for 
yielding too readily to Scottish demands; and delay of 
moneys to the Scots v/as like a naked threat to the Crown. 
There was no mention in the anti-Scottish speeches of 
episcopal government; nor was there in the pro-Scottish 
utterances any indication of support for Presbyterianism.
The subject of the debates v/as v/hether honour or political 
considerations should govern Parliament's policy toward the 
Scots. Depending on the outcome of this debate was the 
reform policy as propounded by Pym and his supporters. By 
the beginning of March 16M the anti-Scottish group seemed 
to be having the better of the argument, and in so doing 
threatened both the leadership and the proposed reforms of 
the active party in the Commons.
2. ibid., 29k. It is significant that Gardiner gives his 
account of the debate on the extra subsidies in a chapter 
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